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In this thesis, I take a gender perspective to consider how Herodotus presents the rule of law 
in the Histories. Demaratus introduces Xerxes to the Spartan military nomos which compels 
men to ‘win or die’, making it an external despotic force to be feared more than the command 
of a tyrant. However, Herodotus as narrator observes that people have an internal attachment 
to their own rules, which include the regulation of gender performance and involve women as 
much as men. I show that, although most women were excluded from legal and political 
institutions, devalued by gender ideology, and prevented from exercising power, they were 
involved in the regulation of everyday life, which is a key aspect of the rule of law in the 
Histories. I adopt a socio-legal methodology to examine how women and men live with a 
variety of rules, political, religious and social, and adopt a range of strategies to do so.  
 
The rule of law is also a normative ideal which is used by Herodotus to interrogate power, in 
particular the nomos of tyranny. I use a range of case studies to show how a focus on gender 
helps us to think about abuse of power, excess and arbitrariness. For Herodotus, respect for 
nomos is necessary whatever one’s status and gender, and operates within a network of 
relationships, depends on the performance of appropriate roles and is contingent on 
reciprocity.  I argue that the rule of law is a powerful force in the Histories precisely because 
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I think Pindar was right to say in his poem that law is king of all 





In this thesis, I investigate Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law, and argue that he is 
committed, like Lord Reed, to the idea that society is governed by law. The rule of law is a 
fundamental principle in the Histories, which Herodotus uses as part of his historiē to 
evaluate, as well as describe, events and characters, to interrogate questions on justice, law 
and its role in a community, and to show that everyone, whether tyrant or slave, male or 
female, Greek or non-Greek, must live with the rules.  
 
I argue that the rule of law has three strands. It is an external coercive force which acts as a 
constraint on women, as well as other subaltern groups, by excluding them from legal and 
political institutions within which they have no agency or authority. However, the rule of law 
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 Lord Reed in R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51: [68]. 
2
 Herodotus, Histories. All references are to Herodotus’ Histories, except where reference is made to 
other texts where a full citation will be given. Translations are my own, made in consultation with the 
editions and translations listed in the bibliography.  
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also operates as an agent of social cohesion, identity and control within communities, in 
which women in the Histories feature prominently as actors, speakers and figures of authority 
as well as voiceless victims of male power. Finally, the rule of law in the Histories is a 
normative ideal which applies to everyone, whatever their gender or status. The unequal 
position of women, both institutionally and ideologically, means that men in power are often 
shown to underestimate female capacity to make judgments, to act rationally or strategically, 
or to influence events. As a consequence, they ignore the rules which regulate their 
relationships with women and suffer accordingly. The rule of law also operates in a world 
‘permeated by the divine’ in which the gods are believed to punish those who ignore limits 
which are implicit in the unwritten laws of the gods and of communities, who exercise power 




I take a novel approach in that I consider the rule of law in the Histories from a gender 
perspective. I argue that law is as much about the regulation of social and cultural life, which 
involves women as much as men, and is part of everyday life, as it is about institutional 
practices which exclude women and reinforce an ideology of female inferiority, and I show 
that Herodotus uses the principle of the rule of law to interrogate power. I propose a wider 
model of the rule of law than the one used by most modern scholars. I argue that, if we view 
the rule of law through the prism of gender, we can fully appreciate that it is a powerful force 
in the Histories precisely because it combines external coercive force (law as despot), internal 
rule of conduct (law as king) and normative ideal. 
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 Cairns 2019: 87-91(quotation). 
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In my introduction, therefore, I will review scholarship on the rule of law in ancient Greece, 
arguing that, in relation to Herodotus’ Histories, we can only make sense of gender in relation 
to law if we adopt a much wider definition of law than the one embedded in institutions such 
as the law court, in which adversarial litigation is the norm and which uses the speeches of the 
forensic orators in 4
th
 century BCE Athens as its source material, appropriate for a study of 
Athenian law. I use the theoretical model of law developed by H. L. A. Hart, and apply his 
argument, that rules have a social as well as a legal dimension, to my analysis. I also use the 
work of the legal realists, the model of legal pluralism, and feminist legal theory to argue for a 
definition of the rule of law which applies to everyday life as well as to formal institutions. 
Finally, I apply a sociological model to the question of how to ‘live with’ the rule of law, 
arguing that, for Herodotus, nomos is king precisely because it is multi-faceted. It acts as a 
restraint on those who think the rules do not apply to them, it also reflects law in action, 
where rules can be manipulated and played with as well as obeyed, and it encompasses the 
rules of everyday life, which women as well as men enforce, and which apply to the domestic 
as much as the public sphere, as well as the institutional rules which exclude them.  
 
I will also review scholarship on the topic of women in Herodotus, arguing that a gender 
rather than a female perspective is preferable, since Herodotus shows men as well as women 
having to perform prescribed gender roles, and being influenced by gender stereotypes which 
Herodotus shows are often misleading. I consider not only the content of gender norms but 
also how those norms are applied in practice. I argue that a polarity approach to gender, based 
on the binary opposition of men and women, does not reflect accurately the range of roles 
performed by both genders in the Histories, for example, in negotiating hierarchies within the 
royal oikos. I argue that Herodotus destabilises the binary opposition of male and female by 
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showing the disjuncture between the rhetoric of female inferiority and the agency and 
authority of some women in his wider narrative, by characterising men and women in a 
nuanced and complex way, and by showing men who do not live up to gender expectations, as 
well as women who defy those expectations. 
 
Herodotus shows gender to be a social construct, rather than an innate characteristic of men 
and women, by making the performance of gender a nomos which is changeable, can be 
deceptive and depends on the judgment of others, thereby conflicting with ideological 
constructs which posit the essential difference between male and female. Nevertheless, the 
binary opposition of male and female is a key signifier in the Histories of relationships of 
power, supported by an ideology in which the male/female divide is ‘outside human 
construction, part of the natural or divine order’.
4
 I will, therefore, address the tension 
between practice and ideology when considering relationships of power between men, and 
between women, as well as between men and women.
5
   
 
2. Scope and Evidence 
My subject matter is the rule of law and gender in Herodotus’ Histories and my focus is on 
how both women and men ‘live with the rules’. My approach, therefore, is a socio-legal one, 
analysing how Herodotus shows law embedded in its social and cultural context. I base this 
thesis on the text constructed by Herodotus; he is responsible for the narrative, 
characterisation of groups and individuals, and the speech he gives to some of them. I 
consider Xerxes, therefore, as a character in Herodotus’ text, not the historical figure. 
Similarly, the Amazons in the Histories, I will argue, are not intended by Herodotus to reflect 
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 Scott 1986: 1073. 
5
 Griffin 2018: 377. 
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the historical reality of a nomadic society in which women exercised power but to be a 
thought experiment on difference. In this thesis, I use ‘narrator’ in the narratological sense. 
Herodotus is the ‘representative of the author in the text’ who gives us an ‘external’ view of 
the nomoi he investigates, though he often relates the ‘internal’ view of his characters. He tells 
his story after the event, using prolepses to anticipate outcomes, he also displays his travels 
and his research and from time to time presents his own arguments and conclusions, as 
narrator.
6
   
 
I have chosen to focus on nomos because it is a recurrent theme in the Histories, and on two 
occasions it is described as a rule, firstly by Herodotus, as narrator, observing that law is king 
of all (νόμον πάντων βασιλέα, 3.38.4) secondly, in a speech given to Demaratus, who tells 
Xerxes that Spartan men are motivated to fight by law as master (δεσπότης νόμος, 7.104.4). 
Both examples engage with gender; in the first instance, the rules to which communities are 
attached are practised by both men and women, and prescribe appropriate performances of 
gender as well as other roles. In the second instance, the Spartan nomos is directed at the 
military male and, as I will show in chapter 5, is reinforced by an ideology of female 
inferiority which feminises the man who fails to live up to gender expectations, but also by 
social scrutiny and judgement, involving both genders. 
 
                                                          
6
 See de Jong 2001: xv for definition of narrator; 2013: 257-267; Baragwanath 2008: 33; 2012: 30. 
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3. The rule of law 
3.1 Law as master 
It was Amasis also who made the rule that every Egyptian declare his means of 
livelihood to the ruler of his district annually: failure to do so or to prove that one had 
a legitimate livelihood was punishable with death 
νόμον τε Αἰγυπτίοισι τόνδε Ἄμασις ἐστὶ ὁ καταστήσας, ἀποδεικνύναι ἔτεος ἑκάστου 
τῷ νομάρχῃ πάντα τινὰ Αἰγυπτίων ὅθεν βιοῦται: μὴ δὲ ποιεῦντα ταῦτα μηδὲ 
ἀποφαίνοντα δικαίην ζόην ἰθύνεσθαι θανάτῳ (2.177.2) 
 
Amasis’ nomos reflects the coercive aspect of law which is found in the legal command and 
sovereignty theories of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, who hold that a legal system is based 
on duty-imposing rules which create obligations though external pressure; one man is forced 
to do what another tells him.
7
 A lawgiver gives commands which prescribe or proscribe a 
series of acts or course of conduct, placing obligations on the citizen or subject, and imposing 
sanctions for disobedience. Harris refers to these theorists in his analysis of the rule of law in 
ancient Greece, the ideal of which, he argues, was ‘one of the most important Greek values’, 
and he sets out four key attributes of law, namely, that it is enforced by political authority, is 
                                                          
7
 Hobbes 2012: 820-1 in Leviathan (original publication 1651) writes ‘Law is the Commandment of 
that Man, or Assembly, which has sovereign authority in the commonwealth and who alone has the 
right to make laws and to punish those who break them’ and any other rules not prescribed by the 
sovereign are counsel or advice not law; Bentham 1970: 18-20 in Of Laws in General (original 
publication 1782) argues that law is from the sovereign to whose power the party in question is 
subject; Austin 2000: 13-17 in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (original publication 1832) 
writes that every law or rule is a command, binding/obliging the subject, imposing a duty to obey, with 
‘liability to evil’ (i.e. sanction), for disobedience or violation of duty. Hart 1961: 60 summarises 
Austin’s doctrine as ‘habitual obedience to orders backed by threats’. On Bentham and Austin, see 
Wacks 2005: 42-67 with bibliography. 
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Both Harris and Canevaro draw parallels between ancient and modern concepts of the rule of 
law. Canevaro argues that the rule of law in classical Athens, based on rules which defined 
the requirements for enacting law, a system of due process, that is a trial system, and the use 
of oaths and rhetorical commentaries to enforce and clarify the law, conformed to both 
ancient and modern concepts of the rule of law.
9
 Harris also considers that the Athenians had 
a similar concept of the rule of law to the one we have today (begging the question who ‘we’ 
are), namely that the law applies equally to all, all officials are accountable, all regulations are 
accessible, adjudicative procedures are fair, and there is no punishment without trial. 
However, he acknowledges that the lack of belief in universal human rights, the fact that 
captives in war had no rights, and the use of torture are all significant differences between an 
ancient and modern concept of the rule of law.
10
 In drawing parallels between the ancient and 
the modern concept of the rule of law, both scholars refer to the work of those whose focus is 
on the modern concept; Canevaro cites the work of Tamanaha, Harris quotes from Bingham’s 
book The Rule of Law.  
 
However, there is a significant problem of definition, as Tamanaha acknowledges. He regards 
the rule of law as ‘the preeminent legitimising political ideal in the world today’ and ‘a major 
achievement deserving of preservation and praise’ but also recognises that the tension 
between law as a restraint on democracy and law as a product of self-government, was one 
                                                          
8
 Harris 2004:1-8, 26, 48; 2013: 2-10 on rule of law in democratic Athens.  
9
 Canevaro 2017: 213-216.  
10




which existed in classical Athens and has continued throughout history.
11
 He also recognises 
the difference between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ definitions of the rule of law. A ‘thick’ definition in 
modern terms means a link to liberty and democracy, a commitment to human rights and a 
constraint of state power, whereas a ‘thin’ definition makes law the instrument of government 
and concentrates on the protection of individual rights, such as property, contract, privacy and 
autonomy, the efficient administration of justice and stable governance. The ‘thick’ definition 
can become contested in a legally pluralist world where global capitalism and liberal 
democratic norms clash with customary or religious norms or local methods of dispute 
resolution. The ‘thin’ definition, however, can be used by tyrants or can, for example, legalise 






Bingham ‘roundly rejects’ a ‘thin’ definition, since respect for human rights and good 
governance are ‘inseparably linked; the rule of law requires that the law afford adequate 
protection of fundamental human rights’.
13
 These fundamental human rights are to be found 
in the Human Rights Act 1998, incorporating the articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and include the prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labour, and no 
discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 





If we view the rule of law through the prism of gender, therefore, there is a huge gap between 
the modern ‘thick’ definition and the ancient concept. Harris has to concede that, in gender 
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 Tamanaha 2004: 4, 10. 
12
 Tamanaha 2004: 91-96; Tamanaha 2011: 1-17 on the rule of law and legal pluralism in development 
projects. 
13
 Bingham 2010: 67, 84. 
14
 Bingham 2010: 70-1, 80-1 on Articles 3, 4 and 14 of European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
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terms, Athenian women were not agents in court proceedings, having to rely on male relatives 
to bring law suits on their behalf.
15
 Legal and political rights were accorded to Athenian male 
citizens; there was no concept of fundamental human rights and non-discrimination between 
different groups, as the basis for the rule of law. As Livingstone points out, the underlying 
status quo in democratic Athens was gender-based and wealth-based inequality.
16
 This point 
is also well made by Osborne, who argues that the exclusion of women from the law courts 
was part of an ideology which explicitly discriminated against women to achieve 
homogeneity within the Athenian male citizen group, making the court an ‘arena for 
competition for a self-selecting elite, not a tribunal before which all have the right to 
appear’.
17
 I do not think it is sustainable, therefore, to import contemporary ‘thick’ definitions 
of ‘the rule of law’ into classical Athens, let alone the wider world of the Histories.  
 
Tamanaha, however, concludes that the ideology of the rule of law has a restraining influence 
on those in power, and the concept of the rule of law should be used as a restraint on 
government tyranny, prompting evaluative questions on necessary limits on government, the 
justice of laws, the good of the community.
18
 Bingham also regards the rule of law as an 
important bulwark against tyranny, noting that the European Convention on Human Rights 
was a response to the tyranny of Nazi Germany and Communist USSR.
19
 The arbitrary use of 
power, and the lack of restraint on the exercise of that power, as Bingham points out, leads to 
‘the midnight knock on the door, the sudden disappearance, the show trial, the subjection of 
prisoners to genetic experiments, the confession extracted by torture, the gulag and the 
                                                          
15
 Harris 2013: 6-7. See also Schaps 1979: 4-5, 17; Just 1989: 26-30; Todd 1993: 201. 
16
 Livingstone 2016: 62n.13. 
17
 Osborne 2010: 415-6. Stehle 1997: 117 - democratic ideology rejected women as representatives of 
the community, 
18
 Tamanaha 2004: 137-141. 
19
 Bingham 2010: 67. Harris 2004: 83-4 also makes this point. 
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A key question for Herodotus was the extent to which tyranny was compatible with the rule of 
law. Is the tyrant subject to any rules at all, or is all authority concentrated in him as monarch, 
with power to govern arbitrarily and without constraint? This is the accusation made by 
Otanes in the Constitutional debate, that a monarch subverts a country’s ancient rules, rapes 
women and kills men without trial (νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας κτείνει τε 
ἀκρίτους, 3.80.5). I will argue that Herodotus uses gender relations to think about power and 
excess, and to interrogate the extent to which the king is bound by reciprocal obligations. If 
all his subjects are slaves, what protection do they have? Is he the only source of legitimacy? 
Cambyses, for example, does consult an authority other than himself, the royal judges, but 
they, out of fear, tell him that he can ‘do what he wants’, thereby authorising him to act 
without constraint, as he does when he assaults his wife/sister, killing her and their unborn 
child (3.32). Sometimes, therefore, Herodotus highlights the importance of the rule of law by 
its absence, through the arbitrary and unchecked abuse of power by tyrants, often involving 
gender transgressions. 
  
One of the questions I will ask in this study, therefore, is what the rule of law meant to 
Herodotus, and I will argue that, as with modern definitions, it has both a ‘thick’ and a ‘thin’ 
aspect. The ‘thick’ concept of the rule of law in the Histories is linked, I argue, to recognising 
human limits and boundaries (to avoid divine sanction or punishment by the gods), and for 
this reason there are two aspects of Canevaro’s argument which I find helpful in thinking 
                                                          
20
 Bingham 2010: 9. 
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about the concept. Firstly, he opposes eunomia to hubris: eunomia is linked to order, rules of 
behaviour, proper dealings with others, including the gods, respect of one’s own and others’ 
rights and prerogatives, and knowing one’s place, whereas hubris means overstepping the 
mark, improper, disrespectful or dishonourable dealings with others, including the gods.
21
 
This is a much wider concept of the rule of law than one based on political institutions. It 
reflects the unwritten rules of family, community, and the gods, who are believed to intervene 
when power is exercised by those who think the rules do not apply to them and forget human 
limitations.  
 
Secondly, Canevaro argues that the rule of law was a normative ideal in the ancient Greek 
polis and that even tyrants had to show a law-abiding aspect, even if this was rhetoric rather 
than reality.
22
 It is an ideal which, I argue, Herodotus is committed to, and which he uses to 
assess, and distinguish between, those who exercise power, whether Greek or non-Greek. 
Whereas Cambyses uses legal precedent to ‘do what he wants’, Darius commits to a form of 
due process when dealing with Intaphrenes’ revolt, in that he interrogates all the co-
conspirators before imprisoning Intaphrenes and his male family (3.118).  
 
3.2 Hart’s model of law 
The Austinian model of law, as an order backed up by threats, has been criticised by another 
legal theorist, Hart, who argues that it does not reflect the variety of laws in society, or the 
infrastructure required to produce a fully functioning legal system. In addition, it does not 
acknowledge the ‘internal’ aspect of rules or the duties those rules impose on a sovereign as 
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 Canevaro 2017: 220 n.32. I use this wider definition of hubris in this study, rather than as a legal 
offence in classical Athens, as examined by Fisher 1990: 123-138. 
22
 Canevaro 2017: 222-231. 
12 
 
well as a subject.
23
 Hart recognises that the model of law as orders backed up by threats is to 
be found in criminal law, which creates rules which we have a duty to obey, and are punished 
for violating. The sanctions attached to breaches of the criminal law also have a social 
function in that they are intended to act as a form of deterrence.
24
 However, Hart argues that 
there is a category of law not based on orders backed up by threats. Some laws are power-
conferring, as well as duty-imposing, that is, they give rights as well as impose obligations, 
enabling those in the community to, for example, enter into contracts, negotiate marriages, 
make wills. In the Histories, a number of nomoi have a power-conferring as well as a coercive 
aspect; for example, a political agreement between 12 Egyptian kings is secured through 
marriage alliances, making nomos here a form of dispute resolution: 
[They made] it a rule of their kingship that none of them should try to depose any of 
the others or attempt to gain more territory than any of the others, but that they 
should be firm friends and allies. 
οὗτοι ἐπιγαμίας ποιησάμενοι ἐβασίλευον νόμοισι τοῖσιδε χρεώμενοι, μήτε καταιρέειν 
ἀλλήλους μήτε πλέον τι δίζησθαι ἔχειν τὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, εἶναί τε φίλους τὰ 
μάλιστα. (2.147.3) 
 
Secondly, Hart argues that any legal order has to have secondary rules, which provide 
certainty, flexibility and an efficient method of adjudication.
25
 The first of these secondary 
rules is the rule of recognition, ‘the foundational rule in a legal system which identifies the 
sources of law in that system and imposes a duty to give effect to laws emanating from those 
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 The rule of recognition has a wider application than modern liberal democracies, 
as commentators have noted; it can be practised by a population accepting the succession of a 
king.
27
 It creates a ‘system of reciprocal, legitimate expectations’, providing a rule which 
guides conduct and is the basis for criticising those who fail to comply.
28
 Hart’s next 
secondary rule empowers individuals and groups to change the rules, and his third secondary 
rule, of adjudication, gives individuals and groups the authority to decide disputes. These 
rules in combination, therefore, allow for identification, modification, and adjudication of the 
law, within an institutional framework.
29
 In chapter 1, I will explore the origin of nomos, the 
role of the lawgivers Solon, Lycurgus and Deioces in creating institutions, and, in chapter 2, I 
will consider the extent to which the exclusion of women from those institutions is significant 
to Herodotus’ analysis of the rule of law. 
 
Hart’s third criticism of Bentham and Austin is that they fail to recognise the force of those 
‘internal’ rules which threaten those who deviate from the norms of the group. Members of a 
community are expected to internalise these rules, which are associated with ‘normative’ 
language such as ‘ought’ and ‘must’; ‘violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the 
prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility’.
30
 Law imposes 
obligations on members of the community based on societal control, making nonconformity 
or deviance unacceptable. Rules have a social as well as a legal dimension, which require 
consideration of how those rules are perceived by community members and how normative 
behaviours are enforced.  
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Scholars of ancient law have identified this ‘internal’ aspect of law. Ostwald argues that the 
meaning of nomos goes further than Heinemann’s definition of ‘a rule which is valid for a 
particular group of people’.
31
 It has to be acknowledged and accepted, signifying ‘an order 
which is or ought to be generally regarded as valid and binding by members of the group in 
which it prevails’.
32
 An aspect of nomos, therefore, is belief, opinion, point of view and 
intellectual attitude.
33
 Nomos combines practice and ideology, defined by Missiou as ‘a 
relatively coherent system of beliefs and values, traditions and purposes, connecting the 
institutional networks of a given society with its emotional affinities’.
34
 In the Histories, we 
identify many cases where the sense of obligation is based on internal conviction not external 
pressure; the word nomos conveys belief and attachment. Herodotus’ position on the ‘internal’ 
aspect of nomos is set out in Book 3:  
If one were to command all peoples to choose the best rules in the world, each group 
would, after due consideration, choose its own; each group regards its own rules as 
being by far the best.  
εἰ γάρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελεύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ 
τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἑλοίατο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἑωυτῶν: οὕτω 
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The rule of law in this instance is an ‘internal’ rule which makes nomos king of all.
 36
 People 
are attached to their own rules, however strange or abhorrent they may seem to others, and 
people assert the superiority of their laws over those of other peoples. The Scythians, for 
example, reject others’ nomoi, punishing those who try to introduce them (4.76.1). The power 
of law is based on social control and communal pressure; these are the rules of the group, 
which must be internalised, they confer a sense of belonging, of collective identity. Munson is 
right, therefore to identify both the external and internalised aspect of nomos: ‘the cause of the 
‘must’ is the force of nomos ... the only important category of internal psychological motives 




What does ‘living with the rules’ mean in this context? In his work, Herodotus emphasises the 
diversity and variety of laws, and he shows that there are social, cultural and religious rules 
which are part of everyday life, and are enforced by communal pressure. In contrast to the 
battlefield, the law courts or the assembly, women are part of this community, which is bound 
together by ties of family, religion and shared rules.
38
 This ‘internal’ attachment to one’s own 
rules is an important aspect of the intersection between nomos and gender, because there is 
sometimes a disjuncture between what characters believe about female capacity and how 
women in practice perform gender roles and enforce the rules.  
 
                                                          
36
 Marincola 2006: 19; Asheri 2007: 44; Baragwanath 2015: 23; Thomas 2000: 125-6; Munson 2001b: 
67-72; Rood 2006: 298-300; Demont 2013: 37-45. 
37
 Munson 2001a: 43-44. 
38
 Just 1989: 23. Brock and Hodkinson 2000: 11. Osborne 2011:102-3; Blok 2013: 163-4; Zacharia 






However, it is important to acknowledge that this acceptance of rules is not absolute or 
unquestioned. Marmor criticises Hart’s theory of rules, whereby most people regularly act in 
accordance with the rule and manifest a normative attitude towards it, criticising deviant 
behaviour and exerting social pressure to enforce conformity, arguing that this does not 
explain why people follow the rule, nor how the rule arises. He argues that social conventions 
arise out of contest, where agreement cannot be reached. He contrasts the basic cooperative 
objective of ordinary conversations with the non-cooperative form of communication in a 
legal context, when people display strategic behaviours. Legal praxis, therefore, is like a 
game, which requires skill and tactics and is inherently competitive.
39
 He draws a distinction, 
therefore, between rules and strategy.
40
 I will develop this argument in this thesis, arguing that 
‘playing by the rules’ sometimes involves negotiating with power or authority; some do it 
better than others.  
 
Finally, Hart points out that even a penal statute may include duties on those who make the 
law as well as on others. I will explore this in greater detail when I consider how Herodotus 
shows the consequences for tyrants who do not ‘live with the rules’, which include the rules 
of the oikos. For now, I highlight one example of compulsion on Xerxes, when he is forced to 
accede to Amestris’ request: 
the rule compelled him (for at this royal banquet in Persia every request must of 
necessity be granted) 
ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐξεργόμενος, ὅτι ἀτυχῆσαι τὸν χρηίζοντα οὔ σφι δυνατόν ἐστι 
βασιληίου δείπνου προκειμένου (9.111.1) 
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To summarise, Hart’s model of law is one in which primary rules of obligation (to perform 
certain actions and desist from others) include those customary laws based on social control, 
and also require secondary rules which provide an authoritative version, allow for change and 
determine how a dispute is to be adjudicated and by whom.
41
 This model provides a useful 
tool for analysing nomoi in Herodotus because it reflects not only the external coercive aspect 
of law but also its function as an agent of social cohesion and control, having a role in 
constructing, but also at times contesting, social expectations, ideologies and institutional 
inequality. Moreover, it recognises the diversity of nomoi in the Histories and highlights 




Hart’s model, however, has its limitations for analysing the concept of the rule of law in the 
Histories because he had in mind institutional structures (a law-making body, an 
administration whose officials accept the rule of law, and a judiciary which is authorised to 
decide disputes) whose workings could be analysed. In the case of Miller, the Supreme Court 
had to make a decision on the rule of recognition: did authority rest with the executive or 
parliament to make the decision to trigger Article 50 to leave the European Union?
43
 
However, the institutional significance of both institutions was not in question. Similarly, 
Bingham’s definition of the rule of law, that ‘all persons and authorities within the state, 
whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly 
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In classical Athens, likewise, we read the Athenian orators within the framework of the 
institutions of the assembly, Council and law courts, and Harris is right, I think, to analyse 
Athenian law within this institutional framework. He uses the work of March and Olsen on 
the role of institutions in politics to argue that rules and procedures shape conduct; in other 
words, they are not merely the arena within which politics takes place.
45
 In some ways, March 
and Olsen’s work mirrors that of Hart in that they recognise that rules can be both external 
coercion and part of a code of appropriate behaviour which is internalised through 
socialisation and education. Moreover, they argue that courts are not only areas for 
contending social forces but also structures which define and defend norms and beliefs, and 
places which impose standards and procedures.
46
 However, I will argue that this ‘institutional’ 
approach is not appropriate for a study of the Histories. One aspect of my argument, which I 
develop in chapter 2, is that Herodotus’ methodology is not based on the institutions of the 
law courts, or on written statute or forensic oratory, but still deals with key legal methods of 
evidence-gathering, interpretation and judgment through speech. 
 
4. Law as a tool: the model of the legal realists 
For this reason, I now consider an alternative model, that of legal realism, which considers the 
practice of law in societies, such as that of the Cheyenne Indians, which did not have written 
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laws, but clearly had means of resolving disputes and regulating their community.
47
 This has 
been the starting point for those scholars of the law of classical Greece (mainly Athens and, to 
a lesser extent Sparta and Gortyn) who adopt a comparative methodology, using cross-cultural 
material from anthropology, to include contemporary Mediterranean communities and the 
‘trouble-cases’ of legal anthropology, drawing on the work of legal realists, Llewellyn, 
Hoebel and Pospíčil. Their functionalist approach emphasises the practice rather than the 
theory of law, and uses an interdisciplinary approach, interrogating the work of sociologists, 
anthropologists and psychologists, to consider law in the context of social practice; what do 
people do with law?
48
 As Llewellyn puts it in The Bramble Bush, a lecture to law students: 
‘This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the business of law’.
49
 
Law should be seen ‘merely as a batch of tools to get jobs done in a culture’, in the context of 
diverse and sometimes conflicting levels of control-systems (what he calls “law stuff”) in any 
complex society.
50
 Hoebel also argues that the functions of laws are to maintain social 
integration through norms, to authorise physical coercion as a way to maintain order, to 




Those scholars, therefore, who adopt the approach of the legal realists, and whose focus is 
democratic Athens, ask ‘how law functions and is practised in a polis’.
52
 They argue that the 
rule of law intersected with the interests of the demos, rather than being in opposition to it, 
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and they relate litigation to ‘cultural values of competition, aggression and wiliness’.
53
 They 
also argue that the motivation for legal suits was often the desire for revenge, the need to 
protect reputation, or a means to perpetuate rather than resolve disputes.
54
 Scholars who adopt 
this approach, therefore, emphasise ‘law in action’, and focus upon legal processes rather than 
formal legal structures, seeking to contextualise law rather than analyse its internal logic, and 
seeing law as more dispute resolution than an objective search for justice.
55
 Foxhall argues 
that the courts emphasised techniques of persuasion, not legal technicalities, and there was no 
sense of the autonomy of law; for her, law, for Athenians, was a tool not a master.
56
 Christ, 
however, argues that whilst the development of legal rhetoric was far more prevalent in 
classical Athens than an emerging jurisprudence, those who litigated had to appeal to the 




This debate concerns democratic Athens and so, for the most part, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but I will address the issue of ‘law in action’ which the debate provokes. I argue that 
the model of Pospíčil, one of the legal realists, is the most helpful in analysing the rule of law 
in the Histories, because it recognises the role of law in everyday life as well as its 
institutional place in law courts, law codes and a judiciary and legal profession, but also 
acknowledges the coercive aspect of law, whether formally or informally instituted, which is 
sometimes missing from the analysis of those scholars who take a ‘legal realist’ approach to 
Athenian law. Pospíčil’s aim was to formulate an analytical concept of law that could be 
applied cross-culturally. His definition of law does not refer, therefore, to a sovereign or king 
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but to the legal authority within a group, that is, those who have power to enforce an 
imperative decision (you must behave in this way), by way of a sanction (which can be 
physical or psychological), in a dispute between parties on rights and obligations, and who 




This analysis has some parallels with Harris’ examination of the Greek ideal of the rule of 
law. However, Pospíčil questions the idea that law is the property of society as a whole rather 
than subgroups within it, seeing this idea as ‘a characteristic of a modern Western 
Weltanschauung which thinks in terms of dichotomies’ and uses evolutionary explanations; if 
‘civilised’ people are rational, then ‘primitive’ people are irrational.
59
 He suggests this may be 
a legacy of the ‘well-elaborated and unified law of the Roman Empire ... had classical Greece 
exercised such influence over the minds of our civilisation, our traditional concept of law 
might have been much more flexible and, cross-culturally speaking, ‘realistic’.
60
 He argues 
that there is a plurality of legal systems within any society, with each functioning subgroup 
regulating its members by varying forms of social control, with the result that the individual 
may be subject to several legal systems. Though he distinguishes between authoritarian law, 
regarded as unjust by most people, and requiring external sanctions and enforcement, and 
internalised custom, which is followed by most of the group, he also points out that what 
wider society may regard as custom, members of a subgroup may see as authoritarian.
61
 He 
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concludes, therefore, that ‘law should be studied as an integral part of the cultural whole, not 




5. Legal pluralism 
I argue that this is a more productive way to approach the rule of law in the Histories, as an 
intersection of law with the cultural whole, rather than considered in an institutional context. 
As Tamanaha notes, formal legality has its uses but may have limited applicability to family 
and other communal activities.
63
 In the Histories, I will show that the rule of law applies to 
everyday activities, in which women are involved as actors who police the boundary between 
the public and the private sphere, and enforce social and cultural norms, as well as being a 
subaltern group, excluded from legal and political institutions. This approach, therefore, 
applied to the Histories, portrays cultural conflict or collaboration as a process of negotiation 




The term legal pluralism reflects ‘the co-existence de jure or de facto of different normative 
legal orders within the same geographical and temporal space’.
65
 In the Histories, one of these 
normative legal orders is the regulation and enforcement of gender norms, which is often done 
by women. Candaules’ wife, for example, issues her husband’s personal guard Gyges with an 
ultimatum (be killed or kill the king), since the king has acted unlawfully (anomos) in 
arranging for her sexual exposure before Gyges (1.8-1.12). She can issue a command to 
Gyges because she has authority as queen, a fact her husband has disregarded. Though he has 
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the power of a tyrant, his wife is the one to pass judgment, and he is punished for disregarding 
legitimate gender expectations within the oikos. This makes her one of many women in the 
Histories who protest against the violation of nomos by men.  
 
The rules which dictate appropriate gender performance apply to men as well as women, and 
are reinforced by social judgments. For example, when Croesus excludes his son Atys from 
an expedition to kill a boar, following a dream in which his son is killed by an iron spearhead, 
Herodotus expresses the weight of social expectation in the words he gives to Atys:  
What kind of man will my fellow citizens take me to be? What will my new wife 
think of me? What kind of husband will she think she is living with? 
κοῖος μέν τις τοῖσι πολιήτῃσι δόξω εἶναι, κοῖος δέ τις τῇ νεογάμῳ γυναικί; κοίῳ δὲ 
ἐκείνη δόξει ἀνδρὶ συνοικέειν; (1.37.3) 
 
Atys has to perform appropriately as a man to preserve the respect of the community and his 
wife. 
 
These examples show that the rule of law cannot be based solely on external coercion. As 
Hart argues, such an approach fails to recognise the force of those rules which threaten those 
who deviate from the norms of the group. Law imposes obligations on members of the 
community based on societal control. Rules have a social as well as a legal dimension, which 
require consideration of how those rules are perceived by community members, and how 
normative behaviours are enforced. For example: 
24 
 
The Argives made a rule, with a curse added to it, that no Argive grow his hair, and 
no Argive woman wear gold, until they recovered Thyreae  
ἐποιήσαντο νόμον τε καὶ κατάρην μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα, 
μηδὲ τὰς γυναῖκάς σφι χρυσοφορήσειν, πρὶν Θυρέας ἀνασώσωνται (1.82.7) 
 
This is an order, with a penal sanction in the form of a curse. However, the rule is also both 
functional, in that it provides a means to display the Argives’ response to defeat and their 
resolve to recover Thyreae, thereby acting as an agent of social cohesion, and ideological, in 
that it reinforces gender performance through the regulation of outward appearance. These 
examples also show that the regulation of sexual behaviour and gender performance, as well 
as Amasis’ coercive dictat, is the business of nomos, as feminist legal theorists have argued, 
in relation to modern law. 
 
6. Feminist legal theory 
The Cyclopes have neither assemblies for advising, nor customary laws ... except 
that each one lays down the law to his wife and children 
οὔτ᾽ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες ... θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων 
(Homer, Od. 9.112 ... 114-5) 
 
Though the Cyclops have no assemblies, laws, community life, agriculture, technology and, 
as Odysseus and his men discover, no tradition of hospitality,
66
 they do have patriarchy.
67
 The 
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regulation of the family is a rule, even in the absence of other rules. Both the Hartian model of 
legal positivism and the legal realist school fail to engage in a significant way with gender. 
Hart’s model of primary rules of obligation, for example, ignores completely the regulation of 
family life: parental obligations, the reciprocal obligations of the young to care for the old, 
sexual conduct and the regulation of sexual activity.
68
 Llewellyn was aware of the risk of 
unconscious ethnic or chronological bias in judges, warning his students to guard against ‘the 
smugness of your own tribe and your own time: we are the Greeks, all others are barbarian.’
69
 
However, like Hart, he was blind to the significance of gender in law, though his study of the 
Cheyenne Indians included a number of women, both as victims of male sexual violence and 
as authority figures. Pospíčil’s model of authority figures is exclusively male. Though he 
acknowledges that in China, for example, the family can be the centre of power and that this 
can cause a clash between familial and state law, he does not interrogate this further, nor does 
he expand on who the ‘pertinent family authorities’ are in solving six family disputes amongst 




I will, therefore, use two further types of cross-cultural material in this study, one legal, one 
sociological, to analyse the rule of law and gender in the Histories. Firstly, I argue that 
modern family law and critiques of it, which highlight the ideological, as well as the 
functional and positivist aspects of such law, provide a comparator to consider how such 
aspects might intersect in the context of the Histories. Secondly, I use a model from modern 
sociology to consider ‘the cultural narrative in people’s accounts of law’, what ‘the rule of 
law’ meant, both to Herodotus, and to individuals and groups in the Histories.
71
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Feminist legal theory posits that the family, like other institutions, is a social construct, which 
regulates its members, and should be studied as an element of the practice of structural gender 
inequality. Law is ‘not simply a coercive force, but also a powerful and productive social 
discourse which creates and reinforces gender norms’ and can contribute to a gender ideology 
based on the binary opposition of femininity and masculinity, which devalues the 
‘feminine’.
72
 Lawyers, it is argued, often fail to interrogate the ideological framework they 






Naffine, therefore, notes how law both polices the boundary between the public and the 
private realm, and defines appropriate gender roles, male and female. She argues against the 
exclusion of the family from liberal political theory, pointing out that the family ‘is itself 
organised and understood only in accordance with social and legal norms’.
74
 Fineman also 
argues that the family is not ‘an essentialised institution, natural in form and function’ but 
highly regulated.
75
 Other scholars also point to the ideological role of family law in defining 
who is excluded as well as who is included and to ‘the manipulation of social norms as well 
as legal ones’ in the regulation of family life.
 76
 In this study, therefore, I will examine how 
men and women ‘live with’ the rules of family and the oikos in the Histories. I will also 
consider the significance of family relationships in the Histories, asking whether oikos 
membership is contested, what social and cultural expectations there are in respect of gender, 
                                                          
72
 Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley 2010: 6-7. 
73
 Davies and Munro 2013: 1-13; Wacks 2005: 309-321; Naffine 2002: 71-101 for review of 
scholarship in feminist legal theory (FLT) generally; Diduck and O’Donovan 2006: 1-17 applying 
FLT to family law. MacCormick 2008: 10-11. 
74
 Naffine 2002: 83-85. 
75
 Fineman 2004: 154. 
76
 Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert 2008: 6-7; Diduck and O’Donovan 2006: 7; Example of 
exclusion: Burden and Burden v. UK [2007] 1 FCR 69; two sisters claimed their exclusion from 




how disputes are resolved, and whether there is a clear boundary between public and private 




This final point introduces another key theme in my thesis: the relationship of women to 
power, the role of nomos in that relationship, and the relevance of a ‘feminist’ approach to 
studying the Histories. For the purposes of this thesis, I follow the approach adopted by Lady 
Hale, president of the Supreme Court, who understands feminism in these terms: 
Feminism involves the belief both that women are the equals of men and that the 
experiences of women are as much part of the common experience of mankind as are 
the experiences of men. The first belief is normative. It shapes our view of what the 




She reflects the liberal strand of feminist legal theory, which seeks to place women as equal 
before the law, and as actors in law, whether as litigants, lawyers or judges.  
 
This normative belief in female equality separates us from Herodotus’ Histories in which 
gender inequality is a part of the institutional framework of most societies. Those societies 
that practise gender equality are on the margins of the known world. The Issedonians are one 
example: ‘In other respects, these are said to be a law-abiding people, too, and the women to 
have equal power with the men’ (ἄλλως δὲ δίκαιοι καὶ οὗτοι λέγονται εἶναι, ἰσοκρατέες δὲ 
ὁμοίως αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖσι ἀνδράσι, 4.26.2). The Amazons (4.110-117) are another. They do 
not fit the model of the Amazons in Athenian ideology, that sees the female fighters as 
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aggressors and invaders who must be defeated. Instead, their story is a reflection on their way 
of life, their nomoi, and their relationship with men, which is based on reciprocity and not 
hostility. I explore the story of the Amazons in chapter 3 as a thought experiment on 
difference. However, these groups are remarkable (thōmata) because they practice gender 
equality, as are the individual high-status women in the Histories, like Tomyris, Pheretime 
and Artemisia, who do exercise political and military power. 
 
Moreover, a belief in gender equality is not expressed at all in the Histories. Indeed, 
Artemisia, though she exercises power effectively herself, pronounces on the inferiority of 
women in her speech to Xerxes before the battle of Salamis (8.68.1). In a military context, the 
ideology of female inferiority based on a binary opposition of male and female genders, 
whereby one’s identity as a male is created through rejecting the female, or projecting 
femininity onto those whose performance of masculinity falls short of the normative ideal, is 
used to motivate men to fight.
 
I will argue, however, that a belief in this rhetoric is often 
shown by Herodotus to be a poor guide to strategy and a misleading predictor of outcomes. 
 
However, Hale’s second, empirical, belief is reflected in the Histories in that female as well 
as male experience is described and analysed, albeit by a male narrator.
79
 If we focus on 
women’s lack of political and constitutional agency, we privilege political exclusion over 
social significance. This does not mean that women’s social and cultural agency is necessarily 
greater. In fact, the pressure of social expectation in terms of gender roles, for example, may 
be more oppressive than subjection to external authority which they share with men. The book 
Is multiculturalism bad for women?: Susan Moller Okin with respondents, illustrates the 
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range of views on the extent to which culture coerces or enables in the modern world.
80
 Okin 
herself argues that there is inevitably a tension between the norm of gender equality and the 
protection of cultural diversity, and that respect for some cultural practices violates women’s 
and children’s rights to protection from violence, citing as one example, the cultural defence 
of zij poj niam (marriage by capture) by Hmong men to charges of kidnap and rape.
81
 Her 
conclusion is that ‘unless women – and more specifically young women (since older women 
often are co-opted into reinforcing gender inequality) are fully represented in negotiations 
regarding group rights, their interests may be harmed rather than promoted by the granting of 
group rights’. She points out that an older woman often acquires a relatively high status 
within the group precisely because she has successfully encultured children and grandchildren 
into their prescribed gender roles.
82
 Halley also argues that culture constrains rather than 
liberates; the family is illiberal not only because of male control over women, but also 
because of adults’ over children in that parents will always constrain their children merely by 
enculturing them.
83
   
 
Parekh, however, argues that Okin is too essentialist in talking about ‘women’ pointing to the 
diversity of roles, status and power amongst women, whose views on their situation also have 
to be given due consideration.
84
 Honig too questions Okin’s proposed partnership between 
liberalism and feminism, and says the answer is not to extinguish culture, which she defines 
as ‘a way of life, a rich and timeworn grammar of human activity, a set of diverse and often 
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conflicting narratives whereby communal (mis)understandings, roles and responsibilities are 




This book Is multiculturalism bad for women?: Susan Moller Okin with respondents has legal 
significance in that it is referred to by Lady Hale in a modern case in which judges had to 
reflect on how women and girls themselves view their dress. They also had to place this 
within a wider debate about human rights, religious dress as a mark of identity, and the 
tension between gender equality and cultural diversity, between state law and a law-like 
normative system. In this case, five law lords gave judgment on whether a school (Denbigh 
High School) unjustifiably limited Shabina Begum’s right to manifest her religion or beliefs, 
and violated her right not to be denied education, by refusing to allow her to attend school 
wearing a jilbab.
86
 The school’s uniform policy, intended to promote cohesion and a sense of 
community at school, gave pupils the option to wear the shalwar kameeze. Shabina Begum 
contended that her religion imposed an absolute obligation on her to wear the jilbab. The law 
lords therefore had to decide, firstly, whether the school did interfere with Shabina Begum’s 
Article 9 right to manifest her religion, and secondly, even if it did, whether that interference 
was objectively justified. On the first count, the court was split three-two on whether there 
was interference with her Article 9 rights.
87
 On the second count, all five judges decided that 
the school was justified in refusing to allow her to attend school wearing the jilbab. This case 
                                                          
85
 Honig 1999: 39. 
86
 R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School (Appellants). HL [2006] UKHL 15. Shabina's legal 
representatives argued that the school’s decision to exclude [her] breached her human rights under UK 
and European human rights law, citing Articles 9, 8 and 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the 
Convention on Human Rights. 
87
 The two dissenting judges were Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale. Lord Bingham, Lord Scott and Lord 
Hoffmann all held there was no interference. 
31 
 
was decided on the basis of legal interpretations of both UK and European human rights 
legislation. 
 
However, when we examine the judgments more closely, especially the judgment of Lady 
Hale, it is clear that wider social, political and cultural issues are engaged by this case. Lady 
Hale refers to a number of social and constitutional commentators in her judgment, including 
the contributors to the book Is multiculturalism bad for women?: Susan Moller Okin with 
respondents, and concludes her judgment as follows: 
[98] Social cohesion is promoted by the uniform elements of shirt, tie and jumper, and 
the requirement that all outer garments be in the school colour. But cultural and 
religious diversity is respected by allowing girls to wear either a skirt, trousers, or the 
shalwar kameez, and by allowing those who wished to do so to wear the hijab. This 
was indeed a thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the complexities of 
the situation. 
 
This judgment recognises the tension between social cohesion and cultural and religious 
diversity, and also indicates clearly that female dress can be a contested area of law. This is 
significant for my reading of the Histories in that forms of female dress, or states of undress, 




The debate between these scholars to whom Lady Hale referred in her judgment, shows the 
need, I argue, for an intersectional approach to gender and reflects a retreat from a grand 
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theory of feminism, which was expressed by MacKinnon, for example, in binary terms; ‘the 
state is male in the feminist sense. The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat 
women’.
89
 She argues that the law itself is gendered, benchmarking and assessing women 
against a normative ideal, whereby both men and the law are seen as authoritative, rational, 
competent and unemotional. Rather than being a neutral arbiter, law, therefore, is cast as an 
agent of oppression and denies legal subjectivity to women.
90
 This, however, is as reductive 
as the ideology it critiques. An intersectional approach is preferable, which considers feminist 
thought as a network of ideas and concepts, rather than set binaries, for example, materialist v. 




 Conaghan, for 
example, argues that we should think of agency as what can be done under (oppressive) 
circumstances, and stresses the need for a debate between law in action which addresses 
material realities and law as discourse, rather than polarised opposition.
92
 This is the approach 
I will take in considering the intersection of gender with the rule of law in the Histories. 
 
7. The model of intersectionality 
This model provides a means to critique the essentialist views of some feminists for whom 
‘woman’ was the sole marker of identity; Kimberley Crenshaw, for example, points out that 
both race-based and gender-based research ignores the experience of women of colour and 
thereby marginalises them.
93
 Her construction of a social model in which there are multiple 
intersections of identity is reflected also in McCall’s definition of intersectionality as ‘the 
relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject 
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 This definition recognises the differences between women, the power dynamics 
among and between women,
95
 and rejects the use of ‘women’ as an all-inclusive term which 




An intersectional approach, therefore, requires us to interrogate categories such as ‘wives’ and 
‘mothers’ and look for differences as well as commonalities between women, as well as 
comparing and contrasting women whose experiences may intersect in one respect but 
diverge in another.
97
 In Herodotus’ narrative as a whole, there are important distinctions 
between women in terms of status and power, which may be more significant markers of 
difference than gender, for example, between wives and pallakai.
98
 I will consider, therefore, 
how gender difference intersects with other markers of difference, such as social status, 
familial role and adherence to other normative constraints. Men as well as women have to 
negotiate a range of identities and roles, though ideology may seek to define subaltern groups 
like women, in a reductive way.
99
 Moreover, as ‘an intellectual descendent of narrative 
studies’,
100
 intersectionality offers a way to explore Herodotus’ narrative, with its multiplicity 
of individual stories and examination of individual subjectivities and motivations.   
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However, there is clearly a tension between a theory in which the individual constructs her 
own identity narrative and the ‘social reality of categorisation’.
101
 Malik, for example, in 
considering multiculturalism, minority women and family law in the modern world, 
highlights the role of women in helping to re-create collective identity through reproducing 
and socialising future members of the group and passing on collective history and norms to 
the next generation, thus preserving the cultural boundaries and identity of their 
community.
102
 The social reality of categorisation is also clear in the stories in the Histories 
which concern the socialisation of children. One story which illustrates how problematic this 
can be is that of Scyles, king of Scythia, who is shown to incite civil war by adopting Greek 
customs, such as the celebration of Bacchic rites (4.79.3). As a result of his upbringing by a 
Greek mother, who was from Istria and taught him to speak and read Greek (τὸν ἡ μήτηρ 
αὕτη γλῶσσάν τε Ἑλλάδα καὶ γράμματα ἐδίδαξε, 4.78.1), he is more inclined to Greek rather 
than Scythian practices, and displays this by dressing as a Greek and worshipping Greek gods 
(4.78.4). His performance of being a Greek leads to rebellion and his death at the hands of his 
brother. His mother’s failure to assimilate Scythian customs, but preserve her natal nomoi and 
pass them on to her son, has disastrous consequences. This tension between social coercion 
and individual agency is a key aspect of ‘living with the rules’ which I will analyse in a 
number of Herodotus’ stories. 
 
8. A sociological model 
It is precisely because law is both god and gimmick, sacred and profane, objective 
disinterested, and a terrain of legitimate partiality that it persists and endures. Legality 
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is composed of multiple images and stories, each describing a particular relationship 




I now consider a modern sociological model as a comparative study. Rather than attempt to 
define the rule of law, Sibley and Ewick researched what the concept meant to Americans in 
their everyday lives. They came up with a tripartite model which reflected the ‘cultural 
narrative in people’s accounts of law’ based on interviews with people from a range of social, 
economic and racial backgrounds. This, of course, was in the context of a modern society 
with a written constitution, very different from ancient Greece. However, I find this model 
helpful to think about nomos in the Histories, because Herodotus too gives us a cultural 
narrative in which people are not just subject to law, but engage with it, even in situations 
where they have limited power.  
 
In the first of the three cultural narratives the law is ‘a magisterial, remote and objective force 
governing human affairs’, which is to be both revered and feared, which is detached from 
everyday life and requires conformity, or supplication, in the face of judicial power. The 
second cultural narrative, however, sees law as ‘a terrain for tactical encounters’ and the 
boundaries that separate law from the everyday are understood to be ‘relatively porous and 
fragile’. In this cultural narrative, law is a game requiring strategy and skilful manoeuvring. 
Those interviewed by Sibley and Ewick considered that, in this context, what mattered was 
having a good lawyer, someone who had the skills to play the game effectively. They also 
recognised that in practice those with power, money and status could ‘play the law game’ 
more effectively than those without those resources. The third cultural narrative identified by 
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Sibley and Ewick is what they term ‘Up Against the Law’. In this account, people feel 
powerless; unable to keep law at bay, unable to play by the rules; recognising themselves as 
‘have nots’, they respond with acts of resistance, either relying on their invisibility and social 
subordination, or telling their story to pass on the message that ‘legality can be opposed if just 
a little’. The two sociologists emphasise that these three narratives are not mutually exclusive 
and that, as Pospίčil notes, people live with a plurality of rules. They argue that ‘the so-called 
gap between the law on the books and the law in action might actually operate to define and 




In this thesis, I use these three cultural narratives to consider the multifaceted aspect of nomos 
in the Histories. Firstly, nomos unquestionably has a coercive aspect, making a despot of law. 
Demaratus tells Xerxes that it is ‘[the Spartans’] master which they fear much more than your 
men fear you’ (ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ 
σοὶ σέ, 7.104.4). I will examine this as theory and practice in chapter 5. However, in 
contrasting the Persian nomos of tyranny, which depends on fear of the ruler with the Spartan 
nomos, Demaratus draws attention to what is the most prevalent order backed up by threats in 
the Histories, the command of a tyrant.
105
 I will explore throughout this thesis the extent to 
which such commands are compatible with Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law. I will argue 
that tyrannical nomos is not always incompatible but Herodotus highlights, often by gender-
related transgressions, the tension between the rule of the tyrant and the rule of law.  
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However, there are those in the Histories who have the power and resources to approach 
nomos strategically. In chapter 4, I will analyse the stories of Anaxandridas and his 
negotiations with the Ephors (5.40), and Argeia who wants both of her sons to be king (6.52), 
to show that their creative approach to family nomoi contrasts with the Spartans’ military 
nomos which is inflexible and coercive.  
 
Finally, I consider those stories in the Histories where law is used to resist an oppressive 
situation. In chapter 1, I will argue that the story of the Carian women (1.146.2-3) is one of 
resistance to the rule of law as a coercive power which forces women into marriage with the 
men who killed their fathers. They show resistance in the home, creating a nomos whereby 
they reject social intercourse with their husbands at mealtimes or in forms of address. The 
story of Cyrus and Cyno analysed in chapter 4 also shows a slave woman exercising some 
agency in oppressive circumstances. 
 
To summarise: the rule of law we encounter in the Histories is both coercive (the Spartans’ 
δεσπότης νόμος, 7.104.4) and regulatory in that it relates to everyday life, the social, sexual 
and religious practices, which make nomos king of all (πάντων βασιλέα, 3.38.4). With some 
limited exceptions, legal and political institutions exclude women from power, but I will 
question how significant that is to Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law. Legal pluralism, I 
aim to show, is the most productive model with which to analyse the range of nomoi which 
act as informal, but nevertheless powerful, constraints on the behaviour of men as well as 
women, as this theoretical framework recognises the significance of rules which are not 
recognised as ‘law’ in the positivist sense. By considering the rule of law from a gender 
perspective, I highlight the importance of the oikos, as well as political and legal institutions, 
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to the rule of law, and identify sources of authority which may not be reflected in formal 
political or legal institutions. 
 
9. Scholarship on women in the Histories 
In this section, I will survey the direction of scholarship on this topic and show, firstly, that 
the focus on ‘women’ does not do justice to the range of roles and identities that women and 
men have to negotiate in the Histories, and secondly, to argue that a structuralist approach 
based on the binary opposition of male and female reflects ideology but not necessarily 
practice, when we consider how Herodotus shows his characters ‘living with the rules’. 
 
Nearly 40 years ago, Carolyn Dewald published two articles on women in the Histories, in 
which she identified women not only as social actors, in partnership with men in establishing 
and maintaining social order, often defending society against transgressions of nomos by men, 
but also as cultural motif, symbolising the thin line in ancient societies between cultural 
survival and cultural extinction.
106
 This reflected two strands of historiography at that time. 
The first sought to make ‘women’ a valid historical subject, to place the lives of women in a 
historical and cultural context, and was reflected, Dewald argued, in the Histories by 
Herodotus’ effort ‘to describe women as they were, or at least as Herodotus thinks they must 
have been’.
107
 Tetlow argues that ‘authentic historiography communicates truth insofar as it is 
grounded in the reality of the past, which must include the history of women as well as that of 
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men’, reflecting Hale’s view that female experience, as much as male experience, makes up 
reality.
108
 However, this, I think, minimises the rhetorical aspect of ancient historiography. 
Thucydides, for example, did not include much female experience in his historiography and 
this does not make him inauthentic, but reflects his priorities as a historiographer.  
 
The second strand of historiography concentrated on Herodotus as a storyteller, who uses 
symbols or theoretical concepts, such as ‘alterity’ to structure his narrative. This approach 
emphasised Herodotus’ literary, rather than historical role. Gould’s work reflected this dual 
approach. Women were visible in the Histories, playing a role in determining what happened, 
in stark contrast to the way the public world of political action appears in other Greek 
literature, but in structuralist terms, their function was ‘to define the male role by 
opposition’.
109
 Structuralist theory holds that human beings interpret the world and define 
themselves through a series of binary oppositions. Rosellini and Saïd used this model in 1978 
to consider women’s customs in the Histories, developing a theory of alterity based on the 
Greek norm of monogamy and the oikos, which they linked to Greek practice in agriculture, 
cooking and sacrifice, against which other groups ‘bring to the stage different aspects of 
marginality, all of which are opposed to the norm but not exactly superimposable’.
110
 For 
these scholars, the issue was the extent to which others were culturally distant from the Greek 
norm, a distance which they expressed in geographical terms: the further the ‘other’ was from 
Greece the more extreme the cultural difference. However, as Blok points out, this does not 
allow for the dynamics of time; in Rosellini and Saïd’s article, there is ‘hardly any history left 
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 One of the important aspects of nomos is that it can be changeable, 
flexible, and negotiable as well as coercive, and women as well as men are involved in this 
process, making any static model inappropriate. 
 
Hartog’s analysis of Herodotus’ portrayal of the Scythians in Book 4 of the Histories was also 
expressed in polarity terms. He argued that the polarity between Scythians and Greeks is 
challenged when the Amazons arrive, introducing a male-female polarity. At this point in the 
narrative, the Scythians ‘turn into quasi-Greeks’, thereby destabilising the Greek-barbarian 
one.
112
 Gray also used the polarity model to analyse the story of Cyrus and Cyno in Book 1 of 
the Histories, but she argued that the polarity between barbarian ruler and barbarian subject 
was more significant than gender difference; ‘they [Mitradates and Cyno] are there to produce 
a dialectic on the nature of royal barbaric power through their difference’.
113
 I will argue in 
chapter 4 that the difference between Mitradates and Cyno is as significant as their polarised 
position in relation to the king. 
 
Cartledge argued that, for Herodotus, Sparta was the Greek ‘Other’ and so he treated the state 
in an ethnographical manner, comparing Spartan with Persian and Scythian practices, unlike 
other Greek states, and linking the madness of Cambyses with his Spartan counterpart 
Cleomenes.
114
 He cited the example of Gorgo, to illustrate the ‘otherness’ of Spartan 
women.
115
 Millender also argued that the polarity model was the key organisational principle 
of Herodotus, associating him with an Athenocentric conceptualisation of a ‘barbarised’ 
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Sparta as an exercise in self-definition, ‘othering’ Cleomenes as despot, for example, though 




This emphasis on polarities was reflected in wider scholarship. Edith Hall’s Inventing the 
barbarian, published in 1989, argued that the ideological invention of the cultural ‘other’ was 
based on the story of the Greeks’ conflict with the Persians, though she acknowledged the 
significance of sophistic thought on Euripides, for example, whose plays such as Hecuba and 
Trojan Women subverted the antithesis of Greek-barbarian on a moral level.
117
 Jonathan Hall 
also identified what he termed ‘oppositional’ identity, which defined the Hellene through 
opposition with the non-Greek or barbarian.
118
 Both these writers were writing principally 
about ethnic identity, whereas Foxhall, who also considered that binary oppositions were 
fundamental to ancient Greek culture, applied them to gender constructs, drawing a contrast 





Joan Scott, however, a cultural historian, argued in 1986 against the fixed binary opposition 
of male and female as a permanent aspect of the human condition, arguing that history is often 
written as if such normative positions are arrived at consensually, and as a result, they then 
take on the appearance of timeless permanence. In fact, historical analysis shows that such 
positions are often the subject of debate and disagreement amongst those affected, and it is the 
                                                          
116
 Millender 2009: 9-15; 2002: 1-11. 
117
 Hall 1989: 56, 217-223. 
118
 Hall 1997: 32-3. 
119
 Foxhall 1989: 23, 30-1. This structuralist approach whereby identity is created through opposition 
is also found in Just 1989: 153-193 (on attributes of gender in the Athenian polis); Cartledge 1993: 
200; Hall 1989: 201-223 though she deconstructs the polarity in her epilogue by considering barbaric 
Greeks and noble barbarians and in her analysis of Andromache and Troades in Chapter 5; Hall 2006: 
26-30; Hartog 1988; Demand 1994; Payen 2015: 215-217; Loraux 1986, 1993; Iriate 2013: 95-116. 
42 
 
historian’s role to uncover the debate and show that cultural and political change is usually 
contested.
120
 More recently, scholars have recognised that the polarity model was, in many 
ways, a product of its time. In an article published in 2006, Edith Hall reflects on the 
influence of the Cold War model of self and others on her 1989 book, and, 17 years on, 
frames the conflict in different terms, as the ‘dialectical interpenetration of culture and 
especially propaganda’ between Greeks and Persians, adding that it was important to 
recognise the impact on the Athenians of their homeland being penetrated and ravaged by 
Persians and allies.
121
 Jonathan Hall now considers that his conception of ‘oppositional 
identities’ was very much a product of the intellectual environment of the 1990s, when 
structuralist theory was applied to ancient Greek literature, myth and ritual, and the concept, 
he argues, needs to be revisited in the light of network theory, which posits that ethnicity is 
‘continually constructed through practice’.
122
 This reflects a wider move from structuralist 
polarities by those scholars who argue that we should instead be looking for networks of 
relationships, ways that individuals and communities interact.
123
 Skinner suggests that identity 
is created through the process of negotiating boundaries and contestation, making boundaries 
between Greek and non-Greek permeable, not fixed.
124
 Taylor and Vlassopoulos also argue 
that conflict and change are inherent in social processes and Vlassopoulos points out that 
social practice is more complex than law’s categorical distinctions between, for example, 
slave and free; citizenship is not always the main or only marker of identity. Cohen critiques 
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the ‘citizen-club’ model of Athenian democracy, which casts non-citizens as passive objects 
of exclusion, domination and exploitation.
125
 Jonathan Hall argues for an alternative to the 
oppositional model of identity, whereby one’s Greekness is defined through opposition with 
the non-Greek, which he suggests became more prevalent after the Persian wars. He terms his 
second model ‘aggregative’, that is it is based on shared kinship, territory and history, and 
recognising similarities rather than differences between peer groups, which, he argues, was 





Scholars have also recognised the need to distinguish between women, rather than take a 
polarity view of gender. Foxhall, in her book Studying Gender in Classical Antiquity, 
published in 2013, takes an intersectional approach to gender, emphasising that lived reality is 
more complex than the male/female dichotomy, and arguing that we should view the activities 
of the oikos, for example, as subject to negotiation, rather than being based on defined and 
separate spaces, so that men as well as women have to avoid contravening gendered 
conventions.
127
 Sebillote Cuchet notes how male/female characteristics vary according to their 
discursive context and are not necessarily in opposition.
128
 In Herodotean studies, a similar 
shift can be seen. Gray, for example, who analysed the story of Cyno and Mitradates in 
polarity terms, more recently takes a network approach to the story of Melampus in the 
Histories, to argue that Herodotus is interested in how cultures are introduced and imported 
leading to adaptions, thereby producing ‘a global village looking for connections’.
129
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Boedeker, in her article on Persian gender relations in Herodotus, analyses interactions 
between male and female, and observes that both sexes, Greek and barbarian are able to act 
outside the constraints of nomos if they have power.
130
 Brosius, Kuhrt and Sancisi-
Weerdenburg have done valuable work exposing the orientalist bias of historians who portray 
Persian women generically as cruel, aggressive, and manipulative, who have too much 
influence over men in power.
131
 As Brosius points out, this reflects an ideology which 
projects Greek anxieties about gender performance onto a convenient ‘other’: women, Persian 
and Greek, who are characterised in gendered terms as extremely emotional or extreme in 
action.
132
 Sancisi-Weerdenburg reminds us we need to distinguish between Persian women in 
literature and in history, and points out how little we know of the history of Persian women at 
the time of Herodotus. Most have left no trace in the record and those that have, have acquired 
a notoriety based on Greek literary sources.
133
 She argues for a more careful reading of 
Herodotus which does not ‘reinforce the tendency to see the Orient as female, weak and 
worthless and Western civilisation as male, valiant and valuable.’
134
 Herodotus does, of 
course, give us the ‘external’ view of a Greek on Persian nomoi, but I will demonstrate that he 
is more nuanced than most in his portrayal of Persian women, and that he interrogates the 
generic picture of Persian women outlined above by showing that they engage in different 
ways with Persian nomoi. However, Harrison warns against reading the stories as purely a 
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With regard to Sparta and women, Bresson argues that the binary opposition of Athens and 
Gortyn masks a diversity of inheritance systems and ‘we should not translate the biased and 
hostile ideology of other Greeks towards the Spartan situation into a scholarly judgment. For 
non-Spartan theorists living in male-dominated cities, a form of female autonomy was a pure 
scandal. Interestingly, most of them were Athenians, or men who had lived in Athens. The 
exception is Xenophon’.
136
 The disagreement between Hodkinson and Hansen on the 
‘exceptional’ nature of Sparta generally makes this an ongoing matter of debate.
137
 Flower 
makes the point that Spartan society was ‘continually being reinvented’, so it is impossible to 




In this study, therefore, I will explore the network of relationships and the range of roles and 
identities that women and men have to negotiate, rather than seek to analyse Herodotus’ 
stories in which gender plays a significant role, in terms of gender polarities. For example, I 
will draw a contrast between the coercive military nomos of the Spartans and the more 
flexible approach taken by their royal families, both male and female, to family nomoi. I will 
also question whether practice mirrors gender ideology by using the story of Artemisia to 
interrogate Herodotean concepts of andreia, and in the context of tyranny, I will examine how 
significant gender difference is when compared with the challenges for both genders of 
negotiating court hierarchies and royal power.  
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10. Definition of terms 
10.1 Gender 





This statement and the term ‘gender’ is by no means uncontested. The term ‘gender’ has come 
to be used, since the 1970s, as a way to distinguish the social, cultural and political regulation 
of sexual difference from biological difference.
140
 Gender, therefore, what it means to be male 
or female, is a social construct. However, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 uses the term 
‘gender’ to refer to the sex, male or female, one is assigned at birth. As Scott notes, the issue 
is partly political and philosophical, ‘a matter of contested meanings both explicit and 
implicit’.
141
 A recent United Nations resolution to combat the use of rape as a weapon of war 
which included the word ‘gender’ was opposed by a number of countries, including the USA, 
on the basis of their claim that the word ‘gender’ is a cover for the liberal promotion of 
transgender rights.
142
 The word, therefore, has no universal accepted meaning and attempts to 
define it are difficult. 
 
When using the term to apply to the Histories, therefore, I think it is more important to think 
of gender, as with nomos, as a concept rather than trying to define the word, a concept which 
embraces the practice of gender roles, both masculine and feminine, the ideology of gender 
difference, and the gap which sometimes emerges between the two, that space which 
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problematises a belief based on the essential difference between male and female. Scott 
encourages us to historicise gender categories, to ‘open ourselves ... to the idea and possibility 
that things have been and will be different from what they are now’ by asking questions such 
as: How do laws, rules and institutional arrangements refer to and implement sexual 
difference? In what spheres does the performance of normative sex roles matter? How are 
relationships of power consolidated by appeals to sexual difference?
143
 I argue that this is a 
more productive way to approach gender in the Histories, as interactive rather than binary, as 
‘living with’ the rules of gender. I will address the first two questions in chapters 3 and 4. The 
relationship of power to gender will be a dominant theme in chapter 5, when I explore the 
relationship of women to power and performances of masculinity in the public sphere, by 
women as well as men.  
 
10.2 Performativity 
West and Zimmerman introduced the concept of ‘doing gender’, of managing situations so as 
to perform in a gender-appropriate way.
144
 Masculinity and femininity, therefore, are not 
natural, essential properties of individuals but ‘social properties of a system of 
relationships’.
145
 In this model, gender is a collective performance, regulated and evaluated by 
others, to whom one is accountable.
146
 Griffin expresses this in explicitly performance terms. 
A convincing display of gender requires a script (acquired through the socialisation process), 
props (appearance, speech and gesture) and an audience which understands the performance; 
‘the dominant social group will not be those who embody the normative ideal but those who 
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can most plausibly present themselves as so doing’.
147
 The performance of manliness 
(andreia), therefore, means not only acting in a manly way but also being judged by others to 




Those activities, therefore, based on sex category, are reinforced and legitimised by being 
judged to be performed appropriately, whereas the character, motives and predispositions of 
those who perform inappropriately are called into question.
149
 Butler echoes this when she 
writes of the performance of gender as ‘repeated actions which confer social legitimacy’.
150
 In 
chapter 5, I will show how the ideology of female inferiority is used by characters in the 
Histories as a persuasive strategy to make men fight, and as a way to explain military defeat 
or victory in the field. I will also analyse the performance aspect of gender, in particular of 
masculinity in the context of war, and I will consider relationships between men and the 
creation of hierarchies, not only in the Persian court, but also in the Greek alliance.  
 
West and Zimmerman also point out that normative conceptions of the appropriate attitude 
and activities are variable and can change with time.
151
 Again, this links to one of Hart’s 
secondary rules, the rule of change, which provides necessary flexibility in any legal system. I 
will argue, therefore, that Herodotus shows both femininity and masculinity to be social 
constructs rather than an innate characteristic of women and men by making the performance 
of gender a nomos which is changeable, can be deceptive and depends on the judgment of 
others. In this way the performance of gender is in tension with the binary construct of 
male/female in gender ideology. 
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11. Summary of chapters 
In chapter 1, I explore the origins of nomos, and discuss the function of divine rules in 
Herodotus’ narrative, and the significance of oaths as an integral aspect of law enforcement. I 
analyse the stories of three important lawgivers in the Histories, Solon, Lycurgus and 
Deioces, arguing that they set a template for their communities which has ongoing 
significance, tested as ‘law in action’ in later chapters. I use a case study from the story of 
Solon and Croesus to argue that Solon’s role in the Histories is not primarily to create 
institutions or laws, but to educate Croesus that the rule of law includes respecting the 
reciprocal relationship between gods and humans, which the powerful sometimes forget. With 
regard to Sparta, I argue that we need to separate Lycurgus’ introduction of eunomia from the 
institutions he creates, to appreciate the dynamic aspect of nomos within the Spartan regime. I 
then show how the nomos of tyranny arises in the context of a community’s need and demand 
for law and order, through analysing the story of Deioces and the Medes. Finally, I use the 
story of the Carian women who create nomoi as a response to the coercive actions of Athenian 
men for which they have no formal remedy under the rule of law, as defined in its ‘thin’ 
sense, as a case study to show that Herodotus’ expansive concept of nomos includes women 
as lawmakers. 
 
In chapter 2, my focus is on what nomos is for, and the legal processes which implement and 
enforce nomos. I use a case study on the foundation of oracles at Dodona and Siwa to 





nomos was being discussed, contested and debated. I also argue that Herodotus’ methodology 
is both adversarial and inquisitorial, making his approach very different from the Athenian 
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orators of the 4
th 
century BCE. I argue that we understand Herodotus’ concept of the rule of 
law through his use of informal speech acts, by women as well as men, rather than through 
law court scenes, or forensic oratory which is largely absent from the Histories. I use two 
contrasting models of modern law to show that, just as modern law can be coercive, 
regulatory or facilitative, so the rule of law in the Histories has several aspects, as 
punishment, as regulation, and as agent of social cohesion.  
 
In chapter 3, I discuss the key elements of female gender performance, that is, appearance, 
speech, and conduct; how women are seen, how they are heard, and how their conduct is 
judged. I then consider two stories about Athenian women, one from the Athenian/Aeginetan 
dispute, one when they join with Athenian men in an act of violence against Lycides and his 
oikos, firstly, to question the effectiveness of male sanctions when women are judged to break 
the rules, and secondly, to show that, in the circumstances of war, both the ideology and the 
institutions of the Athenian polis are disrupted, threatening the rule of law and the Athenian 
nomos of isēgoriē. Finally, I argue that the story of the Amazons, in the hands of Herodotus, 
is a thought experiment in a different world setting, used to interrogate both law and gender, 
which effectively deconstructs their place in Athenian ideology, as female warriors who must 
be defeated. 
 
In my fourth chapter, I consider in more depth how nomos regulates domestic relationships. I 
focus on royal households, because this is where Herodotus sets most of his stories which 
concern family relationships, using case studies to show the variety of responses to the nomos 
of tyranny, and to analyse how people of both genders are shown to ‘live with’ the rules. 
Firstly, I use the story of Candaules and his wife as a case study, to show that the rule of law 
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applies in the oikos, when a woman’s honour is impugned and a man breaks the rules. I then 
discuss the political and rhetorical significance of the royal oikos through the story of 
Cambyses’ wife, which illustrates female vulnerability in a dangerous oikos and the risks of 
defending the rule of law in a domestic setting. I analyse another dysfunctional oikos, that of 
Xerxes, where the contrast is between those, like Masistes and his wife, who defend the 
values of the oikos, and Xerxes, his wife and Masistes’ daughter, who violate those values in 
differing ways.  
 
I then consider case studies from the Spartan logos to interrogate the assertion that the 
Spartans obeyed the rules in terms of religious practice, showing how they manipulated as 
well as obeyed oaths and oracles. I argue that stories in which oaths are a significant feature 
often raise questions about credibility, which problematises any straightforward equation of 
oaths with coercion and enforcement; the power of oaths can be manipulated by some actors, 
of both genders. I show that the rules can be treated as more flexible by those who have 
power.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I use the story of Cyrus, Astyages and Cyno as a case study 
in tyrannical breach of the rule of law by those who destroy, rather than protect the oikos. I 
conclude with the story of Intaphrenes’ wife, comparing it with Sophocles’ Antigone, to argue 
that there is a fundamental difference between the two stories based on the different 
approaches of the protagonists to law and gender. Intaphrenes’ wife enters into dialogue with 
Darius, who adopts an inquisitorial role, whereas the exchange between Antigone and Creon 




In my fifth chapter, my focus is on performances of masculinity, in the context of the Spartan 
nomos of ‘win or die’, which, in an ideological and institutional sense, excludes women. I 
place Herodotus in an intellectual framework where the meaning of andreia is increasingly 
contested. I then discuss the extent to which the constraints of nomos and of gender apply to 
women who perform a masculine role in exercising military and political power, using the 
stories of Artemisia, Tomyris and Pheretime as case studies. I argue that Herodotus uses the 
character of Artemisia to highlight the contested aspect of andreia, both in speech and action, 
and that both she and Themistocles are shown to be characters of mētis, able to manipulate 
rules and relationships to succeed. I show that powerful men sometimes underestimate female 
capacity and do not live up to gender expectations themselves; conversely women sometimes 
defy those expectations. However, I conclude that the downfall for Cyrus, Pheretime and 
Xerxes is ultimately because they violate the rule of law by seeking to go beyond boundaries 
that separate humans from gods; they are corrupted by power. In this way, Herodotus signals 
his concept of the rule of law in its ‘thick’ aspect as a universal value which has power over 














There is a clear concept of the rule of law in both Demaratus’ words to Xerxes that law is 
master (δεσπότης νόμος, 7.104.4) and in Herodotus’ observation as narrator that law is king 
of all (νόμον πάντων βασιλέα, 3.38.4). Where does this concept come from? That is one of 
the questions I will consider in this chapter, in the light of Hart’s argument that any 
functioning legal system needs a rule of recognition, that identifies the foundational rule, or, 
in other words, the authoritative source of law, and imposes a duty to implement and enforce 
that law.  
 
I start by considering the gods as a source of nomos, arguing that Herodotus shows their role 
as lawgivers to be of less significance than their role in interpretation (through the Pythia) and 
enforcement (through oaths and divine punishment). I then analyse the stories of three 
important lawgivers in the Histories, drawing a contrast between Solon, Lycurgus and 
Deioces, and the institutions they create, but arguing that all three achieve a level of 
legitimacy in that their introduction of nomos is accepted by the community. However, the 
rule of law they create has very different ramifications, which are often illuminated through 
gender practices and transgressions.  
 
Finally, I discuss the story of the Carian women who institute a new social practice through 
creating a nomos which binds daughters through oaths but also influences their social 
intercourse with men. Oaths play a key role in this story in making the nomos enforceable and 
ensuring that it is implemented from generation to generation. This story also supports the 
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legal realist position that people are subject to a range of rules, which can coerce, enable or be 
resisted, depending on circumstances, and feminist legal theory which highlights the 
significance of the regulation of the domestic sphere. 
 
In this chapter, I consider in what sense we can find the ‘thick’ definition of the rule of law in 
the Histories, and I will argue that one way that Herodotus shows his commitment to a 
concept of the rule of law, which is of universal application, is by showing that those who 
violate nomos often do so in the context of violating key religious practices and beliefs,
152
 
ignoring the boundaries between the mortal and the divine, or forgetting the limitations of 
human knowledge and the unpredictability of the divine. For example, the ‘great nemesis 
from the god’ (ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη, 1.34.1) descends on Croesus, in Herodotus’ 
estimation, because in all likelihood (ὡς εἰκάσαι, 1.34.1) he thought he was the happiest man 
in the world.
 
Divine retribution is the possible explanation for Croesus’ reversal of fortune. It 




1. Living with divine rules 
When Croesus asks the god if it is his rule to deceive his benefactors (εἰ ἐξαπατᾶν τοὺς εὖ 
ποιεῦντας νόμος ἐστί, 1.90.2) and Hermotimus refers to the rule followed by the gods being 
one of justice (νόμῳ δικαίῳ χρεώμενοι, 8.106.3) in handing Panionius into his control, 
Herodotus suggests that gods as well as mortals have nomoi. The divine nature of nomos is an 
idea that is found in epic, philosophy, and drama.
154
 For example, in Hesiod, Zeus ‘lays down 
this rule for men’ (τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, Hes. Works and Days. 276) 
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and in a Heraclitus fragment: ‘For all human rules are nourished by the divine one’ 
(τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνος τοῦ θείου, Herakleitos 22B 114 DK).
155
 
Euripides also gives Hecuba a speech in which Nomos is personified as a rule controlling even 




However, the boundary between divine and mortal agency can be ‘malleable and 
problematic’.
157
 Sophocles dramatises a debate on the meaning and origin of nomos in 
Antigone, exploiting, Harris argues, the ambiguity in Athenian concepts of nomos to create 
tragic misunderstanding.
158
 Creon and Antigone do not agree on what constitutes nomos. For 
Creon, his edict forbidding the burial of Polyneices is a nomos which must be obeyed. 
Antigone, however does not recognise his edict as a nomos; she calls upon the unwritten rules 
of the gods.
159
 I will analyse this agōn in greater detail in chapter 4, when I discuss the story 
of Darius and Intaphrenes’ wife. This ambiguity at the heart of nomos is also reflected in the 
Heraclitus fragment. Kahn notes in his commentary that the phrase ‘(nourished) by the divine 
one’ is ambiguous in that it can be construed either in the neuter, with ‘the divine’ (theion) as 
a term for the supreme cosmic principle, or as the masculine form agreeing with nomos: ‘the 
one divine law’. He argues that this duality is deliberate; the single divine principle, ‘what is 
common to all’ is both part of, and separate from, nomos, which is associated with human and 
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The ambiguous relationship between mortal and divine is also to be found in the Histories. 
When Croesus asks the god if it is his nomos to deceive, and Hermotimus refers to the nomos 
followed by the gods being one of justice, Herodotus is not showing us the divine origin of 
rules which regulate human interaction, but rather developing his theme in the Histories that 
relationships between gods and humans are based on reciprocity, which requires negotiating 
successfully the boundary between the divine and the mortal. Croesus is complaining that the 
god, through the oracle, had misled him, despite his many dedications to Delphi, gifts which 
he thinks should earn him the gods’ favour.
161
 In a very different context, Hermotimus seeks 
divine authority to justify his own act of reciprocal revenge, in having Panionius, the man 
who had castrated him, castrated by his sons.
162
 I will analyse the story of the mother of 
Cleobis and Biton as an example of divine-human reciprocity in this chapter and consider the 
significance of the Harmotimus story in chapter 5.  
 
In this chapter, I will show that, in the Histories, those who create rules require some form of 
divine authority.
163
 ‘Living with the rules of the gods’ means accepting their role in policing 
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human activity, and punishing excess, often in the context of gender transgression.
164
 The 
gods also have a role in enforcing human nomoi through oaths.  
 
2. Oaths 
When nomoi impose obligations, these are often secured by oaths, described by Bayliss as 
‘typically seen as a binding contract that must be fulfilled, regardless of whether doing so 
would benefit the parties involved’.
165
 The story of Glaucos certainly supports this viewpoint; 
he holds a sum of money on trust for a Milesian, secured by exchange of tokens. When the 
man’s sons come to Sparta with tokens to claim back the money, Glaucos asks the Delphic 
oracle if he could steal the money by swearing that he did not have it (εἰ ὅρκῳ τὰ χρήματα 
ληίσηται, 6.86γ1). The oracle warns him that if he does this, he will make an immediate profit 
but in the longer term he will be pursued by oath’s child who will destroy all his children and 
his household. This is the outcome for Glaucos, even though he pays back the money. I will 
show the significance of the destruction of the oikos in chapter 4.  
 
Oaths, therefore, play a key role in making performance of rules obligatory, so Solon makes 
sure that the Athenians are bound by oaths (ὁρκίοισι γὰρ μεγάλοισι κατείχοντο, 1.29) when he 
makes laws for them. Oaths are also used in a functional sense in the Histories to cement 
alliances, as in the exchange of oaths of friendship between Hippocrates of Gela and the 
Samians (6.23.4), to protect a trading monopoly, as at Naucratis (2.179), to seal a joint 
commitment, for example, by the Carian women (1.146), to form a military alliance of 
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West argues that the medieval or classical world view on the sanctity of oaths meant there 
was no need for civil remedies as vengeance from the gods would be visited on those who 
broke their oaths.
167
 This presupposes not only a belief in the supernatural force of an oath, 
but that perjury will be punished. This is not always the case in the Histories, however; oaths 
are not necessarily binding.
168
 Half the Phocaeans (1.165.3) break their oath to emigrate, 
though they face an imminent Persian invasion, and Themiston (4.154) devises a clever means 
to save the life of Phronime, despite his oath to her father. I argue that it is not only the 
obligation imposed by the oath, but the possibility that it might be broken that makes it an 
ideal storytelling motif with which to explore evidential questions of credibility, a key aspect 
of Herodotus’ legal method, as I explore in my next chapter. Oaths are a significant feature of 
the Spartan logos in the Histories and they always involve contested accounts and trickster 
characters, reflecting how Spartans were seen by others. As Cyrus said about them, they meet 
in the agora, swear oaths and deceive each other (ἐν μέση τῇ πόλι ἀποδεδεγμένος ἐς τὸν 
συλλεγόμενοι ἀλλήλους ὀμνύντες ἐξαπατῶσι, 1.153.1). Herodotus, therefore, signals that 
oaths are both very serious, and open to manipulation, and evasion, both ‘a sacrosanct element 
and a social weapon’.
169
 The coercive aspect of oaths is illustrated by the story of Glaucos, 
and also in that of Xerxes, who makes a promise to Artaynte, supported by an oath (ὤμοσε, 
9.109.2) which he has to keep.  
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However, the coercive aspect of oaths also makes them an effective tool. Democedes, for 
example, makes Atossa swear that she would repay him by granting whatever he asked of her 
(ἐξορκοῖ μιν ἦ μέν οἱ ἀντυπουργήσειν ἐκείνην τοῦτο τὸ ἂν αὐτῆς δεηθῇ, 3.133.2), when he 
agrees to treat her breast abscess, and Themistocles bribes Adeimantus to stay and fight, 
rather than retreat to the Isthmus, by securing the agreement with an oath (ἐπομόσας, 8.5.1). 
The exchange between the Ephors and the Athenian envoys (9.11) is under oath but, as 
Bayliss points out, the Spartans are not playing by the ‘cooperative principle’ rules; the 
Athenians have to keep questioning them to get to the truth.
170
 As Marmor argues with respect 
to modern law, sometimes the aim of legal discourse is non-cooperation.
171
 I will explore this 
further with stories from the Spartan logos, in chapter 4. Oaths, therefore, are an important 
enforcement mechanism, involving the gods, but can also be manipulated by some who 




And among them came Solon the Athenian, who, after making rules for the 
Athenians at their request, went abroad for ten years, sailing forth to see the world, 
he said. This he did so as not to be compelled to repeal any of the rules he had made, 
since the Athenians themselves could not do that, for they were bound by great oaths 
to abide for ten years by whatever rules Solon should make. 
καὶ δὴ καὶ Σόλων ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς Ἀθηναίοισι νόμους κελεύσασι ποιήσας 
ἀπεδήμησε ἔτεα δέκα κατά θεωρίης πρόφασιν ἐκπλώσας, ἵνα δὴ μή τινα τῶν νόμων 
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ἀναγκασθῇ, λῦσαι τῶν ἔθετο. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ οἷοί τε ἦσαν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι Ἀθηναῖοι: 
ὁρκίοισι γὰρ μεγάλοισι κατείχοντο δέκα ἔτεα χρήσεσθαι νόμοισι τοὺς ἄν σφι Σόλων 
θῆται. (1.29.1-2) 
 
Unlike Lycurgus, who creates institutions for the Spartan polis, or Deioces who creates a 
system of centralised tyranny, we get no information in this passage about the nature of the 
nomoi which Solon creates for the Athenian polis, or Athenian institutions, though Herodotus 
later in the Histories says that he introduced an Egyptian law created by Amasis into the 
Athenian legal system (2.177).
172
 However, in terms of the rule of law, this passage highlights 
one way that nomos comes into existence, through human request not divine intervention, yet 
the gods are involved in enforcement, through the imposition of oaths. This introduces a 
coercive element which Herodotus signals is necessary to ensure that Solon’s nomoi are 
implemented.    
 
There are further aspects of the Solon narrative that relate directly to the rule of law. Law 
comes from a two-sided negotiation with the Athenians. Solon responds to their request for 
laws, and both he and the Athenians commit to a ten-year trial period, when Solon leaves 
Athens and the Athenians seal their commitment with oaths, showing that both parties accept 
the obligation to be bound by the rules which Solon creates. The model, therefore, is not that 
of a monarch who imposes legislation. Solon separates the rule from the exercise of power, 
which makes him unusual; the other person who does so in the Histories is Demonax, sent by 
the Mantineans to Cyrene as arbitrator (4.161).
173
 This makes both men outsiders, with a 
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claim, therefore, to ‘impartial universality’.
174
 This contrasts with Deioces, whose motivation 
as a lawgiver is to become tyrant, to get power for himself, as I analyse below, and who 
creates a structure which forces obedience and compliance.  
 
Is Solon’s significance in the Histories, therefore, that he makes laws for the Athenians? 
Willey argues that his role as legislator – ‘one who brings order and justice to the city and 
promotes its success and values’ – is key to his wider presentation in the Histories.
175
 I think 
this reading owes too much to the Solon of poetry and later tradition.
176
 His portrayal by 
Herodotus relates, I argue, not only to his position in social memory as a travelling wise man 
and lawgiver, but also to his role in warning Croesus of the limits of human ambition and 
power.
177
 His overall message that ‘everything human is a matter of chance’(πᾶν ἐστὶ 
ἄνθρωπος συμφορή, 1.32.4)
178
 is one which the powerful in the Histories tend to forget and is 
linked to the divine phthonos which punishes those who assume godlike powers and think 
they can ignore the boundary between mortal and the divine.
179
 Cairns expresses this as 
violating others’ legitimate claims to respect; ‘in all behaviour which attracts divine phthonos 
will be found the same elements of the transgression of limits, of the offender’s excessive 
pursuit of honour and status and of the corresponding insult to the timē of the gods’.
180
 There 
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is, therefore, a concept of a universal rule of law which involves divine intervention and 
sanction. 
 
Solon illustrates this with two stories which have a strong gender element. He first tells the 
story of Tellus of Athens, who was prosperous throughout his life, had fine, noble sons (καλοί 
τε κἀγαθοί, 1.30.4) and surviving grandchildren, and who died a glorious death (ἀπέθανε 
κάλλιστα, 1.30.5) in battle and was honoured by the Athenians as a result (ἐτίμησαν μεγάλως, 
1.30.5). This is a conventional view of happiness based on material wealth, family, a long life 
and an honourable death, and is a remarkable paradigm of the normative male because, as 
Dewald puts it, ‘his achievement is one that none of the thousands of individuals who 
populate Herodotus’ long narrative come close to equalling’.
181
 Tellus, therefore, is an 
exemplum of ‘hegemonic masculinity’,
182
 combining wealth, prowess in battle and familial 
good fortune. This model of the normative male which foregrounds family as well as prowess 
in battle is not specifically Athenian; the Persian king rewards those who produce the most 
sons (1.136.1). 
 
In the second story told by Solon, Cleobis and Biton pull their mother, priestess to Hera, in a 
cart to the sanctuary, for the festival of Hera at Argos, witnessed by Argives, male and 
female. The men congratulate (ἐμακάριζον, 1.31.3) the boys for their strength, the women 
congratulate their mother for having such children. Cole reads this as a ritual speech act, a 
‘public ritual pronouncement of happiness, prosperity and a blessing from the gods’.
183
 This 
story certainly illustrates that festivals are a form of collective activity, which validates this 
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woman’s agency in ritual practice and her performance as priestess, showing her in the public 
sphere, with a public voice, performing a public function.
184
 However, I read it also as a 
speech act which praises gender performances; men respect and admire physical strength, 
women see it as a matter of good fortune to have sons with this quality.
185
 This aspect of the 
story, therefore, like the story of Tellus, reinforces both male and female gender norms, 
emphasising the significance of family in both instances. 
 
However, there proves to be a tension between this woman’s role as mother, and her role as 
priestess, in that, through her religious actions, she causes the death of her sons. She is the 
actor in this story and it is her feelings that are focalised, in particular her excessive joy at 
what they had done and the fame it would bring (περιχαρὴς ἐοῦσα τῷ τε ἔργῳ καὶ τῇ φήμῃ, 
1.31.4). The adverb περιχαρὴς always foreshadows disaster, whether actual or pending, in the 
Histories.
186
 In this case, the mother is responding to the women’s speech act congratulating 
her (αἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖαι [ἐμακάριζον] τὴν μητέρα αὐτῶν, οἵων τέκνων ἐκύρησε, 1.31.3) for having 
gained such children as Cleobis and Biton. Cole notes that μακαρίζειν is ‘a gift not bestowed 
without irony’ and that is certainly the case here.
187
 The woman who is so exceedingly proud 
of her sons prays for the best outcome for a human being (τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ τυχεῖν ἄριστόν ἐστι, 
1.31.4), and thereby causes their death. Both she and her fellow Argives thought she was 
happy but they learnt the lesson that happiness can only be measured after death, not during 
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For some commentators the point is to illustrate the pessimistic wisdom of the god that death 
is better than life for humans (ἄμεινον εἴη ἀνθρώπῳ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζώειν, 1.31.3).
189
 This 
places Herodotus in the tradition of archaic elegy, in which proverbially
190
: 
It is best of all for mortals not to be born and not to look upon the rays of the piercing 
sun, but once born it is best to pass the gates of Hades as quickly as possible and to lie 
under a large heap of earth. 
πάντων μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον, μηδ᾿ ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου, φύντα δ᾿ 
ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι καὶ κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γῆν ἐπαμησάμενον (Theognis 
Elegies 1: 425–28) 
 
Chiasson notes the link between maternity and mortality in archaic poetry as well as in 
Herodotus, and the elements of myth and initiatory ritual in this story, whereby the dedication 
of statues gives the young men honorary initiation into the status of adult male warriors and 
mitigates their mortality.191 
 
However, I think this misses a significant aspect of this story, the uncomfortable intersection, 
at times, between religious practice and gender performance, the ambiguity at the heart of 
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 In the case of Hera’s priestess, her power lies in her religious 
function, which enables her to make a request of the god, but the outcome for her as a mother 
is unhappy. It contradicts the message in the story of Tellus, that happiness lies in having 
children and grandchildren who survive. Croesus himself suffers the loss of his son Atys, the 
effect of which Herodotus describes as devastating (τῷ θανάτῳ τοῦ παιδὸς συντεταραγμένος, 
1.44.1) and, as Lateiner points out, childlessness in Greek society was seen as punishment 
because it meant the end of the oikos.
193
 I explore this theme in greater length in chapter 4 
when I consider those who put the oikos, and therefore their power and status as men, as well 
as rulers, at risk. The happiness of this woman as the boys’ mother was short-lived and her 
story, like that of Croesus, illustrates Solon’s observation that one must look at the outcome 
of events before passing judgment on them (σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν 
κῇ ἀποβήσεται, 1.32.9).  
 
Herodotus, therefore, follows his description of Solon as lawgiver (1.29) with his role as 
storyteller, someone who understands that living with the rules of the gods means accepting 
that they sometimes punish those, like the mother in this story, and subsequently Croesus, 
who are over-confident in their dealings with the gods. In the case of Lycurgus, the interaction 
of divine and human agency is more directly signposted by Herodotus. 
 
3.2 Lycurgus 
Some say that the Pythia also declared to him the order that now exists at Sparta, but 
the Lacedaemonians themselves say that Lycurgus brought it from Crete when he 
was guardian of his nephew Leobotes, the Spartan king. Once he became guardian, 
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he changed all the rules and made sure that no one transgressed the new ones. 
Lycurgus afterwards established their affairs of war (the sworn companies, the 
division of thirty, and the communal messes), and beside these the ephors and the 
gerontes.  
οἳ μὲν δή τινες πρὸς τούτοισι λέγουσι καὶ φράσαι αὐτῷ τὴν Πυθίην τὸν νῦν 
κατεστεῶτα κόσμον Σπαρτιήτῃσι. ὡς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι, Λυκοῦργον 
ἐπιτροπεύσαντα Λεωβώτεω, ἀδελφιδέου μὲν ἑωυτοῦ βασιλεύοντος δὲ Σπαρτιητέων, 
ἐκ Κρήτης ἀγαγέσθαι ταῦτα. ὡς γὰρ ἐπετρόπευσε τάχιστα, μετέστησε τὰ νόμιμα 
πάντα, καὶ ἐφύλαξε ταῦτα μὴ παραβαίνειν: μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἔχοντα, ἐνωμοτίας 
καὶ τριηκάδας καὶ συσσίτια, πρός τε τούτοισι τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ γέροντας ἔστησε 
Λυκοῦργος. (1.65.4-5) 
 
Herodotus, therefore, gives two versions of the story of Lycurgus as lawgiver, one based on 
divine revelation, one on human agency. The Pythia has already blurred the boundary 
between god and mortal by questioning whether Lycurgus is man or god but on balance, 
favouring the latter (δίζω ἤ σε θεὸν μαντεύσομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον. ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον θεὸν 
ἔλπομαι, ὦ Λυκόοργε, 1.65.3). Herodotus himself does not commit to either version of the 
story. The latter version however historicises the process, in that firstly, Lycurgus changes the 
rules, later (μετὰ δὲ) he creates the institutions. Willey glosses κόσμος and τὰ νόμιμα πάντα 
as ‘constitution’ but this is to miss the development in this story.
194
 Herodotus shows the 
creation of new rules with sanctions attached to be a process which precedes the creation of 
institutions. These, in gender terms, embed male authority in the Spartan polis, creating rules 
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which define who is included and excluded and making war and politics institutionally 
gendered.  
 
The creation of new rules, therefore, the rule of law introduced by Lycurgus, is separate from 
the creation of gendered institutions, making gender less significant as a factor in the wider 
story of how Lycurgus brought ‘good rule’ to the Spartans, who had formerly had the worst 
rules (κακονομώτατοι ἦσαν ... μετέβαλον δὲ ὧδε ἐς εὐνομίην, 1.65.2). He is thereby credited 
with introducing a form of the rule of law to Sparta, based on eunomia, which is of 
significance to the wider community, as well as institutionalised gender segregation in matters 
of war and politics. In later chapters, I will argue that, in Herodotus’ stories on Spartans 
‘living with the rules’, the institutional aspect is less important than the interaction of human 
and divine authority, expressed through oaths, the Pythia and supplication. Moreover, Spartan 
rules are not always coercive, orders backed up by threats, but have to be negotiated, as in 
other Greek poleis, and the performance of those rules assessed by the wider Spartiate 
community. Negotiating with the rules of tyranny is a different proposition as I now consider, 
though, as with Lycurgus and the Spartans, the absence of rules may need to be addressed 
before institutions are created. 
 
3.3 Deioces 
He was a clever man ... who desired to be tyrant ... and he did, in fact practise with 
integrity and fairness, because he desired power. Already a man of some standing in 
his own village, he began to practise justice more enthusiastically and zealously than 
ever, and he did this even though there was much lawlessness throughout the land of 
Media, and he knew that injustice is the enemy of justice. Then the Medes of the 
same village, seeing his behaviour, chose him to be their judge  
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σοφὸς ... ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος ... ὁ δὲ δή, οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχήν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν 
... ἐν τῇ ἑωυτοῦ ἐὼν καὶ πρότερον δόκιμος καὶ μᾶλλόν τι καὶ προθυμότερον 
δικαιοσύνην ἐπιθέμενος ἤσκεε: καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι ἐούσης ἀνομίης πολλῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν 
τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐποίεε, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι τῷ δικαίῳ τὸ ἄδικον πολέμιον ἐστί. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς 





For Thomas, there are echoes in the Deioces story of similar ones about Greek tyrants, 
encouraging an audience to reflect on ideas of justice, law and state formation.
196
 The 
prevalence of words with a dikē root in this story has been noted and the role of Deioces in the 
process of synoecism, changing Media from a predominantly rural society to a centralised 
bureaucracy, controlled from Ecbatana.
197
 Asheri reads the story as ‘a parable on the subject 
of tyranny as seen by an intellectual Greek’ achieved through gaining a reputation as a judge 
and law enforcer.
198
 Moreover, it is clear that Deioces becomes an increasingly harsh and 
remote protector of law and order who hides from view but has ‘eyes and ears’ across Media. 
This transformation is reflected in the changing descriptions of Deioces; the Medes agree to 
make him king (βασιλέα σφίσι εἶναι, 1.98.1) but once he is in power he strengthens his 
tyranny (ἐκράτυνε ἑωυτὸν τῇ τυραννίδι, 1.100.1).
199
 Harris argues that the tyranny of Deioces 
was the antithesis of the rule of law in Greek eyes, since he promoted law and order as a 
means to gain power, rather than an end in itself, whereas for Solon the rule of law was an 
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alternative to the rule of man.
200
 Is tyranny, therefore, always incompatible with the rule of 
law? 
 
This story provides a model of how the nomos of coercive tyranny is created, but I argue that 
Deioces, in some ways, is a foil to Astyages and model for the young Cyrus, and that, 
whereas the straightforward narrative structure of the Deioces story suits its purpose as a 
medium for Herodotus’ audience to think about political theory, the mythical and dramatic 
nature of the story of Astyages and Cyrus invites us to think about the ‘unwritten laws’ of 
family and the oikos community, as I explore in chapter 4. The story of Deioces is told as part 
of the story of Cyrus’ rise to power (told in ring composition from 1.95-1.130) and, in many 
ways, both explains some of the difficulties inherent in the nomos of tyranny (reliance on a 
hierarchy of command, for instance) as evident in the rule of Astyages, but also highlights the 
individual nature of Astyages’ offence against nomos; whilst both Median kings are harsh, 




Deioces sets up a relationship with the Medians based on his role as the embodiment of 
justice and creator of rules to combat anomia, but in pursuit of his desire to be tyrant. In this 
respect he is like Peisistratus, who convinces the Athenians to reinstate him as tyrant by 
dressing up Phye as the goddess Athena (1.60), thereby using an element of guile to achieve 
his goal. The Medians prove themselves capable of resisting an external power, the Assyrians. 
Having freed themselves from external rule (ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων πάντων, 1.96.1) why, 
then, do they return to the rule of tyranny internally (ὧδε αὖτις ἐς τυραννίδα περιῆλθον, 
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 Herodotus presents this as the calculated outcome of Deioces. It is notable that 
there is no compulsion here; the Medians choose Deioces to be their judge, and eventually 
will agree only to his judgments because he alone was fair (ὡς Δηιόκης εἴη ἀνὴρ μοῦνος κατὰ 
τὸ ὀρθὸν δικάζων, 1.96.3). However, it is very clear from Herodotus’ narrative that Deioces 
skilfully manipulates his position to achieve his ends. To that extent, he shows the 
‘uncommon skill and success as a political operator’ that, in Anderson’s view, distinguishes 
turannoi from other oligarchic leaders, winning the support of the community and thus a 
degree of legitimacy.
203
 The state of anomia that Herodotus attributes to the Median villages 
is not anarchy, but an unfair and ineffective system of justice, which does not command the 
respect of the community. There are nomoi but they are not enforced adequately, as is 
highlighted when Deioces refuses to continue his pro bono judgments:  
This caused robbery and lawlessness to return to the villages on a greater scale than 
before and, gathering together, the Medes had a debate about their present situation, 
and considered what action to take (here, I suppose, the main speakers were Deioces’ 
friends) ... ‘Let’s make one of us king. Then the country will be well governed and 
we can return to work and not lose our homes due to lawlessness’.  
ἐούσης ὦν ἁρπαγῆς καὶ ἀνομίης ἔτι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνὰ τὰς κώμας ἢ πρότερον ἦν 
συνελέχθησαν οἱ Μῆδοι ἐς τὠυτὸ καὶ ἐδίδοσαν σφίσι λόγον, λέγοντες περὶ τῶν 
κατηκόντων. ὡς δ᾽ ἐγὼ δοκέω, μάλιστα ἔλεγον οἱ τοῦ Δηιόκεω φίλοι ... φέρε 
στήσωμεν ἡμέων αὐτῶν βασιλέα: καὶ οὕτω ἥ τε χωρῇ εὐνομήσεται καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς 
ἔργα τρεψόμεθα, οὐδὲ ὑπ᾽ ἀνομίης ἀνάστατοι ἐσόμεθα, 1.97.2-3) 
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This passage illustrates that the Medians have a forum for debate and decision-making; they 
meet together and make speeches and persuade themselves to be governed by a king 
(πείθουσι ἑωυτοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι, 1.97.3), albeit following a debate that was dominated by 
Deioces’ friends, in Herodotus’ opinion as narrator (ὡς δ᾽ ἐγὼ δοκέω, 1.97.2). Part of the 
Medians’ motivation is a wish for stability, so that they can work and not be driven from their 
homes through lawlessness (ὑπ᾽ ἀνομίης ἀνάστατοι); like the Spartans they seek eunomia. 
The price for this is submission to a harsh regime in that he forces the Medians to build him 
one city (τοὺς Μήδους ἠνάγκασε ἓν πόλισμα ποιήσασθαι, 1.98.3).
204
 He then creates the 
institutions which underpin his tyranny: 
When he had made these arrangements and strengthened his position as tyrant, he was 
harsh in the protection of justice. People would write down their pleas and send them 
in to him; then he would pass judgment on what was brought to him and send his 
decisions out. This was his manner of deciding legal cases, and he had other methods 
too, for when he heard that a man had committed an offence, he would send for him 
and inflict on him the punishment the crime deserved. And he had spies and 
eavesdroppers everywhere in his kingdom.  
ἐπείτε δὲ ταῦτα διεκόσμησε καὶ ἐκράτυνε ἑωυτὸν τῇ τυραννίδι, ἦν τὸ δίκαιον 
φυλάσσων χαλεπός: καὶ τάς τε δίκας γράφοντες ἔσω παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐσπέμπεσκον, καὶ 
ἐκεῖνος διακρίνων τὰς ἐσφερομένας ἐκπέμπεσκε. ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὰς δίκας ἐποίεε, 
τάδε δὲ ἄλλα ἐκεκοσμέατὸ οἱ: εἴ τινα πυνθάνοιτο ὑβρίζοντα, τοῦτον ὅκως 
μεταπέμψαιτο κατ᾽ ἀξίην ἑκάστου ἀδικήματος ἐδικαίευ, καὶ οἱ κατάσκοποί τε καὶ 
κατήκοοι ἦσαν ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν χώρην τῆς ἦρχε. (1.100) 
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The language has changed from choice, debate and face to face justice to coercion, written 
judgments and a network of informants. As Baragwanath points out, the walls of Ecbatana 
symbolise and effect the transformation of Media from the autonomous rule of villages to the 
centralised tyranny of Deioces, which creates an institution and legal system based on 
coercion.
205
 Deioces also isolates himself; ‘he was the first to make rules that no-one was to 
enter into the king’s presence, but all business was to be conducted through messengers and 
the king was to be seen by no one’ (Δηιόκης πρῶτος ἐστὶ ὁ καταστησάμενος, μήτε ἐσιέναι 





However, there are aspects of the story which distinguish it from the story of Deioces’ great 
grandson Astyages. Whilst Deioces is harsh, his rule is not arbitrary and he does nothing 
either to threaten the integrity of his oikos or to risk foreign campaigns (unlike his son, who 
died, with most of his troops, at the hands of the Assyrians, 1.102.2). I suggest, therefore, that 
whilst the story is clearly part of Herodotus’ explanation of why things happen, and how the 
political nomos of tyranny can arise, Herodotus also contrasts Deioces with Astyages, who 
invites retribution through acts which are egregious and unlawful (anoma). In the story, 
Deioces shows some skill in his pursuit of power, playing the same game of alliance 
negotiation and image-marketing as everyone else.
207
 Herodotus shows us a community 
which chooses tyranny, through a process that includes debate and consideration of options. 
As Brock and Hodkinson point out, even in those communities without democratic processes 
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rulers need to interact with the community; ‘issues of power are often balanced by the need to 
create a general will to action and consensus within the community’.
208
 Deioces imposes 
harsh nomoi, as tyrant, but, initially at least, with the consent of the Medes and the support of 
his friends. This story illustrates the interaction of ruler and community, whereby nomos is 
increasingly coercive, but is the price the community pays for not being driven from their 
homes through lawlessness. Deioces creates a rule of law in the ‘thin’ sense of rules which not 
only coerce the subject but also facilitate community life. Herodotus, however, also signposts 
the lack of accountability of king to subject, the use of spies, and the lack of a proper system 
of due process, which can become markers of the absence of the rule of law in the hands of 
other tyrants. In the next story, by contrast, women create a nomos within the oikos, rather 
than issuing orders backed up by threats, which they lack the power to do. 
 
3.4 The Carian women 
[The Athenians] did not bring wives with them on their voyage of colonisation, but 
married some Carian women, having murdered their fathers. It is because of this 
murder that the women made it a rule (a rule they bound themselves to by oaths and 
passed on from mother to daughter) never to share a meal with their husbands and 
never to call out to them by name – these were, after all, the men who had gained them 
as their wives by murdering their fathers, husbands and children  
οὗτοι δὲ οὐ γυναῖκας ἠγάγοντο ἐς τὴν ἀποικίην ἀλλὰ Καείρας ἔσχον, τῶν ἐφόνευσαν 
τοὺς γονέας. διὰ τοῦτὸν δὲ τὸν φόνον αἱ γυναῖκες αὗται νόμον θέμεναι σφίσι αὐτῇσι 
ὅρκους ἐπήλασαν καὶ παρέδοσαν τῇσι θυγατράσι, μή κοτε ὁμοσιτῆσαι τοῖσι ἀνδράσι 
μηδὲ οὐνόματι βῶσαι τὸν ἑωυτῆς ἄνδρα, τοῦδε εἵνεκα ὅτι ἐφόνευσαν σφέων τοὺς 
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πατέρας καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἔπειτα ταῦτα ποιήσαντες αὐτῇσι συνοίκεον 
(1.146.2-3) 
 
In this story, the Carian women make a nomos which regulates their social intercourse with 
their Athenian husbands, as a consequence of the murder of their own kin. I argue that this 
can be read both as an act of resistance, and in the longer term, an act of memorialising that 
resistance, which Herodotus himself perpetuates with his work. This resistance is to the rule 
of law as oppressor, a coercive power which forces women into marriage with the men who 
killed their fathers. The Athenians who colonise Caria assume a right analogous to the right in 
war, to capture these women as if they were spoils of war.
209
 At a talk at the University of 
Birmingham on 7
th
 March 2018, Irad Malkin argued that the usual practice was for Greek 
colonists to take their wives with them, and the Carian example was, therefore, unusual.
210
 
This would be an added reason for Herodotus to find this story interesting, as well as the 
undoubtedly unusual aspect of women as lawmakers.  
 
Asheri interprets this story as a rational aetiology for the widespread custom of sex-
segregation at meals, drawing parallels with the Cretan and Spartan syssitia, the Greek 
symposium and the banquets of the Macedonians in the Histories (5.18.3), and interprets the 
custom of not calling a husband by name as probably a Carian tradition which outlived 
Hellenisation of the city.
211
 He comments that the custom introduced by the Carian women is 
seen by Herodotus as strange or exceptional, citing Dickey, whose general study of Greek 
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forms of address distinguishes between women for whom the appropriate form of address for 
a respectable, unrelated woman is ‘γύναι’, that is, not by her first or last name, and men, 
where the variation between first name and ‘ἄνερ’ is ‘either random or dependent on factors 
which cannot be identified’. However, she also points out that the lexical meaning of γῠνή as 
‘woman’ or ‘wife’ does not either emphasise the connection between husband and wife or 
signal affection or respect.
212
 What is remarkable, and this may be the reason why Herodotus 
was attracted to this story, is that women are the agents, setting arrangements within the 
oikos; they both exclude men from social space, rather than being excluded from it, and they 
register their protest through silence, not speech, by not naming the men. Dewald argues that 
Herodotus tells this story to mock Ionian pretensions, because, whilst they pride themselves 
on being true-blooded Athenians, in fact they are half Carian.
213
 It could equally suggest that 
Herodotus is mocking not only the Athenian autochthony myth, but also male control of oikos 
space through sex segregation at the Athenian symposium. In his story not only was sex 
segregation at meals introduced by Carians, it was also introduced by women. 
 
There is another aspect to this story, however, which has received less attention, namely the 
internal story, about an act of resistance whereby women reject a social expectation of 
reciprocity, which becomes an act of cultural memorialising, passed by mothers to their 
daughters, and preserving the memory of the murder of husbands, fathers and children by 
Athenians when they colonised Miletus.
214
 Otten, who has interviewed some of the Yezidi 
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women abducted and raped by men from ISIS, writes that they deal with the trauma of their 
experiences through telling stories of their captivity and resistance, in order to reassert their 
identity as Yezidi women and to reject the orientalist stereotype of the passive victim, subject 
to a form of reductive exoticism by the media as ‘sex slaves’.
215
 They know their ancestors 
faced the same sort of persecution in the past and storytelling is a means of promoting 
survival and resistance, though Otten acknowledges this is not always successful.
216
 The story 
of the Carian women, therefore, I argue, has a universal quality which transcends its temporal 
aspect, and links it to similar stories such as those of the Yezidi women. Lateiner’s reading of 
the story of the Carian women is that ‘this report of female determination feeds a Hellenic 
taste for scanning and weighing exotic otherness in race and gender’.
217
 Through creating a 
nomos, though, and securing it with oaths, suggesting an element of compulsion, I suggest 
that the Carian women, like the Yezidi women, reject any narrative of exotic otherness, 
making nomos in a gender-appropriate space, the oikos, and securing it in an appropriate way, 
by oaths. 
 
For Assman, one of the functions of ritual is to keep alive a memory that is not kept alive in 
everyday life.
218
 Certainly, the use of oaths to bind women to the nomos they introduce could 
suggest a ritual element to their practice as well as the need to make the rule obligatory. 
However, the Carian women also preserve and reinforce memory in everyday activities, not 
sharing meals with their husbands or calling them by name, which make this a nomos which 
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concerns the performance of gender as well as a ritual activity. To adapt Jonathan Hall’s 
observation on ethnic identity,
219
 if gender is continuously constructed through practice and 
reinforced through interaction with others, then it is an act of rebellion for the Carian women 
to refuse to name their husbands. Calame argues that the significance of naming the gods is 
that it enables us to identify them, it gives them qualities based on function.
220
 By analogy, 
the Carian women deny their husbands both an identity and a function. By imposing sex 
segregation at meals, moreover, these women are shown to manage both time and space 
within the oikos, rather than being excluded from, for example, the Athenian symposium. 
However, paradoxically, they also assert the Greekness they have acquired through marriage, 





For me, the significance of this story is that women assume the power that is available to them 
to create a nomos that relates to everyday life, but which they intend, through transmission to 
their daughters, to be a means of passing on the memory of their oppression, making the act 
of lawmaking an act of resistance. They create nomos within the oikos, a space which includes 
them, rather than through the formal apparatus of the male assembly, which excludes them. 
What constitutes female authority within the oikos? In Pomeroy’s discussion of the Athenian 
oikos, she links women’s lack of legal competence to their lack of power in the wider sphere. 
The history of the Greek family, she writes, ‘must be largely the history of an institution 
dominated by men’.
222
 Taylor, however, argues that ‘ideological notions of separation quickly 
break down when confronted with lived experience’ and suggests we should consider what 
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women are allowed to do rather than what they are excluded from.
223
 Patterson, also, 
considers women within the oikos as participants, not just objects of the male gaze, whose 




Herodotus’ story, however, goes further than giving women agency as mediators; they make 
the rules of social intercourse within the oikos, suggesting that it is a mistake to focus on legal 
capacity in the narrow sense of participation in legal institutions. They have authority as 
mothers which enables them not only to control their daughters, and enforce that control 
through oaths, but also to limit their own interaction with their husbands. They create a 
precedent, which unquestionably has a prescriptive aspect, and is intended to bind daughters 
as well as husbands, thus conforming to Hart’s concept of law as including social norms 
which are accepted as valid and binding by those amongst whom they prevail. 
 
It is important, nevertheless, to emphasise the unusual aspect of this story. Most women in the 
Histories do not find a remedy for abduction and rape through creating or enforcing nomos. 
At the start of the Histories, Herodotus relates the stories of four mythical women. In his 
account they have no voice; they are akin to property, to be seized and exchanged. Herodotus 
makes Alexander’s motivation explicit; he wanted a Greek wife and he thought he would get 
away with stealing one (1.3.1) because no consequences had followed the previous abduction 
of Medea by the Greeks. The language in this section (1.1-5) is significant. Herodotus uses 
variants of ἁρπάζω 16 times,
225
 emphasising the seizure or theft of women. The king of 
Colchis demands payment for his daughter’s abduction and her return (1.2.3), the Greeks 
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demand the return of Helen and a compensation payment (1.3.2), and Herodotus uses words 
which suggest justice, compensation and reciprocity (αἰτέειν τε δίκας ... ἀπαιτέειν, 1.2.3), but 
for men, not women. The Corinthian women who are stripped naked by Periander (5.92) have 
no legal remedy, nor do the Phocian women gang-raped until they died (γυναῖκας τινὰς 
διέφθειραν μισγόμενοι ὑπὸ πλήθεος, 8.33). Greeks receive the spoils of war after their victory 
over the Persians, which include women (τὰς παλλακὰς τῶν Περσέων καὶ τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ 
ἄργυρον καὶ ἄλλα χρήματα τε καὶ ὑποζύγια, 9.81) and Masistes’ wife is only protected from 
rape because of her husband’s relationship to Xerxes (9.108.1). As with the stories of 
remarkable individual women, such as Candaules’ wife or Artemisia, the story of the Carian 
women is an interesting and salutary counterpoint to an essentialist ideology which devalues 
the female, but it is unusual. For me, the significance is that women are shown to create 
nomos and make it effective and binding outside structures of patriarchal authority. 
 
Conclusion 
The story of the Carian women shows that Herodotus’ conception of nomos is wide enough to 
encompass the regulation of family and social life, which feminist legal theory has 
highlighted as missing from much modern legal discourse. The story also illustrates Hart’s 
argument that rules have an ‘internal’ aspect which coerces those subject to them, and 
supports Pospíčil’s concept of law whereby women here are the legal authority within a 
group, who have power to enforce an imperative decision on their daughters, supported by a 
sanction in the form of oaths, as a response to a dispute with the men who have taken them 
legitimately (according to the rules of war) but against their will. Moreover, they intend their 
decision to bind daughters in the future. I will explore this in more detail throughout this 
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thesis, when I consider the performance of gender by women as well as men, in the oikos and 
in public space.  
 
Solon, Lycurgus and Deioces are shown to be very different lawgivers. Solon is someone who 
speaks truth to power, and understands the interaction of gods and men to be integral to 
nomos. I will apply this to those in the Histories who forget this crucial aspect of the rule of 
law. Lycurgus shows a different relationship to the divine, which is ambiguous since even a 
god (Apollo) cannot be sure whether he is a god or human. However, through setting up 
Spartan institutions, he establishes a legal system which I will test as ‘law in action’ in 
chapter 4. Deioces, meanwhile sets up the nomos of tyranny. These are the rules therefore, 
which individuals and groups have to live with, but everyone, including the rulers themselves 
have to live with divine rules, which are secured through oaths, negotiated through 
interpreting the Pythia, and should be respected as imposing sanctions and punishments on 
those who violate the wider rule of law. 
 
I have identified the rule of law in both its ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ sense. The Deioces story shows 
that law has to be implemented to avoid anomia, but he also introduces the coercive, 
repressive, aspects of tyranny. Another tyrant, Croesus has to be educated by Solon to ‘look to 
the end’, to acknowledge limits on tyranny whereby Herodotus gives us an ideal of the rule of 
law, its ‘thick’ aspect, which has a ‘normative role for the community as a whole’
226
 and also 
binds kings as well as slaves. 
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In this chapter I have concentrated on those who make law, addressing the role of the gods, 
and human lawmakers, including the Carian women. In my next chapter, I use a case study 
about the foundation of religious institutions, the oracles at Dodona and Siwa, to illustrate 
Herodotus’ legal method, integral to his concept of the rule of law, and to consider what 
nomos is for, what legal procedures, institutional or otherwise, uphold it and how nomos is 




CHAPTER 2: HERODOTUS’ JURIDICAL METHODOLOGY: LAW, 
GENDER, AND SPEECH 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law is reflected in his own 
methodology. He emphasises the need to evaluate source material, just as a lawyer has to 
assess evidence, to interpret those sources critically and to come to a judgment based on a 
balance of factors. In his work of historiē, Herodotus interrogates the past, seeking evidence 
for what happened, why it happened, who was responsible, and whose fault it was, for 
example, that the Greeks and non-Greeks went to war (δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι, 
Proem). From the start of the Histories, therefore, Herodotus is addressing issues of 
causation, a key aspect of both civil and criminal proceedings in modern law. He assembles 
stories from his informants, often giving us more than one version; sometimes he assesses the 
evidence and favours one account, sometimes he distances himself from both stories. Both 
approaches are assessments on his part of credibility. 
 
In any legal investigation there will be at least two accounts which need to be evaluated. At 
the start of the Histories, Herodotus reports the Persian belief that no women would be 
abducted unwillingly (1.4.2) and the Phoenician account which holds Io complicit in her own 
abduction (1.5.2), but declares ‘I will not come down on one side or another’ (ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν 
τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως κως ταῦτα ἐγένετο, 1.5.3). He thus establishes 
his critical credentials at the start of the Histories, seeking out alternate sources and not 
relying on a ‘single propagandistic account’.
227
 The assessment of evidence, the interrogation 
of conflicting accounts, the analysis of source material is all part of legal work, and is more 
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complex than a binary opposition of truth and lies; it is arriving at a balanced judgment. Any 
trial is interpretive; it ‘reconstructs a history, and marshals evidence to answer a particular 




In this chapter, I start by using the story of the foundation of oracles at Dodona and Siwa as a 
case study to show how Herodotus models for us a methodology that is part inquisitorial, part 
adversarial, and engages with key legal skills of evidence-gathering, interpretation and 
judgment, but is not based on the institutions of the law courts, written statute, and forensic 
oratory. I use two examples from modern law, one from criminal law, one from family law, to 
show that law can be both punitive, invoking the rhetoric of blame, and investigatory, making 
a judgment on what is in the best interests of a child. Herodotus also shows us a rule of law 
which sometimes invokes the rhetoric of praise and blame, sometimes regulates gender 
performance.  
 
I will demonstrate that, in the Histories, we are most likely to discover the authoritative 
nomos through speech rather than through a written statute. Nomos, then, has to be interpreted 
in the light of available evidence, and, finally, a judgment has to be made. In this chapter, 
therefore, I introduce the role of speech, by both men and women, in engaging with these 
three categories, though there is, of course, some considerable overlap. Candaules’ wife for 
example, speaks the rule, and comes to a judgment on the basis of her interpretation of what 
she knows and sees. In later chapters, I will distinguish between those cases where violation 
of nomos is being punished, those where women are involved in preserving the oikos, 
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regulating their community and acting as agents of social control, and those characters of both 
genders who are shown to confound gender expectations. 
 
In considering Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law from a gender perspective, I will show 
that he models for us a form of legal method in which an inquisitorial method may be more 
appropriate than an adversarial one, because it can highlight the gap between ideology (the 
official representation of gender, based on the binary opposition of male and female), and 
gender performance, which may subvert or manipulate that ideology. I use the following case 
study to show that Herodotus’ legal method is both inquisitorial and adversarial, in practice. 
In the story of the foundation of oracles at Dodona and at Siwa in Libya, Herodotus 
establishes his own authority and displays his legal method, through evaluating and 
interpreting his sources as well as relating what they say. His informants speak but Herodotus 
explains their words for us. He explores the origins of the oracles and relates two traditions 
from which he draws his own conclusions.  
 
1. The foundation of oracles at Dodona and Siwa 
In the version told by the priests of Theban Zeus, two priestesses were abducted from Thebes 
by Phoenicians (δύο γυναῖκας ἱρείας ἐκ Θηβέων ἐξαχθῆναι ὑπὸ Φοινίκων, 2.54.1) and sold in 
Libya and Greece (2.54), where they founded oracles in those countries (2.54). Herodotus 
cross-examines the priests on how they could speak with such precise knowledge (εἰρομένου 
δέ μευ ὁκόθεν οὕτω ἀτρεκέως ἐπιστάμενοι λέγουσι, 2.54.2). The priests reply that they could 
not find the women but learnt about the story later on (ἀνευρεῖν μὲν σφέας οὐ δυνατοὶ 
γενέσθαι, πυθέσθαι δὲ ὕστερον ταῦτα περὶ αὐτέων τά περ δὴ ἔλεγον, 2.54.2). This rather 
undermines their credibility, as it exposes their lack of witnesses and is based on a hearsay 
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account. Herodotus questions the truth of the story (εἰ ἀληθέως, 2.56.1) and also corrects the 
vagueness of their reference to ‘Phoenicians’. ‘In my opinion’ (δοκέει ἐμοί, 2.56.1) he says, it 
was the Thesprotians who brought the one priestess to Greece, who worked as a slave for 
them and built a shrine to Zeus under an oak tree. When she had learnt Greek (συνέλαβε τὴν 
Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν, 2.56) she founded an oracle and told how the same Phoenicians who had 
sold her also sold her sister in Libya.  
 
Thus, Herodotus takes an adversarial approach to the priests. They claim to give an accurate 
account but have no supporting witnesses, as Herodotus’ cross-examination reveals. Their 
account is undermined by the lack of a female voice to corroborate their story. He criticises 
them not only for the accuracy of their account but also for how they argue their case, giving 
his own interpretation. However, he also begs a question of his reader: why do you, 
Herodotus, think it was the Thesprotians who brought the priestess to Greece?
229
 He does not 
tell us, making our engagement with Herodotus adversarial in turn. We ask questions of 
Herodotus just as he interrogates his informants. 
 
The second version, told by the priestesses of Dodona (Δωδωναίων δὲ αἱ ἱρεῖαι ... ἔλεγον 
ταῦτα, 2.55.3) has a mythic quality, in which two black doves take off from Thebes in Egypt. 
One flew to Libya, one to Dodona, where it spoke with a human voice (φωνῇ ἀνθρωπείῃ, 
2.55), telling the local people to found an oracle of Zeus there, and the dove which flew to 
Libya told the local people to construct the oracle of Ammon.
230
 This, therefore, is ‘a story 
within a story’ which explains how myths develop, as a way of describing what cannot be 
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understood, in this case, the enigma of a talking bird, which reflects that the women’s speech 
was unintelligible.
231
 Herodotus interrogates this account, but in an inquisitorial rather than an 
adversarial way. He concludes that the priestess sounded like a bird to local people because 
she spoke a foreign language (ἐβαρβάριζε, 2.57.2) but, once she learnt Greek, she could make 
herself understood by them (συνετά σφι ηὔδα, 2.57.2). By identifying her as black they 
signalled (σημαίνουσι) to Herodotus that she was Egyptian. Herodotus, thereby shows his 
interpretive skills, enabling the reader to understand the story.  
 
However, it is clear from the wider narrative that the priestesses are the authorities for a 
particular kind of source material for Herodotus, information about the gods: 
However, where each of the gods came from, whether they have all existed for ever 
and what they each look like was not known until yesterday or the day before, so to 
speak ... say the priestesses at Dodona. 
ἔνθεν δὲ ἐγένοντο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τε τινὲς τὰ εἴδεα, 
οὐκ ἠπιστέατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ ... αἱ Δωδωνίδες ἱρεῖαι 
λέγουσι (2.53) 
 
When he asks them therefore about the oracle at Dodona, he is consulting them as experts on 
religious matters. His priority is to make sure he has the authoritative story, the one that 
everyone connected to the shrine agree on. He satisfies himself that this story, this foundation 
myth,
232
 is agreed by all those connected with the shrine, including the three named 
priestesses (Δωδωναίων δὲ αἱ ἱρεῖαι, τῶν τῇ πρεσβυτάτῃ οὔνομα ἦν Προμένεια, τῇ δὲ μετὰ 
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ταύτην Τιμαρέτη, τῇ δὲ νεωτάτῃ Νικάνδρη, 2.55.3). By naming the three women, moreover, 
he, unlike the priests, produces his witnesses and confirms both his and their authority, as well 
as showing that he has the skill to read signs. In his response to this version, Herodotus again 
shows how such a story should be interpreted, through an argument on probability. It is likely 
(οἰκὸς, 2.56.2), he says, that an abducted priestess who becomes a slave would remain loyal to 
the worship of Zeus. Once she learnt Greek, she could found an oracle and relate what had 
happened to her sister. When he comes, therefore, to rationalise the myth he is not criticising 
his informants but enabling his audience to understand the story. What is common to both 
versions is a narrative in which an abducted and enslaved woman has a significant role in 
transmitting religious belief and practice from one culture to another. She becomes an agent 
of change through learning and speaking Greek, which enables her to found an oracle, and 
which Herodotus carefully interprets for his audience in human, not divine, terms.  
 
In this way, Herodotus models for us an approach to understanding and interpreting his 
sources, which is both inquisitorial and adversarial, depending on his informants, and engages 
with probability not certainty. How valid is it, though, to express this as a legal methodology? 
 
2. The model of judicial arbitration 
Munson uses the word ‘juridical’ (of or pertaining to law or legal proceedings)
233
 to describe 
Herodotus’ inquiry into causation, who is aitios.
234
 She emphasises his role as investigator, 
collecting evidence from eye witness accounts and verbal testimonies, but applying a critical 
filter in that, whilst sources needed to be heard, they might not be reliable, as he tells us, in his 
role as narrator: ‘I have an obligation to record what my sources tell me but certainly no 
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obligation to believe them; this statement holds for my entire work’ (ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ 
λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα 
λόγον, 7.152.3).  
 
Whilst Munson, therefore, privileges that aspect of law which is concerned with gathering and 
interpreting evidence, Immerwahr reads ‘the judicial interrogation of witnesses’ as a metaphor 
for Herodotus’ historical method, based on his observations, investigations and critical 
judgment,
235
 whereas Nagy argues that the Histories is a ‘speech-act of authority’, whose 
historiē is in the epic tradition of both the Iliad, in that both texts raise the issue of fault 
(Proem; Iliad 1.8), and the Odyssey in that Herodotus, like Odysseus, is on a quest.
236
 Nagy 
also draws parallels between Herodotus as narrator of the Histories, and the histor in Homer 
and Hesiod, who has authority derived from the gods to resolve conflicts and decide on who 
is guilty.
237
 Both Munson and Nagy express Herodotus’ methodology in terms of judicial 
arbitration. Nagy argues that Herodotus is modelling the process of mediating the ongoing 
conflict between Athens and Sparta. In a wider sense, argues Munson, he is acting as arbiter 
for his audience’s differences, through instructing them in what is relevant and fair, showing 
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This model of Herodotus as arbiter certainly reflects that aspect of his legal method which 
appraises others’ nomoi, appreciates difference, and shows on a number of occasions that 
disputes are resolved through negotiation and compromise. I follow Hart in distinguishing 
between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ aspect of rules.
239
 Herodotus gives us the ‘external’ view 
as an observer, or inquirer, who describes and evaluates the rules that those he is investigating 
accept as ‘internal’ rules.
240
 He often uses comparative or cross-cultural references, to 
interpret nomoi for himself and his audience. Thus, Lydian customs are like those of the 
Greeks, except that they prostitute their daughters (Λυδοὶ δὲ νόμοισι μὲν παραπλησίοισι 
χρέωνται καὶ Ἕλληνές, χωρὶς ἢ ὅτι τὰ θήλεα τέκνα καταπορνεύουσι, 1.94.1); the Caunians, 
by contrast, differ from the Carians and the rest of the world in their rules (νόμοισι δὲ 
χρέωνται κεχωρισμένοισι πολλὸν τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ Καρῶν, 1.171.1). The Lycians 
have some Cretan, some Carian nomoi, but their distinctive practice is matrilinear succession 
(1.173.4). The Massagetae, though monogamous, make their wives available for sexual 
intercourse with other men (1.216.1). Often, the rule relates to a way of life, so the Egyptian 
marsh dwellers live together in couples, as in Greece (2.92.1). Herodotus’ interest in thōmata 
helps to explain in part why he signposts the unusual aspect of gender rules which relate to 
sexual or social practices, but he also uses a comparative methodology to enable his audience 
to understand and interpret the rules and, by contrasting some practices but drawing parallels 
with others, he shows ‘the intrinsic hybridity of culture and identity’.
241
 Herodotus contrasts 
Hellenic and Egyptian practices but also draws parallels between their rites, gods and 
mythology.
242
 As I identified in the story of the foundation of the oracles, Herodotus assumes 
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a role as interpreter for his audience of those many stories in the Histories of cultural 
appropriation, assimilation, adaption or conflict. 
 
Herodotus, however, also subjects nomos to critical evaluation, both praise and blame. He 
praises the Persian rule that a boy lives in an exclusively female household until he is five 
years old (πρὶν δὲ ἢ πενταέτης γένηται, οὐκ ἀπικνέεται ἐς ὄψιν τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῇσι 
γυναιξὶ δίαιταν ἔχει ... αἰνέω μέν νυν τόνδε τὸν νόμον, 1.136.2-1.137.1), he regards Amasis’ 
rule as faultless (ἐόντι ἀμώμῳ νόμῳ, 2.177.2) but condemns one of the Babylonian practices:  
The most shameful rule amongst the Babylonians is this: every woman in the country 
is forced to sit in the temple of Aphrodite and have sexual intercourse with a stranger 
once in her life 
ὁ δὲ δὴ αἴσχιστος τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ τοῖσι Βαβυλωνίοισι ὅδε: δεῖ πᾶσαν γυναῖκα 
ἐπιχωρίην ἱζομένην ἐς ἱρὸν Ἀφροδίτης ἅπαξ ἐν τῇ ζόῃ μιχθῆναι ἀνδρὶ ξείνῳ 
(1.199.1) 
 
He also educates as well as informs his audience. Those Greeks who think the communal 
sharing of wives is a Scythian practice are wrong, it is Massegetan (1.216.1) and he corrects 
the ignorance of Greeks about Egyptian character and practices (2.45). As Baragwanath notes, 
differing nomoi pose a challenge to the external audience, in assessing motivation, and 
understanding speech and action.
243
 In this way, he encourages his readers to see nomos as a 
matter for debate, disagreement and judgment, which reflects also his adversarial side.  
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3. The adversarial model  
The model of Herodotus as heir to Homer and arbiter between conflicting positions, therefore, 
does not fully explain his methodology. In dealing with the Helen logos in Book 2, he 
subjects Homer to critical scrutiny, agreeing with the Egyptian priests’ account in which 
Helen is detained by Proteus in Egypt and never gets to Troy, and reasoning (ἐπιλεγόμενος) 
that, if she had been in Troy, the Trojans would have given her back to the Greeks, whether or 
not Alexander consented (2.120.1). He intrudes as narrator with his suppositions 





In this way, some argue, his form of self-display has parallels with sophists and medical 
writers of his time. In criticising Homer, he is setting up his own authority as someone who 
pursues historiē and may be mounting a challenge to his supremacy.
245
 In this branch of 
scholarship, historiography is a branch of rhetoric, and Herodotus part of an intellectual 
tradition which values competition and in which the historian is ‘fighting his own literary 
battle’.
246
 Thomas argues that Herodotus was part of a world of polemical and rhetorical 
argument, in that both he and his audience saw the art of persuasion as partly a matter of 
display (apodeixis) which one could appreciate and enjoy, as when Herodotus has Artemisia 
say ‘I will demonstrate what I think is the right advice’ (τὴν δὲ ἐοῦσαν γνώμην με δίκαιόν 
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 This approach makes Herodotus more combative, more 
adversarial, than the model of him as judicial arbiter, and aligns him more closely to the 
Athenian model of forensic oratory. However, it is notable that, although there are some law-
court scenes in the Histories, there is only one passage in direct speech in the Histories, that 
of Thearides, which we would categorise as a forensic speech, when he successfully 
persuades the Aeginetans not to remove Leotychides, but to take him to Athens to secure the 
release of hostages (6.85). 
 
These two models, therefore, of law as a form of arbitration, and law as adversarial, of the 
type encountered in forensic oratory, do not answer fully the question of Herodotus’ 
methodology in analysing nomos. I think it is necessary to interrogate our own preconceptions 
of ‘law’ and distinguish more precisely between the various elements of legal proceedings; 
gathering evidence and assessing credibility are different from interpretation, which in turn is 
distinct from the act of judgment. Herodotus’ historiē into law is rarely just descriptive; 
rather, it involves identifying the evidence, and the area of dispute, and coming to a 
judgment.
248
 Within that process there are, I argue, three main stages. I will use modern 
examples and the model of Athenian oratory to show some parallels with the Histories but 
also significant differences. I will also distinguish between that law which imposes 
punishment for offences, and law as social control, the regulation of everyday life. 
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4. An institutional approach to nomos? 
In my last chapter, I discussed the role of Solon, Lycurgus and Deioces as lawgivers, and, in 
the case of Sparta and Media, the creation of associated institutions. However, the lawmaking 
of the Carian women was performed outside a formal institutional framework. This makes 
Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law very different from either modern or classical Athenian 
analyses. The modern lawyer will start with written statute or case law and the institutions of 
the law courts, legal profession and judiciary. In the examples I give in this chapter on child 
abuse, the specific offence, relevant to a criminal prosecution, is child cruelty.
249
 In civil 
proceedings however, where a local authority seeks to protect a child from significant harm, 
the relevant provisions are in the Children Act 1989.
250
 Hart also identified ‘rules of 
adjudication’ which confer powers on judges to make decisions within a prescribed court 
structure with defined procedures.
251
 The legislation I refer to is gender-neutral, though I will 
give an example of a judge who invokes a gender trope in his judgment. 
 
The legal historian of Athenian law has the resource of the surviving speeches of the Attic 
orators, of which approximately three-quarters, according to Todd, were delivered in law 
court trials, which he terms ‘forensic’; the rest were delivered either to a deliberative body, 
usually the Assembly (‘symbouleutic’ or ‘demegoric’ in Todd’s terminology) or were display 
speeches, classified by later rhetorical theorists as ‘epideictic’.
252 
The forensic speeches given 
in the law courts are, therefore, invaluable source material for scholars of Athenian law. In 
gender terms, the Athenian courts exclude women; they have no role as litigants, witnesses or 
dikastai, and their presence or absence in a speech will be determined by the rhetorical 
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purpose of the male speechwriter. Harrison’s index entry: ‘women, disabilities’ sums up their 




To what extent, therefore, can we use the references to law courts and judicial proceedings in 
the Histories to analyse Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law? As Thomas states, ‘we cannot 
examine law by itself without the apparatus within which it was applied and the structures – 
either cultural or political – in which it was created, and then argued over, supported, evaded, 
and put into action’.
254
 Though there are references to law courts and judges (four examples 
of τό δικαστήριον and seven of ὁ δικαστής)
255
 in the Histories, the law court references are 
problematic. It is not clear why Herodotus uses τό δικαστήριον in some contexts but not 
others. For example, it is the place where Miltiades is prosecuted by his enemies (ὑπὸ 
δικαστήριον αὐτὸν ἀγαγόντες, 6.104.2) and subsequently acquitted, but is this the same body 
that then elected him general (αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, 6.104.2)? Herodotus does not appear 
to distinguish between δικαστήριον and δῆμος in his account.
256
 Of the two other references 
in the Histories to legal decisions made by the Athenians, we are not told whether the fine on 
Phrynichus for producing a play called The Fall of Miletus (6.21.2) and the case brought by 
Xanthippus (ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα ἐδίωκε, 6.136.1) against Miltiades, for 
deceiving the people, were heard in the Assembly or another court.
257
 Ostwald highlights this 
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lack of clarity when he says these three trials appear to be before ‘some kind of popular court 




As for the two trials in Sparta which, according to Herodotus, are brought before the 
δικαστήριον, that is, the decision to surrender Leotychidas to the Aeginetans (6.85.1), 
subsequently revoked following a persuasive speech by Thearides, and the banishment of 
Leotychidas for bribery (6.72.2), the constitution of the court is uncertain; was the other king 
present alongside the gerousia and the ephors?
259
 The fourth use of δικαστήριον in the 
Histories concerns the trial of Euenius by the Apollonians (ὑπαγαγόντες μιν ὑπὸ δικαστήριον 
κατέκριναν, 9.93.3) for falling asleep on his watch. His punishment is to be blinded but the 
consequences for the Apollonians are severe, in that their flocks stop producing offspring and 
their fruit trees no longer yield fruit. As a result, they consult the oracle, are told they had 
acted unjustly (ἀδίκως, 9.93.4) and are advised to compensate Euenius. In this story, the 
institution of the δικαστήριον appears to be much less significant than the institution of the 
oracle, which gives the authoritative legal judgment. 
 
This lack of information about procedure and venue, whether in Athens, Sparta or Apollonia 
is, in my view, unsurprising. With regard to Athens, Herodotus’ sources probably had no 
‘particular penchant for the niceties of Athenian judicial procedure’
260
 any more than 
Herodotus himself, and in any event his narrative is likely to reflect what he and his sources 
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knew of contemporary Athens rather than the history of its legal institutions.
261
 For example, 
Ephialtes’ reforms of 462 BCE transferring judicial powers of the Council of Areopagus to 
dikasteria are chronologically well after Miltiades’ two trials and the fining of Phrynichus, 
but it is likely that those Athenians who remembered the trial of Miltiades and told Herodotus 




As regards Sparta, Millender comments on the contrast between the detailed treatment of 
kings and the ‘rather sparse’ presentation of Sparta’s ‘constitutional structure’ (ephors, 
gerousia and ekklesia) by Herodotus, and refers to his ‘weaknesses including the use of 
vague, imprecise language’ in that he points out the function of an office in action rather than 
abstractly.
263
 I argue that what Millender regards as Herodotus’ ‘weakness’ is, in fact, a 
reflection of his legal method. In the case of Sparta, I will analyse how the institutions created 
by Lycurgus worked in practice in chapter 4, arguing that Herodotus places law in a social 
context rather than giving us rules and procedures, of which he or his sources may have been 
ignorant.  
 
For these reasons, therefore, I argue that an approach to nomos in the Histories based on the 
institution of the law court and forensic oratory, is unlikely to be helpful, because it does not 
reflect Herodotus’ own priorities or methodology. How significant, therefore, is the exclusion 
of women from formal legal processes? I consider now how Herodotus constructs a narrative 
in which the rule of law is explored, debated and challenged, in which law court scenes and 
forensic oratory do not play a key role.  
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5. Source material: what are the rules? 
5.1 Written law 
What source material on nomos do we have in the Histories? Ostwald, in my view, confuses 
the issue by referring to political and judicial nomoi, that is, the ‘rules and regulations by 
which the internal life of society as a state is ordered’ as ‘statute’, whether written or not, in 
the fifth century, because ‘statute’ in modern usage suggests a formalism which is not 
reflected in the Histories.
264
 There is certainly no substantial body of written statute for 
Herodotus to consult. The Persian royal judges who are consulted by Cambyses, for example 
(3.31) may refer to written royal decrees, Deioces, once he becomes tyrant, puts his 
judgments in writing (1.100), and the laws drawn up for the Athenians by Solon (1.29) were 
possibly written down, although Herodotus does not say they were; ‘if we were to depend on 





However, I will consider briefly the import of those rules which are described as written 
because it is one of the ways tyrants give coercive orders. The institution of tyranny, and the 
role of kings as judges is a dominant theme in the Histories which I will explore more fully in 
the next two chapters, and written orders or judgments are an aspect of that. Deioces, for 
example, gives written decisions as a substitute for oral judgments, Darius uses a series of 
sealed letters to have Oroetes killed (3.128), and the same king orders the deracination of 
Paeonia by means of a letter to Megabazus (5.14). However, written messages can also be a 
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means to encourage rebellion. Harpagus sends such a message to Cyrus in a hare (1.123.4), 
and Histiaeus has a slave tattooed with a similar message for Aristagoras (5.35.3).
266
 Women 
are shown to have skills in exploiting and deciphering such text. Nitocris exposes Darius’ 
greed through an inscription on her tomb (1.187) and Gorgo works out how to read the tablet 
sent by Demaratus, warning of Xerxes’ imminent invasion of Greece (7.239.3-4). In this way, 
I think Herodotus’ portrayal of the written word does fit the model of law as a coercive order 
backed up by threats, but he also shows how some individuals, female and male, are able to 




As regards Sparta, in the preface to his book on Spartan law, MacDowell issues a number of 
significant disclaimers, one of which is that much of the law is unwritten. In addition, he 
writes, the evidence is incomplete, later writers tend to mythologise Spartan life, and the 
‘boundaries of the subject are difficult to define’.
268
 His conclusion is no more secure: ‘even 
on some of the most obvious topics we are almost totally ignorant’.
269
 This assessment is 
based, moreover, on a variety of sources beyond Herodotus, including Xenophon and 
Plutarch. Written Spartan law, therefore, is not the foundation for the rule of law in the 
Histories. My analysis of the rule of law and gender in the Histories, therefore, is based on 
Herodotus’ narrative which records the information given to him by his informants, and the 
speech he constructs for his characters, who discuss, debate, argue, and evaluate nomos.  
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To summarise, therefore, most nomoi in the Histories are not spoken, argued about or 
enforced in a law court. Atossa, for example, declares both a gender norm and the Persian 
nomos of expansion, when talking to Darius (3.134) in their bedroom, both Artemisia and 
Xerxes pronounce on the inferiority of women (8.68; 8.88) at a gathering of the king and his 
advisors, Gyges declares what is anomos (1.8.4), and Candaules’ wife then enforces the 
penalty (1.11) within the oikos, the Daughters of Danaus teach the rites of the Thesmophoria 
from Egypt to the Pelasgian women (2.171.3) in a ritual setting, the mother of Scyles teaches 
him the Greek language and custom (4.78.1) again in the oikos, and Euelthon rejects 
Pheretime’s request for an army in a speech which includes a gender norm (4.162.5).  
 
5.2 Spoken law 
I have argued that an ‘institutional’ approach, based on an analysis of those sections of the 
Histories where Herodotus refers to law courts, is not productive, but Herodotus nevertheless 
refers to legal proceedings. Does he, therefore, take the opportunity to construct judicial 
speeches for those of his characters who are involved in legal proceedings? Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus noted that Herodotus did not include many speeches to the public assembly or 
in a judicial setting (οὔτε γὰρ δημηγορίαις πολλαῖς ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐδ᾽ ἐναγωνίοις κέχρηται λόγοις, 
Thuc. 23), in contrast with Thucydides. In fact, though Herodotus constructs some 
deliberative oratory for his characters, and these speeches play a significant role in the 
Histories, he does not do the same for those characters who are involved in legal proceedings.  
 
In the trial of Demaratus, based on his father’s denial of paternity (6.65-70), where one might 
expect Herodotus to construct a forensic speech for the occasion, he, in fact, gives a form of 
defence speech to Demaratus’ mother, who is not a party to the court proceedings. Of all the 
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characters involved, she makes the most substantial contribution orally, moving the legal 
debate from the law court to the oikos. In terms of Herodotus’ methodology, this suggests that 
he did not regard it as necessary to construct any form of forensic oratory for his characters, 
whereas he does give us the long deliberative speeches of the Constitutional debate (3.80-
3.82) and those of Socles (5.92) and Leotychides (6.86).  
 
The role of speech in general in the Histories has been the focus of a number of studies. 
Bakker has done a detailed study of all forms of speech in the Histories and his definition of 
speech, as a consequence, is very wide: ‘utterances embedded in the narrative consisting of a 
verb expressing a speech act, as well as a complement of that verb’.
270
 He argues that the 
historiographical function of Herodotus’ speeches, both those he constructs for characters in 
his text, and for his informants, is to establish his authority as a historian, adopting the 
persona of both epic storyteller and researcher.
271
 His emphasis, therefore differs from those 
who focus more on the relationship between speech and action, and the power dynamics 
which are revealed in speech, making demands on the listener or reader to work out 




My focus is different in that I will analyse Herodotus’ use of speech, by female as well as 
male characters, as a key part of his examination of the rule of law. The role of female speech 
in the Histories has not been addressed systematically by scholars. Zali, for example, states 
that women’s speech is ‘mainly reserved for barbarian women’,
273
 an argument which is 
contradicted by a number of significant verbal exchanges in the Histories between Greeks, 
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male and female, which I outline in the following chapters. Lardinois and McClure’s book 
Making Silence Speak: Women’s Voices in Greek Literature and Society has only two index 
references to Herodotus.
274
 McClure makes a bold claim when she states that ‘both Athenian 
and non-Athenian literary texts universally praise female silence and verbal submission while 
equating women’s talk with promiscuity and adultery’.
275
 I will show that this is certainly not 
the case in the Histories. Women’s speech is an integral part of a number of narratives, 
between Greeks and non-Greeks, in which nomos is considered; conversation, reasoning, 
argument, persuasion, explanation, debate and judgment are all forms of speech which are 
practised by women and engage with the rule of law.  
 
In this respect, there is a clear contrast between Herodotus and Thucydides, who saw no need 
to include any female speech in his work.
276
 When he has Pericles advise the war widows: 
There is great glory for you in not being worse than your existing nature and for 
whichever of you has the least reputation among men concerning either her 
excellence or her faults 
τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα καὶ ἧς ἂν 




he reflects his own practice in according kleos to all women by not talking about them, far 
less giving them speech. Wiedemann argues that this is because the intervention of women is 
outside the norms of Thucydides’ subject matter. Their action signals social disruption, or 
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treachery, and, in the case of the Corcyran women, is against their nature (παρὰ φύσιν).
278
 
Hornblower notes that Plutarch (Mor.242E, Virtues of Women) took Pericles’ injunction to 
mean that ‘women’s place is in the home’, and that the role for women in this speech 
corresponds with the general treatment of women in Thucydides, which is to present women 
against a background of turmoil (θóρυβος).
279
 Shannon-Henderson also argues that women, 





Thucydides’ text, therefore, reflects and reinforces those other 5
th
 BCE texts, in which 
characters, male and female, praise female silence and seclusion in the oikos.
281
 The 
characters, of course are voicing a patriarchal ideology which can be subtly undermined. In 
Andromache’s speech, in Euripides’ Trojan Women, for example, she says ‘I didn’t let smart-
talking women into my house ... I used to keep my mouth shut’ (ἔσω τε μελάθρων κομψὰ 
θηλειῶν ἔπη οὐκ εἰσεφρούμην ... γλώσσης τε σιγὴν, E. Tr. 651-2; 654) but she also laments 
the fate to which conformity to that ideology has brought her (E.Tr. 644-5).
282
 Meanwhile, 
Ajax’s admonition to Tecmessa: ‘Woman, silence is an adornment to women’ (γύναι, γυναιξὶ 
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κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει, S. Aj. 293)
283
 emphasises the repressive nature of patriarchal ideology, 
but she proves her rhetorical competence in a speech in which she reminds him of his 
obligations to family and to her (S. Aj. 485-524), as many female characters in the Histories 
do to men.
284
 Moreover, as Loraux acutely observes, the Greeks themselves did not heed 




To what extent, therefore, was Herodotus’ engagement with the rule of law and gender 
influenced by, or conversely had an influence on the Athenian dramatists?
286
 This question 
arises from the passage in Antigone (S. Ant. 909-912) which echoes a very similar one in the 
story of Intaphrenes’ wife (3.119.6) and which I consider as a case study in chapter 4. I argue 
that the dialogue between the characters (Creon and Antigone, and Darius and Intaphrenes’ 
wife) shows a very different mode of argument on the rule of law, highlighting not gender 
difference, but a contrast between an adversarial and an inquisitorial form of argument. In 
chapter 3, I consider a story where Athenian women, like Hecuba and her women, attack a 
man with their dress pins but in a very different context. Both stories raise important 
questions about the role of women in policing male behaviour and punishing male offenders, 
but the Herodotean story, I will argue, presents us with Herodotus’ own perspective (the 
‘external’ view) on Athenian and Aeginetan nomoi.  
 
In a broader context, I will argue that there is a thematic link between the tragedies in 
particular and Herodotus, challenging Bakker’s assertion that the tragedies deal with different 
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stories and themes from Herodotus.
287
 On the contrary, some themes are of central importance 
to both genres. The self-destructive oikos is a dominant theme in Euripides’ Electra, for 
example, as well as the Herodotean stories of Astyages, and Xerxes, revenge is a key motif in 
Euripides’ Hecuba and the story of Pheretime in the Histories, and reciprocity in marital 





However, it is remarkable, in the context of 5
th
 century BCE discourse, that nowhere in the 
Histories does Herodotus, as narrator, express the view that women should be silent because 
of their gender. The Magus stops women talking to each other in the Persian oikos, but this is 
because he fears exposure (3.68.5), Periander stops everyone, male and female, talking to his 
son Lycophron (3.53) and Deioces hides himself away, fearing the judgment of his peers 
(1.99.1). In all these cases, the silencing of women and other subaltern groups is presented by 
Herodotus as indicative of tyrannical behaviour, not a reflection of gender norms.  
 
Female speech, however, may not be heard as authoritative, even if the right to speak is 
allowed, and characters frequently fail to listen to women’s advice or warnings.
289
 In this 
study, I will highlight different types of female speech, and argue that women sometimes do 
speak with authority, on behalf of men and the community, as well as on their own behalf. 
Moreover, those men who fail to ‘hear’ authority in women’s speech often suffer as a 
consequence, for example, Cleomenes, who ignores the authoritative priestess to Athena 
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Polias in Book 5. However, a more prevalent form of female speech, which reflects women’s 
subaltern status, is to be found in negotiation, persuasion and forms of informal mediation. I 
will consider the various forms of female speech and their purpose, in chapter 3. 
 
In the context of nomos, since I am arguing that Herodotus uses speech to highlight issues of 
credibility, the evaluation of conflicting accounts, the interpretation of events and the making 
of judgments, his own reliability should be examined. West argues that his technique is more 
that of a journalist or historical novelist than a systematic researcher and certainly, if we apply 
modern criteria to the Histories, some of it could be called historical fiction; ‘the rendering of 
historical happenings by way of the personalized and momentary experiences of individual 
human beings,’ and the ‘employment of narrative situations that open to inside views of the 
characters’ minds’.
290
 This is displayed by Herodotus not only in his narrative but also in the 
speech he constructs. Jacoby argued that we should distinguish between ‘novelistic’ and 
political-historical’ speeches’ in the Histories.
291
 This suggests that there is a fictional element 
to the non- political speeches, a view which Flory takes in calling the story of the Amazons, 
which includes both direct and indirect speech, a ‘fairytale’.
292
 However this would apply to 
all of the characters in the stories whatever their role. We are invited into the thoughts and 
feelings of Xerxes the king as much as Cyno the slave. Herodotus thereby focalises the 
thoughts and emotions of groups and individual characters, because he regards this as an 
essential part of exploring and explaining nomos.  
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Jacoby’s distinction also suggests that the ‘political-historical’ speeches are not fictional or, to 
put it another way, are factual. This is equally problematic when we consider the context in 
which most of the speeches were delivered. The second conversation between Artemisia and 
Xerxes (8.101-2) is in private and involves just the two of them; how could the version given 
by Herodotus be anything other than his own creative construction? There is a scholarly 
consensus that this would have been taken for granted by Herodotus and his audience.
 293
 
Thucydides problematises the idea of including in his narrative what people said as well as 
what they did, by making a distinction between what was said (ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι, 
Th.1.22.1) and what was done (τὰ δ’ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων, Th. 1.22.2) and acknowledges the 
difficulty ‘for himself and his informants’
294
 in remembering the former accurately; he 
reports, therefore, ‘the case which I thought him most likely to have presented’
295
 (τὰ δέοντα 
μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν, Th.1.22.1). Herodotus does not reflect on his methodology in this way. Indeed, 
he asserts the authenticity of the speeches made in the Constitutional Debate (3.80-82; 6.43) 
which leads Bakker to argue that the opposition between ‘historical’ and ‘fictional’ creates a 
false dichotomy which ignores Herodotus’ own narratorial intervention in the story of Cyrus, 
for example, when he vouches for his version being ‘the true story’ (τὸν ἐόντα ... λόγον, 
1.95.1).
296
 This intervention, I argue, has to be considered in the context of Herodotus’ 
interpretative skills, which makes it more complex than a binary opposition of truth and lies. 
Herodotus arrives at a judgment, having assessed each of the four stories he hears about 
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Cyrus, that one is the most convincing. He also shows his characters engaging with questions 
of credibility through speech. 
 
6. Interpretation 
Legal rules require interpretation; as Hart puts it, ‘all rules have a penumbra of 
uncertainty’.
297
 We as readers of the Histories, moreover, are actively involved in 
interpretation, as lawyers are. Herodotus engages with notions of proof and probabilities, not 
certainties, in collaboration with his audience.
298
 This mirrors legal procedure. In modern law, 
the test in civil proceedings is ‘the balance of probabilities’, in criminal cases, ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’, making law a matter of judgment rather than certainty, the boundary 
between ‘reasonable’ and unreasonable’ doubt sometimes difficult to draw, and ‘facts ... not 
as concrete as they may seem’.
299
As Baron puts it, ‘the choice is not between “fact” and 
“fiction”, or between “objectivity” and “subjectivity”. Someone’s story will emerge in legal 
decisions; the only question is whose’.
300
 Judges as well as legal practitioners, are storytellers, 
creating a legal narrative out of the material presented in court, shaping it, putting it into 
chronological order, making findings of fact and applying the law, and, like all authors, 
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This is the way, I argue, to read Herodotus on the rule of law, as someone whose narrative is a 
creative and structured response to the stories about nomos which he is told by his informants. 
By providing us with shifting focalisations, rival strategies, and argumentative speech, 
Herodotus ‘refuses an authoritative monologic discourse’.
302
 Irwin notes that indirect and 
direct speech in oracular logos stresses the role of the interpretive community and both creates 
and resolves ambiguity.
303
 This has a parallel in modern law; Hart refers to the ‘open texture’ 
of law, which acknowledges the impossibility of drafting rules of conduct which cover every 
situation, which determine every dispute, which foresee every eventuality. Every judicial 
exercise requires interpretation. 
 
Munson argues that Herodotus’ interest in thōmata is partly that they act as an impulse to 
inquiry, they require interpretation.
304
 Darius, for example, finds Intaphrenes’ wife’s request 
surprising (θωμάσας τὸν λόγον, 3.119.5), not her actions in lamenting her husband’s fate 
outside the palace gates. Her remarkable gender performance, therefore, is a prompt to 
enquiry, rather than being an example to be condemned. Irwin and Greenwood point out the 
central role of autopsy in Herodotus’ account, drawing the audience into an interpretive 
community, engaging us in assessing and evaluating his logoi, as conveyed by the verb 
συμβάλλειν and its middle form συμβάλλεσθαι.
305
 In Hohti’s analysis of this verb, he 
describes the process of reaching a conclusion by comparing various pieces of evidence, 
choosing the significant facts, recognising that two parts, one of which may be a sign (an 
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oracle, or a dream, for example), belong together, and reaching a conclusion, whereby the 
‘intelligible whole is more than the sum of its parts’.
306
 He gives the example of the disputed 
interpretation of the oracle before Salamis, between the Athenian elders and Themistocles: 
‘He claimed that the conclusion the interpreters had come to about this wall of wood was not 
entirely correct’ (οὐκ ἔφη πᾶν ὀρθῶς τοὺς χρησμολόγους συμβάλλεσθαι, 7.143.1). This 
interpretive, forensic exercise, assessing evidence and conflicting viewpoints and stories, is 
integral to Herodotus’ concept of the rule of law, and is performed by women as well as men. 
Polycrates’ daughter, for example, correctly interprets a dream and unsuccessfully tries to 
warn her father of an imminent risk (3.124). In the next chapter, I will show that there are 
those who possess interpretive skills but lack the power to convince those they are warning or 
advising.  
 
To arrive at a balanced judgment, therefore, is more complex than a binary opposition of truth 
and lies. A judgment is always a choice between alternatives not a pronouncement of truth. To 
that extent, the aim of any legal process is more modest than a search for ‘the truth’. I do not 
agree, therefore, with Baragwanath, for example, who argues that Herodotus puts the reader in 
the position of the Athenian juror, who had to ‘judge the truth particularly about sequences of 
events and motives’, or Marincola, who identifies a place for the reader to be ‘actively 
engaged in a joint search for the truth about the past’.
307
 Rather, our role is, like Herodotus, 
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‘to listen critically, to question, and to judge’.
308
 We ask whose account is more convincing, 
based on an assessment of the evidence. The type of judgment, however, depends on the 
nature of the dispute, and whether the aim is to apportion blame or resolve a dispute. 
 
7. Judgment 
Hart writes on the nature of judging that ‘we live among uncertainties between which we have 
to choose, and the existing law imposes only limits on our choice and not the choice itself’.
309
 
Each act of judgment is a ‘fresh choice between open alternatives ... because we are men not 
gods’.
310
 The type of judgment that is reached in modern law depends on the area of litigation, 
and the extent to which an inquisitorial or an adversarial approach is appropriate. In both the 
following examples, law is applied to the issue of child abuse, but the focus in proceedings is 
very different.  
 
The area of law which most clearly constructs the ‘other’ is criminal law, the state prosecution 
of a defendant. Law, in this context, is adversarial, a competition of words, the testing of 
narratives; one person is lying or being evasive or being ‘economical with the truth’. The 
courtroom itself constructs ‘the other’, both as a physical place, the dock, where the defendant 
sits apart from the judge and jury, and as the person being cross-examined, whose story is 
being challenged, tested, undermined. The advocate will make full use of rhetorical claims 
based on binary opposites to emphasise her case. Court procedures also emphasise difference; 
the judge and counsel wear wigs and gowns, and the majesty of law is expressed through the 
court crest, formality of address and forensic speech. The judge, moreover, not only declares 
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the formal penalty for the specific offence, but also articulates moral condemnation of the 
convicted person’s conduct and character. For example, on 19
th
 January 2017, Judge Jeremy 
Richardson QC sentenced Michala Pyke, and her partner John Rytting to 13 years 
imprisonment for child cruelty and emotional abuse in respect of Pyke’s four-year-old 
daughter Poppy Widdison, who died as a result of an assault by one of the two defendants. He 
found that Pyke was ‘malevolent and manipulative – you are utterly unfit to be a mother and 
abused Poppy by giving her drugs ... this was serious cruelty over a long time and regular ill 
treatment’. Poppy was sedated to ‘allow you to indulge in your own squalid passion’, both 
defendants’ conduct was ‘cruel and deliberate’, the child was an ‘irritant in respect of your 
baleful romance’ and expressions of love were a ‘despicable masquerade’.
311
 In this way, the 
judge not only imposes the legal punishment for specific criminal offences, but also invites 
his audience to share in the sentiments he expresses.  
 
In this case we see the formal rules of adjudication in action, in that the case was decided by a 
jury and sentencing was carried out by the judge. However, we also observe a social 
dimension in the judge’s remarks. It is no exaggeration to say that he voices hostility towards 
the two defendants who have been found to violate the rules of parenting so egregiously. 
There is, moreover, a gender element in his closing remarks; by invoking the ‘unfit mother’, a 
familiar trope in popular discourse, he emphasises by opposition a normative expectation of 
motherhood. His judgment combines legal requirements, to pass sentence, with moral 
opprobrium, condemning the defendants’ conduct. In both the formal setting of a courtroom 
therefore and in the judge’s summing up, the guilty party is presented as ‘other’, someone 
                                                          
311
 The Telegraph, 19 Jan 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
accessed 26/01/17.  
112 
 
who has both broken the law and violated social norms and expectations, including gender 
expectations of a mother. 
 
In terms of classical oratory, this is an example of the appropriate attribution of blame. The 
skill of the professional speech writer in classical Athens involved creating ‘the other’ through 
persuading the dikastai to identify themselves with the speaker and against the opponent, and 
invoking social norms and expectations as part of this identification. Humphries’ description 
of the Athenian law court as ‘a theatre for the dramatisation of an ideological view of the 
oikos’ is echoed by Foxhall, who portrays the law court as an arena for male competition, 
often on behalf of family members.
312
 In the following chapters, I will explore how 
characters, male and female, are shown to attribute praise and blame, often in rhetorical 
contexts, where they aim to persuade. Artemisia, for example, aligns herself with praise for 
Xerxes, and criticism of his other allies (8.68). 
 
However, modern family law also has a functional role in resolving family disputes,
313
 and 
protecting children from significant harm.
314
 The opening provisions of the Children Act set 
out the overriding principle, which is that the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount 
consideration, and the welfare checklist; what the court has to consider when it is deciding 
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 BCE Athens, whereby orators ally themselves with the audience against their opponent. 
313
 Either within court proceedings: for example, the Finance Dispute Resolution hearing in an 
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any issue to do with a child’s upbringing or property.
315
 This checklist includes the child’s 
physical, emotional and educational needs, any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of 
suffering and how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the 
court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs.
316
 From this it is clear that 
modern family law cannot be understood without a knowledge of social and cultural norms. 
As Stephen Cretney writes, ‘Family Law must keep pace with the social realities that it 
governs and may influence’.
317
 For example, the provisions of the Children Act 1989 I have 
referred to require judgments on what is and is not reasonable parenting (the threshold for 
state intervention in care proceedings) in seeking to protect children from significant harm.  
 
Moreover, the practice of family law requires an interdisciplinary, inquisitorial approach. 
Lawyers and judges can claim no special expertise in these areas; in fact, for this very reason, 
courts commission a report from someone who can assist the court in reaching a judgment on 
such matters as parenting capacity and the needs of the child.
318
 These issues are fiercely 
contested and involve judgments about social issues and parenting rules which change with 
time. Family law, ‘the regulation of family responsibilities and family identities inside and 
outside the home’ has to be considered, therefore, in a social context.
319
 What is required, 
therefore, in my example, is a judgment on what is reasonable parenting or likely significant 
harm, which cannot be resolved through statutory interpretation alone. This is significant for 
my reading of the Histories because the regulation of the oikos and the performance of 
normative familial roles is a key aspect of nomos, as I explore in the next two chapters. 
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The model of court-based adversarial practice, moreover, does not reflect much of the work 
done by modern lawyers. In most courts (civil, family and the various tribunals which form 
part of the court structure in England and Wales) wigs and gowns are not required, the court 
crest is the only marker distinguishing the courtroom from other forms of meeting place, and 
the proceedings are as likely to be inquisitorial as adversarial, more dispute resolution than 
punishment. This also had a parallel in classical Athens. The settlement of family or kinship 
disputes in 4
th
 century BCE Athens through arbitration was a consequence of ‘distrust of the 
court system and worry about the publicity that family squabbles might attract’ and, argues 
Christ, strong social pressure to avoid family litigation, which might threaten the autonomy of 
the oikos and the authority of the kurios.
320
 In chapter 4 I will show, with case studies from 
the Spartan logos, that disputes to do with marriage, the royal succession and paternity are 
sometimes resolved through negotiation, in which women are involved as agents. 
 
Conclusion 
Any model of Herodotus’ methodology needs to recognise both his inquisitorial and his 
adversarial approach to the rule of law. I have emphasised the key elements of evidence-
gathering, interpretation and judgment in modern law, and the socio-legal aspect of family 
law in particular. I have also shown that, even within the institutional framework of the 
modern court, the constraints of statute and strict rules of evidence, wider social norms have a 
significant role to play in litigation. I have also argued that we cannot examine Athenian and 
Spartan nomoi satisfactorily through the institutions of their poleis. This places gender 
relations in a more central role than an approach which focuses on institutions, enabling me to 
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consider to what extent women have influence in negotiations, and can persuade, in less 
formal settings than a courtroom, from which they are institutionally excluded, and how 
judgments are made by women as well as men outside the formal structures of the law court. 
 
Most nomoi in the Histories are unwritten rules which are conveyed through speech. In the 
next chapter, I consider the role of speech, female and male, in articulating, enforcing and 
challenging gender nomoi, and as a key part of the performance of gender. I show the 
significance of female speech to the rule of law, by identifying women who enforce nomos 
through speech (Candaules’ wife (1.11) and Athena Polias (5.72) for example), those who 
manipulate the rules to achieve their own goals or those of their family (Argeia (6.52) and the 
mother of Demaratus (6.69), for example) and those who resist the rules (the Carian women 
(1.146) or the mother of Scyles (4.78), for example). Women also have an important role in 
establishing and transmitting nomos (the daughters of Danaus, 2.171), and intervening in 
speech to warn or advise men when they are at risk of violating nomos. Conversely, women 
are shown not only to practise nomos but also to break it, or to break one nomos whilst 
asserting another. 
 
I will show, firstly, that passing judgment, legal debate and rhetorical performance is mostly 
performed in the oikos rather than a formal legal setting such as a courtroom and secondly, 
that negotiation and persuasion are as important to the concept of nomos as the creation of 
‘the other’, which is a significant technique in adversarial litigation. Unlike Thucydides, the 
intervention of women through speech as well as in action is central to Herodotus’ expansive 




CHAPTER 3: LIVING WITH THE RULES: HOW DOES NOMOS REGULATE 
FEMALE GENDER PERFORMANCE? 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the way nomoi shape gender performance, and what it means to live 
with unwritten rules. One of the striking aspects of nomoi in the Histories is how many are 
grounded in customary practice, rather than enactment by an institution or civic body; in other 
words, there is no conscious law-creating act. For example, when Adrastus visits Croesus and 
asks to be purified according to the country’s rules (κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους, 1.35.1), 
those purity rules ‘emerge, as it were, from nowhere’, without formal enactment by an 
assembly.
321
 Osborne gives the problem of pollution and its solution, purification, as a form 
of informal policing, a means whereby a community regulates itself, and where formal law is 
not applicable.
322
 In many other cases, nomoi are social, sexual or religious practices based on 
precedent, for example, the fish-eating of some Babylonian tribes (1.200), the inherited role of 
keeper of sacred animals in Egypt (2.65.3), and the sale of children for export in Thrace 
(5.6.1).  
 
Even where there is a conscious law-making act, Herodotus emphasises the functional, rather 
than the institutional aspect, in that groups change their nomoi in the light of circumstance. 
Lydian women, for example, work as prostitutes, so that they can earn a dowry, to enable 
them to get married; they then arrange their own marriages (τοῦ γὰρ δὴ Λυδῶν δήμου αἱ 
θυγατέρες πορνεύονται πᾶσαι, συλλέγουσαι σφίσι φερνάς, ἐς ὃ ἂν συνοικήσωσι τοῦτο 
ποιέουσαι: ἐκδιδοῦσι δὲ αὐταὶ ἑωυτάς, 1.93.4). This nomos is related as part of an overall 
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narrative explaining how Lydia became increasingly impoverished in the period before they 
were enslaved by the Persians (1.94) and prostitution becomes an economic necessity with 
Lydia’s fall from power. Similarly, amongst the Babylonians, a father was formerly not 
allowed to arrange his daughter’s marriage, because there used to be a system of marriage 
auction (1.196), but poverty and loss of independence have led the Babylonians to invent a 
new nomos whereby a poor father prostitutes his daughter, ‘so that the women are not treated 
unjustly or taken to another city’ (ἵνα μὴ ἀδικοῖεν αὐτὰς μηδ᾽ εἰς ἑτέραν πόλιν ἄγωνται, 
1.196.1). These two cases, of Lydian and Babylonian nomoi, both illustrate how Herodotus 
depicts cultural practices linked to marriage as having the capacity to change, one of Hart’s 
secondary rules in his concept of law, and a significant indicator that ethnic character, and 




In this chapter, I consider those nomoi which create social expectations and obligations in 
everyday interactions, and are met with sanctions, if breached. I focus on the regulation of 
female gender performance, though this is often in a context where men violate nomos, 
thereby putting women’s legitimate expectations at risk. I consider in what spheres the 
performance of normative gender roles is significant, and which rules refer to gender 
difference. I also ask what kind of sanctions are imposed when women are judged to break the 
rules, analysing two case studies involving Athenian men and women, where their actions can 
be interpreted as a form of informal policing, but I will argue, have a different resonance for 
Herodotus, as a non-Athenian. Finally, I consider the story of the Amazons, a group of 
women who reject the rules of gender performance, both Greek and non-Greek. I argue that 
Herodotus intends this to be a thought experiment on the rule of law, challenging his audience 
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to imagine a society which practises gender equality, but also contesting the place of the 
Amazon in Athenian gender ideology. 
 
The rule of law applies in everyday life by regulating those activities and behaviours which 
are acceptable to the community, and subjecting those who breach the rules to social 
condemnation by both genders. A convincing display of gender requires a script (acquired 
through the socialisation process), props (appearance, speech and gesture) and an audience 
which understands and validates the performance.
324
 These are the rules of conduct that 
function as nomoi, which, for the most part, are acquired and internalised through 
socialisation and education, not imposed by an external authority.
325
 They combine the 
display of gender, that is, one’s deportment and dress, with the conduct culturally sanctioned 
for men and women. An integral part of this process is how one is seen to perform gender; 
social judgments are made on this basis, validating or condemning performed identities 
through speech. In chapter 5, I will consider the performance of masculinity. In this chapter, I 
examine how nomos regulates female gender performance. What is it that people see in a 
woman? What do they hear when she speaks? What is judged to be appropriate conduct?  
 
1. Appearance 
There is a very powerful motif in the Histories of women’s beauty, an attribute of phusis, 
provoking erōs in men and leading them to breach nomos, as I explore further in my next 
chapter. There are a number of occasions in the Histories where female beauty is put on 
display, in an effort to persuade. For example, Peisistratus dresses Phye, who was tall and 
good-looking (μέγαθος ἀπὸ τεσσέρων πηχέων ἀπολείπουσα τρεῖς δακτύλους καὶ ἄλλως 
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εὐειδής, 1.60.4) as the goddess Athena to persuade the Athenians to reinstate him as tyrant, 
and the Coan pallake displays herself in all her gold jewellery to Pausanias in an act of 
supplication, to save her from slavery, as a prisoner of war (αἰχμαλώτου δουλοσύνης, 9.76). 
However, in the first example, Herodotus as narrator describes the plan as ‘extremely silly’ 
(πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον, 1.60.3) and expresses surprise that the Athenians were taken in by it, 
thereby distancing himself from the Athenian viewpoint, and in the second, the Coan pallake 
succeeds, not because of her display of wealth but because her father was ‘very best guest 
friend’ (ξεῖνος μάλιστα, 9.76.3) to Pausanias, who is also shown by Herodotus to respect the 
power of supplication.
326
 The force of xenia between men, and Herodotus’ characterisation of 
Pausanias as someone who respects his reciprocal obligations, therefore, is shown to be more 
significant than the woman’s gender performance. 
 
Sometimes, characters mistakenly think a combination of beauty (phusis) and industry 
(nomos) will persuade. The Paeonian brothers, Pigres and Mastyes, decide to put their sister, 
both tall and beautiful (μεγάλην τε καὶ εὐειδέα, 5.12.1) and industrious (carrying the water on 
her head, using her arm to lead the horse, and constantly turning her spindle: φέρουσα τὸ 
ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ ἐπέλκουσα ἐκ τοῦ βραχίονος τὸν ἵππον καὶ στρέφουσα τὸν 
ἄτρακτον, 5.12.4) on display. They dress her in the best clothes they had (σκευάσαντες τὴν 
ἀδελφεὴν ὡς εἶχον ἄριστα, 5.12.2) and bring her to the attention of Darius, intending to 
indicate to the king that all Paeonian women were as hard-working (ἐργάτιδες, 5.13.3) as this 
woman. Gender performance here is linked directly to tyranny. The brothers desire to become 
tyrants of Paeonia, and they think that possessing such a remarkable woman will signify their 
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 He is, indeed, amazed (θωμάζων, 5.13.1) by her gender performance, and 
this prompts him, as it will when he meets Intaphrenes’ wife, to make further enquiries, to 
find out more. However, his response is not to make the brothers more powerful, but to 
remove all the Paeonians from their native land (ἐξαναστῆσαι ἐξ ἠθέων Παίονας ... καὶ 
αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τέκνα τε καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν. 5.14.1), an act of cultural as well as 
geographical deracination.
328
 Darius is impressed by the woman’s industry (nomos) not her 
beauty (phusis) and the brothers find out too late that this tyrant’s desire is ‘not for 
outstanding women but for outstanding habits’, according to Osborne, or conquest, in Christ’s 
opinion.
329
 Both views are preferable to the rather reductive assessment of Keuls, that the 
story shows ‘what men want is sex and labour’.
330
 In fact, the Paeonian brothers want to be 
tyrants and Darius wants the labour, which makes conquest profitable, not the sex. He 
interprets the woman’s gender performance differently from the way the brothers anticipate. 
Like other characters in the Histories, they fail to ‘read’ a tyrant effectively, and find 
themselves subject to rules imposed by a tyrant, not able to manipulate circumstances to 
achieve the outcome they want.  
 
In this story, the woman is portrayed as a pawn in her brothers’ game, whereas in the story of 
Nitetis, another extremely tall and beautiful woman (κάρτα μεγάλη τε καὶ εὐειδὴς, 3.1.3), she 
refuses the gender performance expected of her. Amasis, who has killed her father Apries and 
whole family, tries to pass her off as his daughter, dressing her up in fine clothes and gold 
jewellery (κοσμήσας ἐσθῆτί τε καὶ χρυσῷ, 3.1.3) to avoid having to send his own child. He 
does this because he knows that Amasis intends to make her his pallakē not his wife (3.1.2). 
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Nitetis, however, alerts Cambyses to the deceptiveness of appearances, when she tells him 
that she is not who he thinks she is (3.1), prompting his attack on Egypt.  
 
The performance of female beauty, therefore, is shown to be an unreliable tool in the hands of 
men who calculate it will achieve a particular outcome. Moreover, appearances can be 
deceptive. The two stories, of the Minyans’ escape from Spartan prison in women’s clothing 
with their wives’ assistance (4.146), and the murder of Persians by Macedonians both depend 
on men being able to pass themselves off as women. The Persian delegation to Macedonia 
explains that it is the Persian nomos to bring their pallakai and wives in to join the company 
at the end of a meal. Amyntas says that is not the Macedonian rule: they keep men and 
women separate (νόμος μὲν ἡμῖν γε ἐστὶ οὐκ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ κεχωρίσθαι ἄνδρας γυναικῶν, 
5.18.3). However, since the Persians are now their masters (δεσπόται), they obey, and the 
beautiful women (γυναῖκας εὐμόρφους, 5.18.4) are sexually assaulted by the Persians. 
Alexander, however, arranges for the men thereafter to disguise themselves in women’s 
clothes, and kill the entire Persian delegation (5.20.5). This trick only works because the men 




These stories, therefore, unsettle a narrative in which female beauty is innate, rather than 
performed, since men can perform as women, if necessary, just as Artemisia, to be considered 
in chapter 5, performs as a man. Appearances can be deceptive, as indicators of gender. 
However, it is through female speech, as the story of Nitetis shows, when she rejects the 
impersonation required of her, that women gain some agency.  
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The role of female speech in the Histories, and its relationship to nomos, has not been 
addressed systematically by scholars. Dewald, for example, divides women into ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ categories but does not draw a correlation with speech. I note that, of the 128 
instances of ‘passive’ women in the appendix to her chapter on ‘Women and Culture in 
Herodotus’ Histories’, only six include speech, whereas, of the 166 ‘active’ women, 69 
include speech.
332
 This suggests that, in analysing the role that women play in the Histories, 
we need to consider their speech in connection with their actions or passivity. Phaedymia, 
daughter of the Persian Otanes, is presented by Dewald as an ‘individual passive woman 
presented in a family context subject to external aggression.’
333
 However, her communication 
with her father, in both direct and indirect speech (3.68-9) reveals the difficulties and 
negotiations involved in her unmasking of the Magus, posing as Smerdis, son of Cyrus. This 
leads to the revolt of the seven against the Magi and shows her as a woman of some bravery, 
aware of the risks she is being asked to take. She shows some agency within a coercive 
regime, obeying her father despite the risk that her husband might annihilate her (ὡς ἀιστώσει 
μιν, 3.69.4). 
 
In my last chapter, I argued that we need to distinguish between the various elements of legal 
proceedings. We firstly need to find out which rule is engaged and in the Histories we are 
more likely to discover that through speech rather than through a written statute; the rule, 
then, has to be interpreted in the light of available evidence, and, finally, a judgment has to be 
made. In this chapter, therefore, I identify and analyse different types of female speech, and 
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show this as law in action. Candaules’ wife for example, both declares the rule, and comes to 
a judgment on the basis of her interpretation of what she knows and sees. I will also 
distinguish between those cases where violation of nomos is being punished, and those where 
women are involved in preserving the oikos, regulating their community and acting as agents 
of social control. 
 
2.1 Teaching the rules  
In chapter 1, I showed the Carian women socialising their daughters through creating a 
nomos, enforced by oaths, which governs speech and practice. There are a number of 
examples in the Histories of a social practice being communicated through the articulation 
and transmission of a nomos. For example, the daughters of Danaus brought the rite of the 
Thesmophoria out of Egypt and taught it to the Pelasgians (αἱ Δαναοῦ θυγατέρες ἦσαν αἱ τὴν 
τελετὴν ταύτην ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐξαγαγοῦσαι καὶ διδάξασαι τὰς Πελασγιώτιδας γυναῖκας, 
2.171.3), a story, like that of the founding of oracles at Dodona and Siwa, which functions as 
a foundation myth. Meanwhile, Herodotus tells of how the Athenian women bore many 
children, and educated their sons in Attic speech and the Athenian way of life (ὡς δὲ τέκνων 
αὗται αἱ γυναῖκες ὑπεπλήσθησαν, γλῶσσάν τε τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τρόπους τοὺς Ἀθηναίων 
ἐδίδασκον τοὺς παῖδας, 6.138.2), when abducted by Pelasgians. These women, therefore, 
assert their natal rules, as Scyles’ mother does; being from Istria and not native to Scythia, she 
taught her son to speak and read Greek (ἐξ Ἰστριηνῆς δὲ γυναικὸς οὗτος γίνεται καὶ οὐδαμῶς 
ἐγχωρίης: τὸνἡ μήτηρ αὕτη γλῶσσάν τε Ἑλλάδα καὶ γράμματα ἐδίδαξε, 4.78.1).
334
 These 
women teach nomoi as a way of resisting the rules of the society they have been forced to 
join: the Carian women, as a form of protest at forced marriage, the Athenian women, as a 
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means of resisting their Pelasgian captors, Scyles’ mother, who brought him up to incline to 
Greek not Scythian ways (4.78.3). Was the socialisation of children into a dominant culture 
recognised as such? It is possible that Herodotus’ sources saw female performances of gender 
as natural rather than learned forms of behaviour, that is, based on phusis rather than nomos, 
but we have already seen that female appearance is a misleading indicator of gender. 
 
How is the essential difference between male and female expressed in speech? Herodotus, as 
narrator, does not express a viewpoint with regard to female nature, though several of his 
characters use the rhetoric of female cowardice and inferior strength, which relies on a gender 
ideology based on female inferiority. Croesus persuades Cyrus to disarm the Lydians, by 
changing their gender performance from male to female (1.155.4), Herodotus shows 
Mitrobates (3.120.3), Atossa (3.134.2) and Artemisia (8.68α) all using the rhetoric as part of 
their persuasive strategy, and Xerxes explains defeat or caution (in the case of Artabanus, 
7.10δ2) in gender terms; it must be based on the female trait of cowardice, which is the polar 
opposite of the Spartan nomos of win or die.  
 
In all these examples, however, Herodotus uses speech to identify a disjuncture between what 
a person says and how that person is depicted in the overall narrative. Croesus as well as 
Cyrus are shown to underestimate Tomyris, since she performs a more effective masculine 
role than Cyrus, both as a speaker and as a fighter. As regards Artemisia, in the first speech 
(8.68) Herodotus gives to her, she praises her own performance at Euboea whilst criticising 
the role of other allies. Herodotus, however, does not reflect that account in the narrative 
concerning the battle. Her speech, therefore, is part of his characterisation of her as boastful 
and well-practised in the rhetoric of praise and blame, which, I will argue, forms part of the 
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andreia that Herodotus attributes to her (7.99.1). Artabanus is punished by exclusion from the 
masculine arena of war but gives better strategic advice than Mardonius. In this way, 
Herodotus subtly undermines the essentialist position that women are by nature inferior, by 
undercutting the assumptions of those who proclaim the rhetoric of female inferiority. 
 
2.2 Violating the rules 
A number of scholars have highlighted the role of women in defending the rule of law against 
those men who either have violated, or are at risk of violating, nomos.
335
 In the story of 
Candaules, his wife and Gyges (1.8-12) a breach of nomos meets a coercive response. In 
exposing his wife to Gyges, Candaules violates marital convention as well as royal status. Her 
response asserts her rights to privacy in both roles and leads to significant dynastic change. A 
combination of focalisation and speech reveals cause and effect in this story. Candaules is 
motivated by an irrational passion, based on his perception of his wife’s beauty and speaks to 
Gyges with misplaced confidence. Gyges speaks a warning: ‘I beg you, don’t require me to 
act unlawfully’ (σέο δέομαι μὴ δέεσθαι ἀνόμων, 1.8.4), but is motivated by fear of the 
consequences of disobeying his master. Candaules’ wife responds to an act of objectification 
with a spoken ultimatum: ‘You have seen me naked and broken the rules’ (σε τὸν ἐμὲ γυμνήν 
θεησάμενον καὶ ποιήσαντα οὐ νομιζόμενα, 1.11.3). Her sexual exposure breaks a marital rule 
and her speech act is an order backed up by a threat. She passes judgment, forcing Gyges to 
choose between two options, to remedy the king’s breach of nomos. She is unusual, however, 
in being a woman who exercises the power of life and death, which is usually reserved for the 
male tyrant. 
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In the following story, a breach of nomos is revealed through a conversation between 
Peisistratus’ wife, and her mother: 
[Peisistratus] had sex with [his wife] not in accordance with the rules. At first she kept 
it secret, but then told her mother (who may or may not have made inquiries), and she 
told her husband  
ἐμίσγετό οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον. τὰ μέν νυν πρῶτα ἔκρυπτε ταῦτα ἡ γυνή, μετὰ δὲ εἴτε 
ἱστορεύσῃ εἴτε καὶ οὒ φράζει τῇ ἑωυτῆς μητρί, ἣ δὲ τῷ ἀνδρί (1.61.2) 
 
Peisistratus’ wife, married as part of a negotiated alliance between two powerful men in 
which she has no say, nevertheless expects that the marriage will produce children; the 
attempt to thwart those expectations has political as well as personal consequences. Herodotus 
tells us Peisistratus agreed to the marriage, after he had become tyrant, but did not want to 
have further children (οὐ βουλόμενός οἱ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς νεογάμου γυναικὸς τέκνα, 1.61.1), a 
unilateral decision which compromised the legitimate expectation of children within marriage. 
Peisistratus’ failure to perform this particular marital rule comes to light in this conversation 
between the wife and her mother, who tells her husband Megacles, and the alliance with 
Peisistratus breaks down. Clearly, Megacles sees the marriage as creating a kinship bond 
which Peisistratus is thwarting by acting οὐ κατὰ νόμον. In gender terms, therefore, the man 
acts, but women, the mother and the daughter, are shown, through speech, to influence events 
beyond the oikos, because of legitimate expectations within the oikos. 
 
Both these stories, therefore, illustrate through gender themes, the normative ideal of the rule 
of law which sets boundaries on human behaviour and indicate that the oikos is a sphere 
where the performance of normative gender roles matters. In other instances, women are 
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shown to reinforce other obligations, in particular the preservation of the royal oikos. 
Cambyses’ sister/wife, for example, accuses her husband of ‘stripping Cyrus’ house as bare as 
this lettuce’ (3.32.4), because he has already killed his brother Smerdis. Periander’s daughter 
also warns her brother Lycophron of the risk his father’s oikos will be destroyed, if he does 
not return home, using a contrast between legal principles of fairness and justice in an attempt 
to persuade:  
‘Child, would you want the power to fall to others, and our father’s house destroyed, 
rather than to return and have it yourself? Come home and stop punishing yourself ... 
Many place fairness before justice, and many throw away their paternal inheritance 
through pursuing their maternal one’  
‘ὦ παῖ, βούλεαι τήν τε τυραννίδα ἐς ἄλλους πεσεῖν καὶ τὸν οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς 
διαφορηθέντα μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτός σφεα ἀπελθὼν ἔχειν; ἄπιθι ἐς τὰ οἰκία, παῦσαι 
σεωυτὸν ζημιῶν ... πολλοὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπιεικέστερα προτιθεῖσι, πολλοὶ δὲ ἤδη τὰ 
μητρώια διζήμενοι τὰ πατρώια ἀπέβαλον’ (3.53.3-4)  
 
The consequence of speaking out for Cambyses’ wife/sister is that she and her unborn child 
are killed, and Periander’s daughter fails in her mediation attempts. Both stories, therefore, 
illustrate a theme found elsewhere in the Histories of the self-destructive oikos, which I 
explore further in the next chapter. Moreover, in both these instances, the conversational 
exchanges illustrate a power imbalance, whereby advice is not heeded, a pattern which is 
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Another breach of nomos is revealed in speech by Phaedymia. Her father Otanes, one of the 
co-conspirators with Darius, suspects that the person who succeeded Cambyses as king is not 
Smerdis, son of Cyrus, but one of the Magi. He asks her, now married to this man, to find out 
who he is, either directly or via Atossa.  
The message his daughter sent in reply said: ‘I can’t talk to Atossa, or meet any of 
the women who live together, because at the very beginning of his reign this man, 
whoever he is, separated us by assigning each of us different quarters’. 
ἀντιπέμπει πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ θυγάτηρ ‘οὔτε Ἀτόσσῃ δύναμαι ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν οὔτε 
ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἰδέσθαι τῶν συγκατημενέων γυναικῶν. ἐπείτε γὰρ τάχιστα οὗτος 
ὥνθρωπος, ὅστις κοτὲ ἐστί, παρέλαβε τὴν βασιληίην, διέσπειρε ἡμέας ἄλλην ἄλλῃ 
τάξας.’ (3.68.5) 
 
This speech reveals that the gender norm, which complements the Persians’ nomos of 
polygamy,
337
 is that women live together in the women’s quarters and communicate with each 
other.
338
 The Magus disrupts this female space and female discourse through his actions in 
isolating the women from each other, he acts against precedent. 
 
Another woman who clearly warns against violating nomos is the priestess to Athena Polias to 
Cleomenes: 
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‘Go back, Lacedaemonian stranger, and do not enter the holy place since it is not 
lawful that Dorians should pass in here’  
ὦ ξεῖνε Λακεδαιμόνιε, πάλιν χώρεε μηδὲ ἔσιθι ἐς τὸ ἱρόν: οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεῦσι 
παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα (5.72) 
 
In the priestly hierarchy, she outranked all other priests, and ‘is only standing up for 
principles that her male fellow citizens would have endorsed’.
339
 Cleomenes does not listen to 
the authoritative speech of this priestess. However, on another occasion, he does heed the 
political advice of his daughter Gorgo: 
‘Father, the stranger [Aristagoras] will corrupt you, unless you leave him and go 
away’. Cleomenes was pleased with the child’s counsel and went into another room  
‘πάτερ, διαφθερέει σε ὁ ξεῖνος, ἢν μὴ ἀποστὰς ἴῃς’. ὅ τε δὴ Κλεομένης ἡσθεὶς τοῦ 
παιδίου τῇ παραινέσι ἤιε ἐς ἕτερον οἴκημα (5.51.2-3)    
 
Aristagoras’ promise that ‘you could rival Zeus in riches’ (τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε, 
5.49.7), encouraging Cleomenes to breach nomos by ignoring the boundary between mortals 
and gods, is ‘the clearest signal in the speech that Aristagoras goes much too far’.
340
 This 
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These examples, therefore, show women defending the rule of law against those men who 
either have violated, or are at risk of violating, nomos, but it also shows that speaking truth to 
power can be a risky undertaking. 
 
2.3 Gender norms and expectations 
Both men and women voice gender norms and expectations, which is an important way to 
reinforce the norms of gender performance. In the story of Cleobis and Biton, we have seen 
the Argives, male and female, praise gender qualities which are valued, and thereby highlight 
gender distinctiveness (1.31.3). Atys meanwhile anticipates censure from the community and 
from his wife if Croesus prevents him performing a masculine role in the hunt (1.35.3). 
Atossa’s appeal to Darius to pursue the Persian nomos of expansionism includes an injunction 
for him to prove his manly qualities: 
It is appropriate for a man who is both young and the master of great wealth to be seen 
to accomplish something significant, so that the Persians know that they are ruled by a 
real man 
οἰκὸς δὲ ἐστὶ ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων δεσπότην φαίνεσθαί τι 
ἀποδεικνύμενον, ἵνα καὶ Πέρσαι ἐκμάθωσι ὅτι ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἄρχονται (3.134.2) 
 
Atossa’s persuasiveness is part of what makes her ‘all-powerful’ (εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος, 7.3.4). 
In chapter 5, I will show how this gender ideology is used as a motivating factor in war, by 
women as well as men.  
 
My analysis shows that other social norms are revealed through speech, often in situations 
where the norm is being challenged or disrupted, for example, the norm of a female 
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community within the Persian royal oikos referred to above. Elsewhere in the Histories the 
contrast between Persian and Greek rules on gender segregation is highlighted through 
speech. The Persians tell Amyntas: ‘It is our rule in Persia to bring in also the pallakai and 
wives to sit by the men after the giving of any great banquet (ἡμῖν νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι, 
ἐπεὰν δεῖπνον προτιθώμεθα μέγα, τότε καὶ τὰς παλλακὰς καὶ τὰς κουριδίας γυναῖκας 
ἐσάγεσθαι παρέδρους, 5.18.2). Amyntas replies: ‘We have no such rule, Persians. Among us, 
men and women sit apart’ (‘ὦ Πέρσαι, νόμος μὲν ἡμῖν γε ἐστὶ οὐκ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ κεχωρίσθαι 
ἄνδρας γυναικῶν, 5.18.3). Herodotus uses speech to draw attention to these conflicting nomoi, 
but also adding a note of irony to the outcome, in that the Macedonians deceive the Persians 
by obeying this rule in practice (they remain men) but breaching it in performance terms (they 
look like women). 
 
The story of the Amazons is also about conflicting nomoi. They reject the performance 
expected of Scythian women who ‘stay in their wagons and do women’s work, and do not go 
out hunting or anywhere else’ (ἔργα δὲ γυναικήια ἐργάζονται μένουσαι ἐν τῇσι ἁμάξῃσι, οὔτ᾽ 
ἐπὶ θήρην ἰοῦσαι οὔτε ἄλλῃ οὐδαμῇ, 4.114.3 and are like all other women in the Histories, 
whose place is in the oikos, save in Egypt, where women buy and sell, and men stay at home 
and weave (ἐν τοῖσι αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἀγοράζουσι καὶ καπηλεύουσι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατ᾽ οἴκους 
ἐόντες ὑφαίνουσι, 2.35.2).  
 
Herodotus, therefore, shows that women have a role through speech in enforcing nomos, 
when men break the rules, but also in transmitting gender norms and expectations, which may 




2.4 Interpreting the rules 
As well as declaring nomos in speech, women also have a role in interpreting events to 
establish whether nomos has been broken. Caudaules’ wife for example, sees Gyges in her 
bedroom but correctly interprets what she sees as Candaules’ fault, whereas Amestris wrongly 
blames Artaynte’s mother, rather than Artaynte for the gift of a cloak to Xerxes (9.110.1).
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When Oroetes conceives an unlawful desire to kill Polycrates (ἐπεθύμησε πρήγματος οὐκ 
ὁσίου, 3.120.1), Polycrates’ daughter correctly interprets a dream to foresee the risk to her 
father, and tries, unsuccessfully to warn him: 
After this vision she used all means to persuade him not to go on this journey to 
Oroetes; even as he went to his fifty-oared ship she prophesied evil for him. When 
Polycrates threatened her that if he came back safe, she would long remain unmarried, 
she answered with a prayer that his threat might be fulfilled: for she would rather, she 
said, long remain unmarried than lose her father.  
ταύτην ἰδοῦσα τὴν ὄψιν παντοίη ἐγίνετο μὴ ἀποδημῆσαι τὸν Πολυκράτεα παρὰ τὸν 
Ὀροίτεα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἰόντος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν πεντηκόντερον ἐπεφημίζετο. ὁ δέ οἱ 
ἠπείλησε, ἢν σῶς ἀπονοστήσῃ, πολλόν μιν χρόνον παρθενεύεσθαι. ἣ δὲ ἠρήσατο 
ἐπιτελέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι: βούλεσθαι γὰρ παρθενεύεσθαι πλέω χρόνον ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἐστερῆσθαι (3.124) 
 
Polycrates’ daughter, therefore, like Cambyses’ wife/sister and Gorgo are all female 
characters in the Histories who speak truth to power: other examples are Tomyris to Cyrus 
(1.206; 1.212), whose words have a Solonian echo, Nitetis to Cambyses (3.1), and Artemisia 
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to Xerxes (8.68; 8.102) who gets a better reception from the king than Artabanus, but still 
fails to persuade.  
 
2.5 Passing judgment 
If we analyse these forms of speech in legal terms, the first, by Candaules’ wife, is an order 
backed up with a threat. She passes judgment, forcing Gyges to choose between two options, 
to remedy the king’s breach of nomos. Her judgment, however, is not identical to that a king 
who assumes the right to kill on the basis of his personal authority. Rather, she seeks a 
remedy for herself, for the breach of nomos; since only the king may see her naked, either 
Gyges must die or become king himself. Moreover, by making Gyges the agent in Candaules’ 
death, she shifts blame for the breach of nomos involved in killing the king onto him. 
However, in adopting a quasi-judicial function, exercising the power of life and death, she is 
the exception rather than the rule. Women, for the most part, have to persuade rather than 
pronounce judgment, negotiate rather than command, advise rather than direct. 
 
To summarise: it is through speech that Herodotus shows women who protest against 
violation of nomos, but also who reinforce gender norms and expectations. In my case studies 
I will develop these two aspects, since status and power within the oikos are key indicators of 
female agency or lack of it. Herodotus, however, at times confounds our expectations, for 
example, with a female slave, Cyno, whose story I analyse in chapter 4. Whilst appearances, 
and therefore female beauty, can be deceptive, Herodotus signals through female speech that 





3. Contesting the rules 
Finally, there are women in the Histories who challenge the rules. Argeia, for example, 
refuses to identify to the Spartans which twin was born first, because she wants to thwart the 
rule of succession which makes the elder boy king (6.52.4) and the mother of Demaratus 
makes a spirited defence of his paternity, when this is questioned in court by Leotychides 
(6.65.4; 6.69.4). I analyse both these stories in the next chapter. The stories of Athenian 
women, firstly those who kill the survivor of the Aegina campaign (5.88) and secondly those 
who stone Lycides’ wife and children to death (9.5) are examples, I will argue, of 
transgressive behaviour which show Herodotus’ critical distance from Athenian ideology. The 
story of the Athenian women, however, raises a significant question to do with appropriate 
behaviour as judged by Athenian men but problematised through speech. The story of the 
Amazons who reject women’s work emphasises by opposition the central role of the oikos in 
both Greek and non-Greek societies. 
 
3.1 The Aeginetan-Athenian dispute 5.82-89  
Following the Aeginetan-Athenian war in the 6
th
 century BCE, only one Athenian gets back 
alive to Attica. He, however, is set upon by the wives of the Athenian men who had died, who 
thought it terrible that he should be the only one to survive (δεινόν τι ποιησαμένας κεῖνον 
μοῦνον ἐξ ἁπάντων σωθῆναι, 5.87); they ‘stabbed him to death with the brooches which 
fastened their clothes, while each of them asked him where her husband was’ (τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
τοῦτον ... κεντεύσας τῇσι περόνῃσι τῶν ἱματίων εἰρωτᾶν ἑκάστην αὐτέων ὅκου εἴη ὁ ἑωυτῆς 
ἀνήρ, 5.87). The Athenian men found what the women had done even more shocking than the 
disaster on Aegina, but the only punishment they could come up with for the women was to 
make them change over to the Ionian style of clothing which did not need fastening with a 
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brooch (Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ ἔτι τοῦ πάθεος δεινότερόν τι δόξαι εἶναι τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἔργον. ἄλλῳ 
μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτεῳ ζημιώσωσι τὰς γυναῖκας, τὴν δὲ ἐσθῆτα μετέβαλον αὐτέων ἐς τὴν Ἰάδα 
... ἵνα δὴ περόνῃσι μὴ χρέωνται, 5.87.3). 
 
In my introduction, I identified dress as one of the ‘props’ which support a performance of 
gender and which can be a way for male authority to control women. In this story, both 
Athenian and Aeginetan men impose a change of dress on their women. For the Athenian men 
it is a punishment for transgressive behaviour by Athenian women, whereas the Aeginetan 
men introduce it as a new nomos for their women. I argue that Herodotus intends us to 
contrast the behaviour of the Athenian women, which goes far beyond acceptable female 
conduct, with that of the Argive and Aeginetan women, whose dress mirrors their role in 
ritual and cult, and reflects conduct which does not breach nomos. Herodotus highlights how 
the Athenian women breach nomos, by showing conduct which is violent and unlawful. 
However, he also problematises this by showing, through indirect speech, their loyalty to 
husbands, in contrast with the Carian women. Moreover, this story, like the story of the 
Athenian women who stone to death Lycides’ wife and children, can be read as emphasising 
the power of women to police male behaviour, operating, therefore, as a form of social 
control, a reading I will question. 
 
For some scholars, this is a mythical story to provide an aetiological reflection on current 




 Others, like Irwin and Greenwood, are more 
circumspect: ‘It is unclear whether such aggressive oppositional self-definition amongst 
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farfetched and polemical’. Schaps 1982: 207 ‘may well be apocryphal but the bitterness of the women 
doubtless had real parallels’.  
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 Dewald identifies 
misogynistic folk motifs within the story, including the Pentheus motif, but, she argues, the 
Athenian women are not mad but grief stricken, infected by the violence of war and, through 
their actions, giving a political response to the destructive effects of war.
345
 Hornblower 
points out the parallel with Euripides’ Hecuba, and notes a pattern of symmetrical aetiological 
reversal in that the Aeginetan and Argive women lengthen their pins as a consequence of the 




My interpretation accords with Hornblower, in that I read this story and the change of nomos 
as part of Herodotus’ explanation for the hostility between Aegina and Athens in his day, by 
which time Aegina was subject to Athens and had suffered huge losses. In those 
circumstances, we would expect the animosity between the two poleis to be reflected in the 
stories they tell about the past.
347
 However, in this story, the women’s anger is directed at the 
Athenian survivor, not the Aeginetans or Argives who have killed their husbands. This is the 
only instance in the Histories where this reaction (δεινὸν ποιέεσθαι) is attributed to a group of 
women.
348
 In some cases, the phrase expresses feelings of resentment or anger at rule by 
another: for example, the Persians at rule by the Medes (1.127.1), which leads them to seek 
independence under Cyrus; the Lydians at Gyges’ succession to the throne (1.13.1) after 
which they consult the oracle and learn of delayed vengeance for the killing of Candaules; 
Theras at rule by his nephews (4.147.3) which motivates him to leave Sparta for Thera; 
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 Irwin and Greenwood 2007: 32. See also Dunbabin 1936-7: 86 on the motive for the change of 
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345
 Dewald 2013b:158. 
346
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Dorieus at Cleomenes becoming king, which leads him to join in a colonising expedition to 
Libya (5.42.2).
349
 In all these cases, the reaction (anger or humiliation) is a precursor to a 
significant change of events, and reflects the ‘internal’ view of individuals and groups; it is 





Is this the case with the Athenian women, who are shown to respond to defeat by punishing 
the survivor? Forsdyke regards it as ‘plausible’ that women might punish a social offender, 
but it is not clear in what sense this Athenian has committed an offence, making the analogy 
with Euripides’ Hecuba inappropriate.
351
 The implication is that he is being treated as a traitor 
or coward, an action which suggests a parallel with the possibly apocryphal story of the 
Spartan women who told their men to return with or on their shields (Plutarch Moralia 
241f16). In an Athenian context, is he being held responsible for the death of husbands, as a 
deserter who has broken his ephebic oath by abandoning the man beside him?
352
 Is he a 
coward who is held responsible for the death of these women’s husbands and therefore liable 
to be punished? 
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 Baragwanath 2008: 165-7 on stories of Doreius and Theras foregrounding twin desires for power 
and land. 
350
 Other examples are: Zopyrus at the Assyrians laughing (καταγελᾶν, 3.155.2) at the Persians, the 
Persians at the small number of ships which had destroyed them at Artemisium, (8.15.1), and the 
Athenians at being attacked by Artemisia at Salamis (8.93.2). It can also express a response to failure, 
as in the rebellion by the survivors of Apries’ campaign against Cyrene (2.161.4) or to 
insubordination, as with Pausanias and Euryanax in relation to Amompharetus, the Spartan who 
refused a tactical order to retreat (9.53.3). 
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 Forsdyke 2012: 228n.84. Mossman 1995; 189-190 - in Hecuba the punishment of Polymestor 
through blinding and the death of his sons fits his crime; he has betrayed the principles of xenia in 
killing Polydorus. Mutilation, moreover, is a barbarian practice (Mossman 1995: 190; E. Hall 1989: 
25-7; 103-5; 158-9). 
352
 Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 440-441. 
138 
 
This does not accord with the Athenians’ own explanation for the defeat, which was that the 
Athenians went out of their mind and began killing each other as if they were enemies (ὑπὸ 
τούτων ἀλλοφρονῆσαι, παθόντας δὲ τοῦτο κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἅτε πολεμίους, 5.85.2). This 
was no Thermopylae, where Athenian men took a heroic stand against a superior foe, but a 
result of madness brought on by thunder and earthquake. This explanation from the Athenians 
is understandable as an alternative to the Aeginetan account, which called it a military defeat, 
but implies divine displeasure, thunder and earthquake being ill divine omens, indicating 
sacrilege.
353
 As Haubold says, ‘their actions cannot be explained in terms of rules that apply 
to normal human behaviour’.
354
 The same is surely true of the actions of the Athenian women, 
who break the rule that killing in war is for men, just as their husbands have offended the 
gods. However, at the same time as they act in this transgressive way as a group, they assert 
their position, their identity, as wives, as each one asks for her own husband (ὅκου εἴη ὁ 
ἑωυτῆς ἀνήρ, 5.87.2) in contrast to the Carian women who refuse such identification with 
their husbands. This brings home to us their loss but also creates a sense of dislocation in that 
these women proclaim their loyalty to their husbands whilst committing this terrible deed. 
Moreover, whilst they act as a group, they speak as individuals, each one asking for her own 
husband.  
 
Haubold reads this story as a historical change from the sacred aetiologies of the distant past 
to the cultural politics of present day society.
355
 He interprets women as the driving force 
behind cultural change, whose action ‘unleashes the potential for female agency’, shifts 
historical agency programmatically from gods and/or men to women and ushers in an ‘age of 
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 Holland 2013: 681; Hornblower 2013: 239 ‘divinely induced insanity after sacrilege’ and 240 ‘to a 
pious Greek observer it would imply an admission of the injustice of their cause’. 
354
 Haubold 2007: 239.   
355
 Haubold 2007: 229. 
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women, of clothes, of cultural politics’, when cultural signifiers become unstable.
356
 I 
question this interpretation, because it minimises the clear breach of the rules of female 
conduct, and the ‘internal’ view which Herodotus shows by focalising the response of 
Athenian men, who disagree with the women’s verdict. They view the women’s actions in 
killing an Athenian man as more terrible than the disaster on Aegina (ἔτι τοῦ πάθεος 
δεινότερόν τι δόξαι εἶναι τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἔργον, 5.87.3). Haubold argues that δεινότερόν can 
mean ‘more powerful’, ‘more important’, as well as having a negative connotation.
357
 
However, I can find no example of such use in the Histories and moreover, it does not fit this 
context. The ‘internal’ view, which Herodotus attributes to the Athenian men leads them to 
punish the women, imposing a new dress code which disarms them, by removing their 
weapons. I also cannot agree with Dewald’s reading of this passage, that men and women 
share a set of social values, and both are infected with the violence of war.
358
 The men in this 
story are enforcing nomos, restraining women who have disregarded social values, and 
thereby put themselves in opposition to men. 
 
How effective is this, though? In this story, male authority is asserted through the imposition 
of a new dress code on women, but we are told that the men ‘had no other way to punish the 
women’ (ἄλλῳ μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτεῳ ζημιώσασι τὰς γυναῖκας, 5.87.3), suggesting weakness 
not strength. Moreover, the women have performed a masculine role in killing the man who 
survives, making them rather like the Spartan women who tell their men to return with or on 
their shield. Who is the brave person now?, Herodotus asks us. This story shows the 
disruptive effect of war, reversing gender roles.  
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Hornblower highlights the way in which Herodotus presents the early history of Aegina, 
Athens, Epidaurus and Argos in terms of cult (of Auxesis and Damia) and cult objects (pins) 
and practices, including the Aeginetan women’s abusive choruses.
359
 I argue that we should 
consider this passage in the light of the change of nomos imposed on the Aeginetan and 
Argive women: 
The Argives and the Aeginetans passed a law that the pins of brooches in their 
respective countries be half as long again as the standard measurement, and that 
women visiting the shrine of the two goddesses make a particular point of dedicating 
their brooches. It was also laid down that no Attic pottery, and nothing else from 
Attica either, be taken into the shrine, and that in the future, by law, no one was to 
drink from any but locally sourced vessels.
360
 
τοῖσι δὲ Ἀργείοισι καὶ τοῖσι Αἰγινήτῃσι καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔτι τόδε ποιῆσαι
1
 νόμον εἶναι 
παρὰ σφίσι ἑκατέροισι τὰς περόνας ἡμιολίας ποιέεσθαι τοῦ τότε κατεστεῶτος 
μέτρου, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἱρὸν τῶν θεῶν τουτέων περόνας μάλιστα ἀνατιθέναι τὰς γυναῖκας, 
Ἀττικὸν δὲ μήτε τι ἄλλο προσφέρειν πρὸς τὸ ἱρὸν μήτε κέραμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ χυτρίδων 
ἐπιχωριέων νόμον τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτόθι εἶναι πίνειν (5.88.2) 
 
Here a change of nomos supports and reflects women’s ritual and cult roles, as well as 
displaying their difference from the Athenian women, through their larger pins, and 
prohibiting all but locally-sourced vessels in shrines. Aeginetan women are associated 
throughout this story with cult; the sacrifice to the statues of Damia and Auxesis, and the 
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abusive choruses performed by women, against women (κακῶς δὲ ἠγόρευον οἱ χοροὶ ἄνδρα 
μὲν οὐδένα, τὰς δὲ ἐπιχωρίας γυναῖκας, 5.83.3).
361
 Their dedication of pins involves women 
in memorialising the defeat of the Athenians.  
 
This story also illustrates how something which appears to be a cultural change may in fact 
also have wider significance, as part of people’s explanation of the past, but it also shows how 
cultural change reinforces the experience of victory or defeat and perpetuates the memory of 
that conflict. The dress of Athenian women becomes a marker of difference from other Greek 
women, an assertion of Athenian identity as well as gender identity.
362
 However, I think we 
are also intended to contrast the Athenian women who breach nomos, with the Aeginetan and 
Argive women, who integrate this cultural change in their female abusive choruses, acting out 
in ritual the murderous actions of the Athenian women, dedicating their pins to the cult of 
Damia and Auxesia, and displaying their polis’ victory over Athens in their dress.
363
 All 
women had previously worn the same (Dorian) dress; now they can be distinguished from 
each other. Dress, therefore, becomes a marker of cultural conflict, of contested rules, as it 
was in the case I referred to in my introduction, of Shabina Begum, who challenged school 
uniform rules. 
 
This story also invites comparison with Thucydides and the speech he constructs for Pericles, 
in advising the war widows. I have suggested that Thucydides, with this speech, declares his 
own historiographical practice in according kleos to all women by not talking about them. 
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Herodotus is different; the stories he tells of women present us with a wider perspective on 
war and incorporate contested versions of history, which he helps to preserve through his text, 
as cultural memory. The story indicates how Athenian women might be viewed by other city 
states, and by Herodotus. Their dress did not advertise their status but their polis origins. 
Indeed, far from cultural signifiers being unstable, as Haubold suggests, they become more so, 
in that Athenian women can now be distinguished from other women, through their dress. 
This change now signifies polis distinctiveness, not gender similarity. It is the Aeginetans, 
moreover, who use nomos not only to shape female behaviour and dress (like the Athenians) 
but also to incorporate that gender change more widely into ritual and cult, in religious 
practice which is the right place, in patriarchal terms, for female authority. Moreover, they 
can be trusted not to use their pins as weapons.  
 
It is significant that Herodotus gives us the ‘external’ view on this story in which Athenian 
women are judged by men to have broken the rules of appropriate conduct, because it is 
possible that the story itself would be told by Athenians with a different emphasis. This is 
certainly the case with my next case study, when women join men in attacking Lycides and 
his family, and the story is used by Demosthenes as one of patriotism and defence of the 
polis. 
 
3.2 The killing of Lycides and his family  
Herodotus himself saw it as one of the advantages of equality of speech (ἡ ἰσηγορίη, 5.78) 
over tyranny, that a free man would be keen to fight for himself, whereas those who were 
repressed by a tyrant would fight badly on purpose.
364
 (κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς 
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δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο 
κατεργάζεσθαι, 5.78). 
The advantages of everyone having a voice in the political procedure are not 
restricted to single instances but are plain to see wherever one looks ... when they 
were working for a master, they fought badly on purpose, but when they were freed, 
each one was eager to achieve for himself. 
δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον ... 
ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ 
αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι. (5.78) 
The extent of Herodotus’ praise of isēgoriē is debated: Baragwanath argues that it is limited to 
military endeavour, by making the Athenians better fighters, and, in linking freedom to 
power, it foreshadows Athenian imperialism, whereas, for Hornblower, Herodotus 
emphasises equality of speech in the passage and suggests the words οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ 
πανταχῇ extend Herodotus’ praise beyond the military.
365
 Forsdyke reads the passage as a 
reflection on both polis traditions and Herodotus’ own view of the link between political 
freedom and civic strength, and Rhodes argues that it shows Herodotus preferred freedom and 
constitutional government to subjection and tyranny making the passage less about Athens, 




My own view is that the passage is problematic because Herodotus provides evidence 
elsewhere in the Histories to contest his claim that Athens under tyranny was no better than 
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its neighbours (Peisistratus’ military exploits, for example).
367
 He also, as I will show in my 
analysis of the battle of Salamis, makes it clear that the Persians did not fight badly on 
purpose, the charge made against the Athenians, when they were ruled by a tyrant. Moreover, 
he problematises the Athenian nomos of isēgoriē with the following story, when the 
Athenians deny Lycides the right to refer the matter to the assembly, which would enable a 
full debate:  
One of the members of the Council, Lycides, argued that, in his opinion they ought 
to welcome Mardonius’ proposals and refer the matter to the people. He did this 
either because he had been bribed by Mardonius, or because he actually approved of 
the proposals. The Athenians (not only the members of the Council, but also those 
outside) straightaway thought this was a terrible proposal. They surrounded Lycides 
and stoned him to death although they let the Hellespontine go unharmed. When the 
Athenian women found out about the uproar in Salamis over Lycides, every woman 
gave a signal to her neighbour and enlisted her help, and the women took the law into 
their own hands and made their way to Lycides’ house, where they stoned his wife 
and his children to death. 
τῶν δὲ βουλευτέων Λυκίδης εἶπε γνώμην ὡς ἐδόκεε ἄμεινον εἶναι δεξαμένους τὸν 
λόγον, τόν σφι Μουρυχίδης προφέρει, ἐξενεῖκαι ἐς τὸν δῆμον. ὃ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν 
γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο, εἴτε δὴ δεδεγμένος χρήματα παρὰ Μαρδονίου, εἴτε καὶ ταῦτά οἱ 
ἑάνδανε: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ αὐτίκα δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ οἱ ἔξωθεν 
ὡς ἐπύθοντο, περιστάντες Λυκίδην κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἑλλησπόντιον 
Μουρυχίδην ἀπέπεμψαν ἀσινέα. γενομένου δὲ θορύβου ἐν τῇ Σαλαμῖνι περὶ τὸν 
Λυκίδην, πυνθάνονται τὸ γινόμενον αἱ γυναῖκες τῶν Ἀθηναίων, διακελευσαμένη δὲ 
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γυνὴ γυναικὶ καὶ παραλαβοῦσα ἐπὶ τὴν Λυκίδεω οἰκίην ἤισαν αὐτοκελέες, καὶ κατὰ 
μὲν ἔλευσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν γυναῖκα κατὰ δὲ τὰ τέκνα. (9.5.1-3) 
 
This incident occurs towards the end of the Histories, when Xerxes has returned to Persia, 
after the defeat at Salamis, leaving his general Mardonius in command, with orders to 
continue the war against the Greeks. Mardonius has just seized Athens as an empty city 
(αἱρέει τε ἔρημον τὸ ἄστυ, 9.3.2). Women as well as men are living as exiles from Athens, on 
Salamis. Twice in a year they have had to leave their homes and farms, and evacuate their 
families, watching the Persians torch their city. This is the context for a story of the 
consequences of war for men and women when their community is dispersed, which engages 
with both political and social norms; to what extent do the actions of the Athenians violate the 
democratic nomos of isēgoriē, and break social norms of appropriate conduct? How does one 
‘live with the rules’ when there is no longer a polis?
368
 I think this story also asks to what 
extent Herodotus shapes this narrative; is he the passive recipient of an Athenian story, or 
does he distance himself from that account, giving us an ‘external’ view of Athenian rules? 
 
This incident is used as an example of an extra-legal collective form of popular justice in 
Athens, a means of self-help in a society which lacked a police force or other forms of 
enforcement, and to argue that, though women were excluded from the formal deliberations of 
the assembly and the law courts, they had an important role to play in disseminating news and 
gossip, one of the ways, claims Lewis, that women policed the morality of others.
369
 For 
Gottesman, this incident is the locus classicus for the role of word of mouth in carrying out 
public acts, a model for enforcement in normal circumstances, though he accepts that the 
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circumstances in Herodotus’ narrative are exceptional.
370
 Allen interprets this story of stoning 
as ‘expressing the community’s desire to enforce its social norms’ and ‘a paradigmatic form 
of collective action’, arguing that, by inverting peacetime norms of punishment (the foreigner 
goes free, the citizen is punished with death without trial, and the punishment is carried out by 
citizens, not the public executioner), this acts to confirm those norms: ‘institutional rules were 
ignored, ideological norms were not’.
371
 Schaps goes further, arguing that these women acted 




On this reading, the ideological argument is that the Athenians, male and female, are 
punishing a traitor, someone who was encouraging them to consider coming to terms with the 
Persians who had sacked their city and destroyed their temples; the Hellespontine, as 
emissary, is not expected to show loyalty to Athens, so can go free. This is certainly the story 
which attracts Demosthenes, in On the Crown, when he uses it to support his argument for 
fighting Philip in Chaeronea, by drawing a parallel with the Athenians who fought the 
Persians at Marathon, Plataea, Salamis and Artemisium.
373
 In his speech, though, the stoning 
takes place before, not after, the battle of Salamis, when the Athenians can be shown to show 
courage in choosing to retreat to Salamis, to avoid coming to terms with the Persians, rather 




In gender terms, moreover, Demosthenes makes a direct appeal to an imagined audience 
beyond the assembly, by saying ‘your wives did the same [stoning to death] to his wife’ (αἱ 
γυναῖκες αἱ ὑμέτεραι τὴν γυναῖκ᾽ αὐτοῦ, Dem. 18.204). The story therefore, has a function in 
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an Athenian context, showing the Athenians, male and female, stand up for freedom against 
enslavement to the Persians and to that extent it makes sense to link this passage to the speech 
made by the Athenians to the Spartans (8.144) when they reject any alliance with Xerxes; 





Herodotus’ presentation of the story however does not support this reading, in my view. I 
think he highlights the extraordinary nature of the Athenians’ behaviour, part of his 
characterisation of the Athenians as becoming barbarians, foreshadowing the end of the 
Histories (9.120) when they crucify Artayctes and stone his son to death in equally brutal 
fashion.
376
 Dewald also makes this parallel, commenting on the ‘lynch-mob mentality’ of the 
Athenians, noting that female violence is the complement and mirror of male violence, not its 
antithesis.
377
 I will analyse this passage by considering, firstly, the actions of both men and 
women and I will argue that, far from being paradigmatic of actions which might be taken in 
normal circumstances, Herodotus intends us to read this in the context of the abnormal 
circumstances of war. Secondly, I will argue that Herodotus emphasises those abnormal 
circumstances through his portrayal of the women in the story, whose behaviour breaches 
family norms. As well as deconstructing the Greek-barbarian polarity, he also shows that 
gender rules, based in Athens in particular on the separation of the genders, are vulnerable in 
the circumstances of war. 
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The Athenians deny Lycides the right to put a resolution made in the boulē to a vote in the 
assembly. Baragwanath argues that this accords with the Athenian legal charge of graphē 
paranomōn,
378
 a prosecution of someone who proposes a nomos or psephisma (before 
403BCE), charging that the proposal is unlawful (paranomōn).
379
 The procedure, whereby a 
proposer of an illegal decree could be indicted on the grounds that it conflicted with existing 
law, was common by 4
th
 century BCE and, argues Gagarin, the merit of both the proposer and 
the decree were relevant.
380
 However, this presupposes a legal process of indictment, whereas 
in this story, the men commit an extra-judicial killing, motivated by outrage at Lycides’ 
proposal (δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι). There is a parallel here with the motivation of the Athenian 
women who kill the survivor of the Aeginetan campaign; as in that story, outrage motivates a 
breach of nomos, and leads to a transgressive act. I read this, therefore, as an indication that 
Herodotus recognises that the exercise of freedom of speech is vulnerable at times of crisis, 




I argue that Herodotus emphasises the breach of a political nomos by showing women 
breaching a social nomos. In their actions, the women are not acting as guardians of nomos by 
enforcing communal norms, nor are they delivering a form of ‘rough justice’. They kill 
another woman and her children, who are part of the Athenian community, not enemies. An 
audience might hear echoes of Andromache’s words in Euripides’ Trojan Women: ‘O you 
Hellenes, inventors of barbaric cruelties, why kill this child who has done no wrong? (ὦ 
βάρβαρ᾽ ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κακά, τί τόνδε παῖδα κτείνετ᾽ οὐδὲν αἴτιον, E. Tr.764-5).
382
 It is 
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significant, I think, that Demosthenes does not mention the killing of children or the 
destruction of the oikos in his speech; perhaps he could not rely on that aspect of Herodotus’ 
story finding favour with his audience. 
 
Georgoudi argues that female activity in civic as well as private space is sometimes marked 
by collaboration, participation and complementarity rather than exclusion and separation, and 
here men and women certainly collaborate, but in a transgressive activity.
383
 Herodotus 
presents these women as if they were communicating across battle lines. They give one 
another a signal (διακελευσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυναικὶ, 9.5.3) suggesting a military chain of 
command rather than a type of social control or enforcement of popular morality.
384
 
Herodotus creates warrior women of these female Athenians, who also act of their own accord 
(αὐτοκελέες, 9.5.3), suggesting that the norms of Athens which deny women legal autonomy 
are fractured in times of war. They become a law unto themselves. This story, therefore, 
illustrates clearly a disjuncture between ideology and practice, and is one example where the 
involvement of women in war does signal disruption and the transgression of norms as it does 
in Thucydides.
385
 Indeed, I argue that the women’s actions in Herodotus’ story are more 
extreme; in Thucydides’ narrative, women’s actions, building defensive walls (Th.1.90.3; 
5.82.6) and throwing roof tiles from housetops at Plataea (Th. 2.4.2) and Corcyra (Th. 3.74.1), 




To summarise, I argue that it is the women’s actions in this story, and the way they are 
presented by Herodotus, as if they were in battle, but directing themselves rather than under a 
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commander, which refutes the argument that this story functions as part of an Athenian 
patriotic tradition, which Herodotus records in his narrative. The women’s transgressive 
actions, rather, complement a male breach of nomos, both in denying Lycides the right to put 
a motion to the assembly and in killing a citizen without due process. That aspect of the 
institutional exclusion of women, namely isēgoriē, the right to speak in the assembly, is 
shown to be unstable in war, when it is denied to Lycides, and when women as well as men 
are involved in a violent act which destroys a whole family. The immediate context, the 
destruction of Athens and the forced migration to Salamis, help to explain their actions. 
However, this story also tells us something significant about gender relations and nomos in 
circumstances where war has come to Athens, has disrupted households and forced the whole 
community to become refugees, in other words, where war is not just men’s concern; the 
fragility of the Athenian nomos of isēgoriē is also exposed by the actions of both women and 
men.  
 
I return to a question I posed in my introduction: how do we recognise the absence of the rule 
of law? This story for me illustrates a situation where Athenian women are shown to break the 
rules of their own polis. The women’s actions coincide with male collective mob violence, 
and they are certainly not inferior in aggression, intent or capacity to act. This story 
challenges the ideological construct of Athenian women as secluded in the oikos and silent in 
public affairs. They identify with their men, they show a capacity for violence, they join with 
men in denying an opportunity for equality of speech (isēgoriē) which was a keystone of 
Athenian democracy, and they do not defend communal norms which protect the oikos. 
Demosthenes presents these Athenian women and men as defenders of their polis but 
Herodotus’ account, in my view, distances him from this patriotic account. Athenian women, 
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both in the Aeginetan episode and the killing of Lycides’ wife and children, are involved in 
actions which may be construed as policing male conduct (the ‘internal’ view) but I interpret 
as transgressive, reflecting Herodotus’ ‘external’ view. He uses another group of women, the 
mythical Amazons, to challenge another Athenian story in which these women are aggressors 
and invaders who must be defeated. 
 
4. Rejecting the rules 
4.1 The Amazons: a thought experiment in difference  
In this section I will argue that the story of the Amazons is constructed by Herodotus to offer 
his audience a thought experiment in which women play a role in making, changing and 
enforcing nomos, rejecting the gender norms not only of the Greeks but also of their own 
society. Such thought experiments are a way to ask a counter-factual question which prompts 
enquiry. For example, Feminist Judgments: from Theory to Practice is a modern example of a 
theoretical engagement with law, in which the authors collaborate to rewrite existing 
judgments in significant legal cases from a feminist perspective, asking ‘What if a group of 
feminist scholars were to write the ‘missing’ feminist judgments in key cases?’
387
 These 
authors aim to disrupt legal constructions of masculinity and femininity which devalue the 
latter, by ‘intervening in law from a feminist perspective ... to introduce different accounts of 
gender that might be less limiting for women’.
388
 The question which Herodotus poses is: 
What if men and women performed the same roles? Herodotus also asks a question which is 
still pertinent today, even though women have achieved legal equality; if nomos prescribes 
that women do the same work as men, who does ‘women’s work’?  
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I will argue that Herodotus uses this story to reflect on the ‘complicated process of 
negotiation, conflict and collaboration’
389
 which occurs when two cultures (here, the Amazon 
and the Scythian) encounter each other, by staging a debate on marriage norms and social 
practices, and that he reveals diversity rather than opposition. Moreover, I aim to show that he 
deliberately deconstructs the Athenian myth of the Amazon as invader, and aggressor, who 
has to be defeated, by narrating a story in which the relationship between the two groups is 
characterised by reciprocity, rather than hostility. I will also challenge Penrose’s claim that 
Herodotus is ‘engaging in orientalism’ in constructing a story which an audience of Greek 
men could understand. I assert that Herodotus in fact destabilises his audience’s expectations 




Herodotus highlights by opposition how certain cultural constructs are embedded in both 
Greek and non-Greek concepts of community, in particular, the centrality of the oikos, and the 
male authority figure, both of which are absent from the Amazons’ world. To that extent I 
adopt a structuralist approach to this story, based on binary oppositions, following Hartog, for 
example, who argues that the Scythians turn into quasi-Greeks, during the course of the story, 
creating a ‘dual relationship: Amazons on the one hand and Scythians/Greeks on the other’.
391
 
Du Bois presents the Amazon state as the inversion of the Greek polis,
392
 and Hardwick reads 
a schematic polarity between the social organisations of Greeks and Amazons.
393
 Rosellini 
and Saïd remark on the ‘otherness’ of a society which makes no distinction between gender 
roles in either war or marriage.
394
  
                                                          
389
 Dougherty and Kurke 2003: 2. 
390
 Penrose 2016: 116. 
391
 Hartog 1988: 216-224.  
392
 du Bois 1982: 32-37. 
393
 Hardwick 1996: 17-33. 
394




However, I argue that Herodotus, through speech, presents us with Amazons who become 
articulate and persuasive once they can communicate with the Scythian young men and have 
acquired rhetorical skills, thereby showing through speech their engagement with nomos and 
making them more ‘Greek’ than the Scythian young men. Their oratorical skill makes them 
similar to the normative Athenian male, an unsettling prospect for some of Herodotus’ 
audience, perhaps, and destabilising the Amazon as ‘other’. 
 
The myth of the Amazon has a particular significance in Athenian ideology, enforcing and 
perpetuating Athenian gender roles; ‘being an Amazon’ is only an interim status, which 
requires the Amazon to die so that men and men alone can occupy the role of warrior and 
master over women.
395
 Aeschylus has Athena attribute the name of the Areopagus to the 
fortification made by the Amazons when they came to Athens to take revenge on Theseus (A. 
Eum. 685-90).
396
 They also feature in artistic form on black-figure vases from the late 6
th
 
century BCE. One, c. 520-500 BCE, shows them fighting Heracles and Telamon, another, c. 
510 BCE shows Theseus abducting the Amazon Antiope. A mural at the Theseum in Athens 
shows their battle with Theseus for the Acropolis, whilst the Stoe Poikile included paintings 
of Amazons on horseback and with wicker shields.
397
 By the time of the Histories, moreover, 
they are shown in Attic vase paintings in Persian clothing, and on the Parthenon frieze, 
fighting the Greeks, which suggests that they were, after 480 BCE, used by the Athenians as a 
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artistic trope to identify the ‘effeminate’ Persian with the female Amazon, both of whom had 
to be defeated.
398
     
 
This reading of myth places ‘the Amazon’ within the Athenian imaginary, as a scary 
embodiment of disorder, a dystopian world turned upside down. Herodotus recognises the 
place of the Amazon in Athenian gender ideology, in the speech he constructs for the 
Athenians before the battle of Plataea (9.27), when they claim a place of honour in the battle 
lines and seek a rhetorical advantage over the Tegeans, by reminding the Spartans of their 
victory over the Amazons, and anticipating later Athenian funeral orations in which these 




However, Hardwick notes that it was specifically the Athenians who portrayed the Amazons 
as invaders, who posed a challenge to Greece, and who used their abduction and defeat to 
assert historical supremacy. She points to the Amazons of epic who appear in the Iliad as 
warriors, earning the epithet of ‘a match for men’ (ἀντιανείραι, Hom. Il. 3.189; 6.186), 
arguing that they are portrayed as worthy opponents of Homeric heroes, to signal the 
achievements of those heroes in defeating them. For Greeks rather than Athenians, she argues, 
it was the self-sufficient lifestyle of Herodotus’ Amazons, and a psychology which was 
neither submissive nor aggressive without provocation, which was the real challenge to Greek 
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Penrose adopts a post-structuralist, postmodernist, postcolonialist approach to rethink the 
‘theory of the other’, and seeks to provincialise Athens and reclaim non-Athenian attitudes to 
gender.
401
 Since a Greek audience ‘could not conceive of equality between the sexes’ 
Herodotus, according to Penrose, creates a story in which Scythian women do women’s work, 
in order to make it intelligible to an audience of Greek men.
402
 However, Penrose is looking 
for real Amazons.
403
 He relies on archaeological evidence of historical peoples where women 
fought, but this does not tell us anything about gender hierarchies or power structures within 
these communities, or indeed how these historical groups constructed ideologies of 
masculinity or femininity.
404
 As a result, Penrose, in my view, underestimates the nuance and 
challenge in Herodotus’ account. I aim to show that Herodotus destabilises fixed concepts of 
masculinity (andreia) by showing that Scythians have a different concept of war from Greeks, 
in which strategic retreat has a role to play. Moreover, in giving the Amazons an ability to 
manipulate and persuade the Scythian young men through speech, he marks his narrative out 
as different from other literary and artistic portrayals, in which the Amazons have no voice. 
 
When Herodotus starts his story with a linguistic note that the word ‘Amazon’ means ‘killer 
of men’ (Οἰόρπατα; ἀνδροκτόνοι, 4.110.1) in both Scythian and Greek, confirms that the 
Greeks were victorious in battle (νικήσαντας τῇ ἐπὶ Θερμώδοντι μάχῃ, 4.110.1) but that the 
crew of the ships taking the Amazons away were slaughtered by them (ἐπιθεμένας ἐκκόψαι 
τοὺς ἄνδρας, 4.110.1), he presents his audience with a familiar picture. They are fully ‘other’ 
in being women who fight, are defeated by Greek warriors but capable of violence against 
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men who are sailors, not warriors, that is, not worthy opponents. Once they land, however, 
they start plundering the Scythians’ land on horseback (ἱππαζόμεναι ἐληίζοντο τὰ τῶν 
Σκυθέων, 4.110.2), suggesting a way of life as nomadic hunters, an aspect of the Amazon that 
differs from either the epic warrior or the vengeful invader. Herodotus’ theme is the meeting 
of two cultures, the Scythian and the Amazon, which produces the Sauromatae, not the 
conflict between two nomadic groups.   
 
The story starts by focalising the Scythians’ incomprehension (οὐκ εἶχον συμβαλέσθαι τὸ 
πρῆγμα, 4.111.1) when they first encounter the Amazons.
405
 They wonder where the people 
plundering their land have come from (ἐν θώματι ἦσαν ὁκόθεν ἔλθοιεν, 4.111.1), since they 
cannot identify their nationality, language or dress (οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν οὔτε ἐσθῆτα οὔτε τὸ 
ἔθνος ἐγίνωσκον, 4.111.1). They have no means of comparison; they are ‘confronted by the 
unknown’.
406
 Herodotus signals that an interpretive exercise is underway: the Scythians’ 
wonder is a prompt to inquiry and investigation into the nomoi of the people they encounter. 
Herodotus employs narrative delay to good effect because the Scythians are ignorant of the 
most remarkable fact, namely that they are women. Their reaction to that fact and their 
subsequent negotiations with the Amazons illustrate a degree of ambiguity in both the 
Scythian young men and the Amazons, I suggest, rather than a polarity in which the Scythians 
become Greeks. When confronted with a ‘logical monster that is both man and woman at the 
same time’, the Scythians do not retreat but engage in negotiations.
407
 The rapprochement 
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between their young men and the Amazons shows the two groups as remarkably alike.
408
 The 
narrative emphasises, too, that both groups live a nomadic existence, hunting and raiding 
(ζόην ἔζωον τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνῃσι, θηρεύοντές τε καὶ ληιζόμενοι, 4.112), that is the opposite of 
the settled life of the polis. On the one hand, the men are the instigators of their plan, to father 
children with the Amazons (ἐξ’ αὐτέων παῖδας ἐκγενήσεσθαι, 4.111.2), which accords with 
the Athenian view that the purpose of marriage is to produce an heir. It also shows that the 
young men are not interested in the Amazons as potential hetairai. On the other hand, the 
Athenian marriage custom whereby the woman goes to her husband’s house with a dowry is 
reversed, but through a negotiated change of nomos. 
 
The two groups begin to communicate by sign language (τῇ δὲ χειρὶ ἔφραζε, 4.113.2) and pair 
off. There is no suggestion of any coercion. This points to another departure from the 
Athenian myth, in which Heracles abducts and overpowers the Amazons and ‘metaphorically 
rapes’ their culture.
409
 Baragwanath points to the contrast between Herodotus’ depiction of 
Theseus as a hubristic abductor of women, and Athenian iconography and political discourse 
which construes Theseus’ victory over the Amazons as analogous to Greek victory over the 
Persians.
410
 The next step they take confirms this reciprocity and again illustrates the 
similarity of the Scythian men and the Amazons and their difference from the Greeks and the 
Greek oikos for the two join camp and make it home (συμμείξαντες τὰ στρατόπεδα οἴκεον 
ὁμοῦ, 4.114.1).  
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The nomadic lifestyle of the Scythians, with their lack of a fixed oikos and polis, and a culture 
based on hunting rather than agriculture, set them apart from Greek norms of settlement and 
cultural practice. However, in one respect, they were similar in assigning different roles to 
men and women. This is the reason given by the Amazons for not returning with the Scythian 
young men to their homeland: they know enough about ‘women’s work’ and women’s place 
(inside the wagon) to reject it. This emerges from the first speech which Herodotus gives to 
the Amazons, when the Scythian young men propose a joint move to their land, and a 
monogamous relationship with the Amazons. 
‘We could not live with your women; for we and they do not have the same rules. We 
shoot the bow and throw the javelin and ride, but have never learned women’s work; 
and your women do none of the things of which we speak, but stay in their wagons 
and do women’s work, and do not go out hunting or anywhere else. So we could never 
agree with them.  
If you want us to be your wives, and to seem the most just of men, go to your parents 
and let them give your share of property, and after that let us go and live together.’ 
The young men were persuaded and did this.  
‘ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἂν δυναίμεθα οἰκέειν μετὰ τῶν ὑμετερέων γυναικῶν: οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ 
νόμαια ἡμῖν τε κἀκείνῃσι ἐστί. ἡμεῖς μὲν τοξεύομέν τε καὶ ἀκοντίζομεν καὶ 
ἱππαζόμεθα, ἔργα δὲ γυναικήια οὐκ ἐμάθομεν: αἱ δὲ ὑμέτεραι γυναῖκες τούτων μὲν 
οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμεῖς κατελέξαμεν ποιεῦσι, ἔργα δὲ γυναικήια ἐργάζονται μένουσαι ἐν τῇσι 




ἀλλ᾽ εἰ βούλεσθε γυναῖκας ἔχειν ἡμέας καὶ δοκέειν εἶναι δίκαιότατοι, ἐλθόντες παρὰ 
τοὺς τοκέας ἀπολάχετε τῶν κτημάτων τὸ μέρος, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντες οἰκέωμεν ἐπὶ 




The Amazons have already proved themselves better linguists than the Scythians (τὴν δὲ 
φωνὴν τὴν μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οὐκ ἐδυνέατο μαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αἱ γυναῖκες 
συνέλαβον, 4.114.1) and the men are persuaded to adopt their proposals. The Amazons 
respond effectively to the men with a wide variety of rhetorical techniques. In their first 
speech (4.114.3-4) they employ ring composition to emphasise their first main point which is 
the contrast between them and Scythian women; they would not be able (οὐκ ἂν δυναίμεθα, 
4.114.3; 4.114.4) to live with (οἰκέειν, 4.114.3) Scythian women or get along with 
(συμφέρεσθαι, 4.114.4) them. They show a familiarity with anaphora (ἡμεῖς is repeated three 
times in this first speech) and the use of μὲν and δὲ to mark the antithesis between them and 
the Scythian women. They also know the persuasive power of the superlative (δικαιότατοι, 
4.114.4) and that a tricola of verbs gives a sense of rhythm (τοξεύομέν τε καὶ ἀκοντίζομεν καὶ 
ἱππαζόμεθα, 4.114.3). They conclude with an order and a request (ἀπολάχετε τῶν κτημάτων 
τὸ μέρος, καὶ οἰκέωμεν ἐπ’ ἡμέων αὐτῶν, 4.114.4), they speak with authority and are clear 
about what they want, all marks of a good advocate.  
So when they had been given the allotted share of possessions that fell to them, 
and returned to the Amazons, the women said to them: ‘We are worried and 
frightened how we are to live in this country after depriving you of your 
fathers and doing a lot of harm to your land. Since you propose to have us for 
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wives, do this with us: come, let us leave this country and live across the 
Tanaïs river.’ 
ἐπείτε δὲ ἀπολαχόντες τῶν κτημάτων τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἦλθον ὀπίσω παρὰ τὰς 
Ἀμαζόνας, ἔλεξαν αἱ γυναῖκες πρὸς αὐτοὺς τάδε. ‘ἡμέας ἔχει φόβος τε καὶ 
δέος ὅκως χρὴ οἰκέειν ἐν τῷδε τῷ χώρῳ, τοῦτο μὲν ὑμέας ἀποστερησάσας 
πατέρων, τοῦτο δὲ γῆν τὴν ὑμετέρην δηλησαμένας πολλά. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείτε ἀξιοῦτε 
ἡμέας γυναῖκας ἔχειν, τάδε ποιέετε ἅμα ἡμῖν: φέρετε ἐξαναστέωμεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς 
τῆσδε καὶ περήσαντες Τάναιν ποταμὸν οἰκέωμεν.’ (4.114.2-4.115.1-2) 
 
In this second speech (4.115.1-3) they start with a synonym (φόβος τε καὶ δέος, 4.115.1) and 
answer the men who had given family and property as reasons for the Amazons to go to live 
with them and the other Scythians (εἰσὶ μὲν τοκέες, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κτήσιες, 4.114.2). The women 
use μὲν and δὲ in the same connective sense to explain why this would not be possible; they 
have taken the men from their parents (τοῦτο μὲν ὑμέας ἀποστερησάσας πατέρων, 4.115.2) 
and caused great damage to their land (τοῦτο δὲ ... δηλησαμένας πολλά, 4.115.2). Once again, 
they use the imperative to give orders (τάδε ποιέετε ἅμα ἡμῖν, 4.115.3) and as a rallying cry, 
Come! (Φέρετε, 4.115.3) and combine it with a proposal for their own marriage 
arrangements: 
If you want us to be your wives and to appear really fair, you should go to your 
parents and get your share of your property, and then when you come back we can 
form our own community. The men were persuaded and acted accordingly. 
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εἰ βούλεσθε γυναῖκας ἔχειν ἡμέας καὶ δοκέειν εἶναι δικαιότατοι, ἐλθόντες παρὰ τοὺς 
τοκέας ἀπολάχετε τῶν κτημάτων τὸ μέρος, καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντες οἰκέωμεν ἐπὶ ἡμέων 
αὐτῶν.’ ἐπείθοντο καὶ ἐποίησαν ταῦτα οἱ νεηνίσκοι. (4.114-115) 
 
Hartog sees this as an example of role reversal in that men are persuaded by women but it 
could equally illustrate that the Amazons are more ‘Greek’ than the Scythians in that they 





The issue for the Amazons is a clash of rules (τὰ νόμαια, 4.114.3). Herodotus uses this word 
in relation to the Scythians to show their conservatism (4.80.5) but, as we see in the story of 
the Amazons, this is not reflected by the behaviour of the young men they encounter. The 
Amazons say their way of life is different from that of Scythian women, who live indoors in 
the wagons. We cannot conclude from this that the Scythian women share gender rules with 
Greek women but have to consider this passage in the context of the other information 
Herodotus has given us about the Scythians, which shows the performance of female roles as 
either transgressive, according to Greek custom, or strange. He starts Book 4 with a story of a 
generation of children born to slaves and Scythian wives who had sex with them (ἐφοίτων 
παρὰ τοὺς δούλους, 4.1.3) in their husbands’ long absence fighting the Medes, and he 
describes their funerary practice whereby a corpse was placed on a wagon, taken round to 
friends and entertained for 40 days before burial (4.73), which contrasts with the role of 
Athenian women in lamenting the dead and visiting family tombs.
413
 We also learn that 
Scythian women cleansed themselves (γίνονται καθαραὶ καὶ λαμπραί, 4.75.3) with a paste of 
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cypress, cedar, and frankincense wood as an alternative to taking a bath (ἀντὶ λουτροῦ, 
4.75.2).  
 
Pelling suggests that the Scythians, including their women, seemed normal compared with the 
Amazons who personified otherness.
414
 However, I argue that the cultural differences between 
Scythian and Greek women, between the nomadic existence and the life of the polis, outweigh 
a similarity which is based solely on division of labour. Herodotus introduces his audience to 
the strangeness of Scythian and Amazon culture, not so much as an exercise in self-definition, 
but rather to highlight those aspects of the Amazon and Scythian which are not so alien, and 




Herodotus’ Amazons are more ‘Greek’ than the Scythians in that they have mastered the art 
of oratory; in fact, in constructing his Amazons, Herodotus makes them better at Greek than 
Scythian, which they struggled to learn (οὐ χρηστῶς ἐξέμαθον, 4.117). This aspect of 
Herodotus’ Amazons is their most remarkable, I suggest, which can only be explored as a 
thought experiment, where the audience’s preconceptions are challenged, presenting us with 
Amazons who argue, negotiate and persuade. Herodotus chooses to dramatise a debate on 
nomos in a dialogue which gives a speaking role to Amazons. In Athenian culture at least, 
Amazons are personified as voiceless fighters and aggressors, whereas in Herodotus they use 
their powers of speech to persuade the Scythian young men to adopt rules which persisted. 
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He concludes his story of the Amazons with an account of their female descendents who hunt, 
ride horses, wear the same clothes as men and go to war (ἐς πόλεμον φοιτῶσαι, 4.116.2). The 
Sauromatae have a nomos which requires a woman to kill a man in war before she can marry 
(οὐ γαμέεται παρθένος οὐδεμία πρὶν [ἂν] τῶν πολεμίων ἄνδρα ἀποκτείνῃ, 4.117). This makes 
them heirs to the Amazons of myth. However, Herodotus introduces a degree of diversity into 
this female group. In his final ethnographical observation, he notes that some women die 
unmarried because they cannot satisfy this nomos (οὐ δυνάμεναι τὸν νόμον ἐκπλῆσαι, 4.117). 
This fits in with Herodotus’ observation later in Book 4 that the Scythians had a different 
ideological concept of war from the Greeks or indeed from other non-Greek peoples. They 
avoided war as a general rule. Because they led a nomadic lifestyle, they proved formidable 
opponents to the Persians, as illustrated by the following speech by their king Idanthyrsus, 
when Darius asks him why the Scythians keep running away: 
I have never fled from any man in fear – I never have in the past and that is not what 
is happening now. What I am doing now is not far removed from my usual way of 
life during peacetime. I’m not going to fight you, and I’ll tell you why. If we had 
towns we might worry about the possibility of them being captured, and if we had 
farmland we might worry about it being laid to waste, and then we might engage you 
in battle quite quickly: but we don’t have either. 
ἐγὼ οὐδένα κω ἀνθρώπων δείσας ἔφυγον οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε νῦν σὲ φεύγω, οὐδέ τι 
νεώτερον εἰμὶ ποιήσας νῦν ἢ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη ἐώθεα ποιέειν. ὅ τι δὲ οὐκ αὐτίκα 
μάχομαι τοι, ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο σημανέω. ἡμῖν οὔτε ἄστεα οὔτε γῆ πεφυτευμένη ἐστί, 





They rejected the type of andreia which amounted to ‘win or die’, the Spartans’ all-powerful 
nomos (7.104) and which required a man to perform his masculinity in battle; running away 
for the Scythians was a tactical move, not a sign of cowardice. However, Idanthyrsus warns 
Darius that if he destroys the Scythian ancestral burial grounds, then the Scythians will 
engage the Persians in battle (4.127.3). The female Sauromatae who fight, therefore, are not a 
mirror image of their Greek or Persian counterparts, but share with men a different motivation 
for going to war.  
 
Herodotus’ picture of the Amazons, therefore, is an ambiguous one. The marriage rule 
whereby the Scythian men moved to live with the Amazons and brought a dowry is an 
inversion of the patrilinear Greek custom but also challenges the myth of the Amazon invader, 
and the relationship between the two groups is characterised by reciprocity rather than 
hostility. In the story of the Amazons, Herodotus imagines women both making and speaking 
rules. I have shown that he effectively undermines Athenian ideology through destabilising its 
gender polarities on the Amazon, and placing her within a world where rules are negotiated, 
rather than in the disruptive space she occupies within the Athenian imaginary.  
 
Gould cites the Amazon story as evidence that the role of women was ‘culturally determined 
not naturally given’.
416
 This story, therefore supports Thomas’ general claim that Herodotus 
makes a stand for nomos as against phusis, in an argument that was well rehearsed by 
contemporary sophists.
417
 However, I argue that Herodotus is suggesting that nomos itself is 
to be debated; it is not set in stone, but potentially a subject for negotiation. By putting the 
debate in the mouths of Amazons he confronts those members of his audience for whom they 
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were merely the embodiment of defeat, as warriors, as women, as quasi-Persians, or the focus 





Women are shown to engage with nomos through speech, yet it is also in their interaction 
with men that we see the power of the rule of law. In this chapter, I have considered various 
models of female practice and speech and shown a range of responses to the rule of law, 
women both protesting against violations of nomos, and passing on gender norms and 
expectations. These stories illustrate, through gender themes which are declared in speech, the 
normative ideal of the rule of law, which sets boundaries on human behaviour.  
 
It is also clear that these women all rely on unwritten rules which are conveyed through 
speech. Moreover, none speak in a judicial setting; rather, these forms of speech take place in 
the oikos. We can, therefore, identify nomoi through female speech and also see women 
showing interpretive skills and making judgments. My examples show that negotiation and 
persuasion are as important to the concept of nomos as the creation of ‘the other’ which is a 
significant technique in adversarial litigation. In gender terms, the exclusion of women from 
formal adjudication and deliberation may be less significant than the extent to which they 
have influence and a voice in more informal settings.  
 
As for the Athenian women, their actions are interpreted as transgressive by the Athenian 
men, yet Herodotus problematises any easy conceptualisation of them as Bacchic maenads by 
making each individual woman speak her sense of loss, asking ‘Where is my husband?’ The 
killing of Lycides and his family by both Athenian men and women, in my interpretation, 
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shows that both political and gender norms are at risk in times of war. In my next chapter, I 
focus on relationships within the royal oikos and the threat to the rule of law posed by 
tyranny. 
 
Finally, I argue that the story of the Amazons can be read as a thought experiment. Herodotus 
is asking us to consider what a society where women perform the same roles as men would 
look like and the mythical nature of the Amazons makes this an ideal vehicle for such an 
experiment. The case study does not emphasise the strangeness of women warriors but of 
women who reject women’s work, in a world where the oikos is literally empty: the women 
have left the wagons and women’s work, and participate with men in the hunt, the battle, the 
raiding party. This emphasises by opposition the central role of the oikos in both Greek and 










CHAPTER 4: HOW DOES NOMOS REGULATE DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS? 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the role of nomos in constructing social and political expectations 
within the oikos in the Histories, and how this intersects with the ideology and practice of 
tyranny. My focus is on royal households, because this is where Herodotus sets most of his 
stories which concern family relationships, showing the impact of those relationships on 
events in his wider narrative. I develop a model of nomos which reflects both its coercive, 
duty-imposing aspect (orders backed up by threats) and its power-conferring, facilitative 
aspect, creating rights and duties within a coercive framework, which acknowledges the force 
of societal as well as legal control. I also develop the sociological model I outlined in my 
introduction, to analyse how people are shown to ‘live with the rules’ in the Histories, under 
the political nomos of tyranny. This model identifies three types of response to the rule of 
law: ‘before the law’, meaning conformity or supplication in the face of judicial power, which 
in the Histories often means obedience or passivity in response to tyranny; ‘with the law’, in 
which law is a game requiring strategy and skilful manoeuvring; and finally, ‘up against the 
law’, whereby law is understood to be a ‘terrain of power, where might makes right’.
418
 In this 
third account, people sometimes find ways of violating formal hierarchy, refusing to offer the 
deference produced by status differentials. In resisting, people seek diverse goals. For some it 
is to retain a sense of dignity and honour, for others revenge.
419
 I will use this tripartite model 
to analyse how relationships within the oikos are regulated by nomoi. 
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1. Rule of law and the oikos  
My argument, applying the principles of legal pluralism, is that the oikos is a significant space 
where gender norms and expectations are regulated, and coexist with political nomoi, 
whatever their type, so those who ignore the regulation of gender norms in the oikos violate 
the rule of law. Moreover, in both Greek and non-Greek states, the danger of the empty oikos 
is a persistent motif, imposing an obligation on everyone to preserve, not destroy the oikos. 
This is dramatically illustrated in the speech of the Pythia to Glaucos, when he has considered 
not repaying a debt:
420
 
But Oath has a son, nameless; he has no hands 
Or feet, but he pursues swiftly, until he catches 
And destroys all the family and the entire house. 
ἀλλ᾽ Ὅρκου πάις ἐστίν, ἀνώνυμος, οὐδ᾽ ἔπι χεῖρες 
οὐδὲ πόδες: κραιπνὸς δὲ μετέρχεται, εἰς ὅ κε πᾶσαν.  
συμμάρψας ὀλέσῃ γενεὴν καὶ οἶκον ἅπαντα (6.86γ2) 
 
Childlessness is an archetypal misfortune in the Histories,
421
 whereas good fortune consists in 
having children and grandchildren, as exemplified by Tellus (1.30). This reflects a wider 
perception that high fertility in the Greek and non-Greek world was to be praised; Persian 
men proved their manliness, after bravery in battle, by producing plenty of sons and the man 
who produced the most was rewarded by the king (ἀνδραγαθίη δὲ αὕτη ἀποδέδεκται, μετὰ τὸ 
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μάχεσθαι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃς ἂν πολλοὺς ἀποδέξῃ παῖδας: τῷ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους ἀποδεικνύντι 




In this chapter, I focus on the roles which both genders play in the regulation of the oikos, 
and, in my case studies, show in particular how the nomos of tyranny, based on orders 
backed up with threats, intersects with the unwritten rules of family, which regulate gender 
relationships within the household, and which even those who exercise power in the public 
sphere are not free to ignore or break. I will show what happens when tyranny becomes 
unfettered from those unwritten rules of family and community. The tyrant who does what 
he wants without heeding nomos puts his own oikos at risk. I analyse how effectively the 
nomos of tyranny controls women in the oikos, and how it intersects with the rules of 
hierarchy at the royal court, which affects both genders. I also show how Herodotus 
highlights ways that control is undermined or subverted by those of both genders who find 
ways round the formal rules, both of gender and of hierarchy. Moreover, gender norms are 
not fixed but can be negotiated by those, male and female, who have power to do so, as I 
illustrate with stories from the Spartan logos. In this chapter, using case studies from the 
Persian logos, I also investigate whether it is valid to regard ‘the rule of law’ as a bulwark 
against tyranny and I consider different ways in which women negotiate with tyrants 
through speech. My focus in this chapter is gender relationships within the oikos, since, as 
I demonstrated in my last chapter, Herodotus’ concept of nomos is wide enough to 
encompass the regulation of family and social life. 
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1.1 The king as judge 
The institution of tyranny, and the role of kings as judges is a dominant theme in the 
Histories. According to Herodotus’ Egyptian sources, Mycerinus was the fairest of the 
Egyptian kings in judging legal cases (δίκας δέ σφι πάντων βασιλέων δικαιότατα κρίνειν, 
2.129.1), and Deioces, king of the Medes, as noted in chapter 1, introduced his own form of 
written judgment. Meanwhile, in Persia, the royal judges exercised the power of life and 
death, as in the story of Psammenitus, when they decreed that for every Mytilinean killed, 10 
leading Egyptians had to die (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐδίκασαν οἱ βασιλήιοι δικασταί, ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς 
ἑκάστου δέκα Αἰγυπτίων τῶν πρώτων ἀνταπόλλυσθαι, 3.14.5).
423
 However, the royal judges 
themselves ran the risk of royal punishment, as is clear in the story of Cambyses, which I 
analyse in this chapter, when Herodotus shows that they are motivated primarily by fear, in 
giving legal advice. Cambyses punishes Sisamnes for taking a bribe to deliver an unfair 
verdict by having him flayed to death and his skin used to string a chair which his son has to 
sit on when he is a judge (5.25.2), a punishment which explains why the royal judges’ fear is 
a rational response to this particular king.
424
 Darius, however, imposes a similarly horrible 
punishment, crucifixion, on Sandoces, for accepting a bribe to decide a case unfairly, but then 
calculates that the man’s good services to the royal house outweighed his wrongdoing 
(λογιζόμενος ὁ Δαρεῖος εὗρέ οἱ πλέω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων πεποιημένα ἐς οἶκον τὸν 
βασιλήιον, 7.194.2) and had him released. He did this because he realised he had acted more 
out of haste than wisdom (γνοὺς ὡς ταχύτερα αὐτὸς ἢ σοφώτερα ἐργασμένος, 7.194.2). In this 
way, Herodotus shows Darius’ judgment to be more reflective and calculating than that of 
Cambyses, destabilising the idea that tyranny inevitably involves arbitrary punishment, but 
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also highlighting, through the character of Cambyses, the risk of this. In the following story, 
however, it is a woman who exercises the power of life and death, as punishment for 
breaching nomos. 
 
1.2 Candaules’ wife as judge  
In the story of Candaules, the relevant nomos is identified in terms of its opposite; the 
exposure of a queen to an unrelated male is anomos, and the breach of nomos is voiced by 
both Gyges and Candaules’ wife. The king’s actions force the queen and Gyges into an 
anomos relationship, for which the queen punishes the king using Gyges as her reluctant 
agent. She plans revenge for a breach both of a marital nomos which protects her from sexual 
exposure and a social nomos which accords her respect and status as queen. Nomos, therefore, 
is breached by the king, articulated by Gyges and enforced by Candaules’ wife, who exercises 
the power of life and death, usually the prerogative of the king. 
 
I analyse this scene (in the narratological sense of the word), with character speeches, and a 
detailed description of time, place and the unfolding of events, in terms of a network of 
relationships which require the performance of appropriate roles, the ‘repeated actions which 
confer social legitimacy’.
425
 Candaules and Gyges undermine that legitimacy by their actions. 
In this story, status as well as gender are performed. As Osborne notes, ‘for both men and 
women, clothing and behaviour, rather than bodily form, are the main indicators of status’.
426
 
As I showed in the last chapter, how you are seen by others is a significant aspect of gender 
performance. Candaules exposes a wife and a queen but it is her status as the latter that gives 
her the power to punish the breach of nomos. Location is also significant in this story. For the 
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king, the oikos is the place he indulges his own voyeurism (both directly and through Gyges) 
but it turns out to be a dangerous place for him, because he disregards the legitimate 
expectations of his wife.  
 
Candaules’ infatuation with his own wife (ἠράσθη τῆς ἑωυτοῦ γυναικός, 1.8.1) leads him to 
think of her as the most beautiful by far of all women (ἐρασθεὶς δὲ ἐνόμιζέ οἱ εἶναι γυναῖκα 
πολλὸν πασέων καλλίστην, 1.8.1) and to praise that beauty excessively (τὸ εἶδος τῆς γυναικὸς 
ὑπερεπαινέων, 1.8.1). I agree with Gray that this characteristic is part of his excess.
427
 This is 
the only use of ὑπερεπαινέω in Herodotus, but the ὑπερ prefix is associated more generally in 
Herodotus with abnormal behaviour, for example, the Thracian chieftain who blinded his own 
sons for disobeying his orders (ἔργον ὑπερφυὲς ἐργάσατο, 8.116.1) or Xerxes’ beheading of 
Phoenicians during the battle of Salamis (ὑπερλυπεόμενός τε καὶ πάντας αἰτιώμενος, 8.90.3), 
though it can signify emotion that is extreme rather than excessive, for example the 
Athenians’ grief at the fall of Miletus (ὑπεραχθεσθέντες, 6.21.2) and the fear of Persian 
invasion by some Peloponnesian states before the battle of Salamis (ὑπεραρρωδέοντες τῇ 
Ἑλλάδι κινδυνευούσῃ, 8.72).   
 
The focalisation here reveals the subjective view of a man in the grip of an irrational 
obsession. Herodotus uses forms of ἔραμαι and ἔρως rarely in the Histories and the word 
always indicates a transgressive passion.
428
 It is also used to describe Mykerinos’ feelings for 
his daughter (2.131.1), Cambyses’ for one of his sisters (3.31.2), Ariston’s for the wife of 
Agetus (6.62.1) and Xerxes’ for his brother’s wife and then her daughter (9.108.1, 9.108.2). In 
all these instances, however, the men’s erōs is part of a more general characterisation and a 
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wider narrative. Candaules is unique in that his infatuation is not set within a wider context. 
His exposure of his wife to Gyges is the single action which leads to his death, an inevitable 
outcome which Herodotus foreshadows by stating that ‘things were bound to turn out badly 
for Candaules’ (χρῆν γὰρ Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς, 1.8.2).
429
 Herodotus gives us no further 
information about Candaules as a public figure, as king of Lydia; he is characterised solely as 
a person whose individual predisposition leads to a fatal outcome.
430
 Events in this story also 
happen within the four walls of the oikos. This is a story, therefore, about a breach of nomos 
committed within the household, and is not linked to other aspects of Candaules’ character or 
performance as a king or husband. This, I argue, distinguishes this story from others in the 
Histories, where gender transgression signifies breach of other rules.  
 
This story has been analysed in part for its ‘disquieting connotations of Eastern tyranny and 
powerful women’ which, though a Lydian story, links it to the portrayal of Persian women 
elsewhere in the Histories.
431
 For others, it is a means whereby Herodotus introduces themes, 
character types and motifs which recur throughout the Histories.
432
 The visual aspect of this 
story is also emphasised. Branscome notes the repeated use of forms of theasthai and Travis 
argues that historiē itself is an act of looking, what he calls ‘the psychology of spectation’, as 
illustrated by this story.
433
 Gould comments on the voyeurism of both Pentheus and 
Candaules, whilst Cairns notes a link to the visual motif throughout, and Christ gives this as 
one example of ‘the paradox of the observer observed’.
434
 Candaules’ infatuation with his 
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wife ‘has a blinding effect on him’, whereas Candaules’ wife is clear-sighted; she sees Gyges 
leaving her bedroom and knows what Gyges has done (ἐπορᾷ μιν ἐξιόντα, μαθοῦσὰ δὲ τὸ 
ποιηθέν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς 1.10.2).
435
 Hazewindus argues that the use of the historic present alerts 
the audience to the fact that her seeing him is of primary importance in the narrative. Had she 
not seen him there would be no violence, no change of dynasty and no Croesus.
436
   
 
This aspect of the story is undoubtedly significant. However, the articulation of nomos and its 
breach is also an important aspect of the story, and I argue that Herodotus uses the speech of 
the three characters, presented as two dialogues, which is a significant element of the whole of 
the story, to show how speech foregrounds gender and breach of nomos in this story.
437
 Both 
Candaules and Gyges speak in proverbs, an ‘application of a widely accepted truth to a 
particular situation’, but wrongly applied by Candaules.
438
 In seeking to persuade Gyges to 
look at the queen naked, he says that ears are more unreliable than eyes (ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει 
ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν, 1.8.2), which is true in a forensic sense (hearsay is 
less reliable than an eye-witness account) and is indeed a guiding principle for Herodotus in 
his research.
439
 However, in Candaules’ case he uses it to justify his own voyeurism. 
 
In response to the king’s insistence that ‘you must see her naked’ (ποίεε ὅκως ἐκείνην θεήσεαι 
γυμνήν, 1.8.2), Gyges begs him ‘not to ask me to act unlawfully’ (μὴ δέεσθαι ἀνόμων, 1.8.4) 
and replies with two proverbs of his own; ‘with the removal of her clothes, a woman strips 
herself of shame’ (ἅμα δὲ κιθῶνι ἐκδυομένῳ συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή, 1.8.3) and ‘let 
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each look on his own’ (σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, 1.8.4).
440
 As Baragwanath points out, the 
latter saying is ambiguous; is he acting out of pragmatic self-interest or acting as a foil to 
Candaules in declaring his compliance with nomos?
 441
 He will eventually choose to survive, 
suggesting the former. However, his spirited objection to Candaules’ proposal also 
emphasises by opposition how extreme Candaules’ proposal is; he is planning to dishonour 
his wife. It could also suggest that Gyges sees Candaules’ wife as her husband’s property, 
making any offence, therefore, against him, not his wife. Nevertheless, Gyges too cannot 
follow his own precepts, as he will soon do exactly what he protests so vehemently against, 
because he is subject to the king’s power. He fails to understand that it is not the king he 
should fear but the queen.  
 
At this stage in the story, Candaules’ wife is portrayed solely as an object to be displayed, a 
‘non-person, only an element in the interaction between the men’.
442
 In fact, Candaules speaks 
for her, to reassure Gyges: 
Do not be afraid of me, that I’m saying this to test you, or of my wife, that some 
harm will come to you, through her. For I will set it up so that she shall never know 
that you have seen her. 
μὴ φοβεῦ μήτε ἐμέ, ὡς σέο πειρώμενος λέγω λόγον τόνδε, μήτε γυναῖκα τὴν ἐμήν, 
μὴ τὶ τοι ἐξ αὐτῆς γένηται βλάβος. ἀρχήν γὰρ ἐγὼ μηχανήσομαι οὕτω ὥστε μηδέ 
μαθεῖν μιν ὀφθεῖσαν ὑπὸ σεῦ. (1.9.1) 
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This is the speech of a man who acknowledges his wife’s potential power and agency, but is 
over-confident in his own abilities to forestall it, showing no awareness of his reciprocal 
obligations to his wife or her capacity for independent action. 
 
Once she appears as an actor in the story, however, she is anything but passive, submissive or 
ashamed, and this is apparent in her speech. When she encounters Gyges (1.11-12) she passes 
sentence immediately: 
One of you must die, either that man who planned this, or you, who have seen me 
naked and broken the rules 
ἤτοι κεῖνόν γε τὸν ταῦτα βουλεύσαντα δεῖ ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἢ σε τὸν: ἐμὲ γυμνήν 
θεησάμενον καὶ ποιήσαντα οὐ νομιζόμενα (1.11.3)  
 
She does not try to persuade him; she forces him to make a choice between two options. She 
turns both men’s assumptions on their head; if she is the king’s exclusive property, then only 
one may ‘own’ her. She adopts a masculine role as a judge, framing the dilemma for Gyges in 
terms of opposites, neither of which is desirable. He either dies or he commits regicide. He is 
the one who tries to persuade, begging her not to force him to make this choice (ἱκέτευε μή 
μιν ἀναγκαίῃ ἐνδέειν διακρῖναι τοιαύτην αἵρεσιν, 1.11.3) but he fails to do so (οὐκ ὦν δὴ 
ἔπειθε, 1.11.4). Gyges takes it for granted that she, as a woman, is either the passive victim of 
a loss of αἰδώς or has removed her own shame when she undressed in his view. She, however, 
blames him for humiliating, dishonouring her (αἰσχυνθεῖσα, 1.10.2) and for the breach of the 
177 
 
rules involved in her exposure.
443
 Asheri observes that Herodotus’ repetition of ἀναγκαίῃ and 
ἀναγκαίην in 1.11.4 stresses the fatal course of events. The compulsion, however, is on the 




There is a gender element to Herodotus’ use of the verb αἰσχύνω, which he uses on four 
occasions.
445
 When used of a woman, it is associated with sexual exposure as with Candaules’ 
wife and with Atossa, who hid her breast abscess at first out of shame (ἐπὶ τοῦ μαστοῦ ἔφυ 
φῦμα ... κρύπτουσα καὶ αἰσχυνομένη, 3.133.1). Herodotus describes the Babylonian custom 
of making women have sex with unrelated men (μειχθῆναι ἀνδρὶ ξείνῳ, 1.199.1) as their most 
shameful (αἴσχιστος τῶν νόμων, 1.199.1). When used of a man, shame means (a perception 
of) cowardice, as in the suicide by the sole survivor of the Battle of the Champions (1.82.8) 
and the refusal by Amompharetus to retreat from the Persians (9.53.2), considered at greater 
length in the next chapter. Candaules’ wife’s speech, if not her actions, therefore, taken in 
response to her sexual exposure, would be recognised by most Greeks as gender-appropriate, 
indeed expected, of a wife, in contrast to her husband, who is motivated by a transgressive 
passion, and characterised as excessive and overbearing. 
 
The repetition of γυμνός in this passage also suggests that Herodotus wants to emphasise the 
transgressive nature of Candaules’ proposal.
446
 The only other reference in Herodotus to 
naked women is in Socles’ speech against tyranny when he condemns Periander for stripping 
the women of Corinth (ἀπέδυσε πάσας τὰς Κορινθίων γυναῖκας, 5.92.η1) for the sake of his 
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dead wife. Both Candaules and Periander breach nomos in part, by failing to discriminate 
between women; their insult treats all women as prostitutes, to be viewed naked by someone 
other than a husband, and therefore as available, un-married. Cairns points out the reciprocal 
nature of αἰδώς as a factor in social relationships; those who show αἰδώς deserve αἰδώς.
447
 In 
exposing his wife, therefore, Candaules fails to respect his wife’s legitimate social as well as 
marital expectations. He attacks her social identity and status as well as violating her personal 
space, the boundary between herself and unrelated men, making his action ‘an outrageous 




However, the nature of Candaules’ wife’s revenge, minded to punish Candaules (ἐν νοῶ 
ἔχουσα τίσεσθαι τὸν Κανδαύλεα, 1.10.2) marks her out, in that she becomes the agent of her 
own affairs. This revenge is not gender specific; the same verb is used of Harpagus who 
desires to take revenge (τείσασθαι ἐπιθυμέων, 1.123.1) on Astyages for the peculiarly horrible 
murder of his son, at a lawless feast (ἀνόμῳ τραπέζῃ ἔδαισε, 1.162.1). Van de Veen 
comments on the parallel between the two stories observing that both Astyages and Candaules 
are irrational and non-reflective in contrast with Harpagus and Candaules’ wife, and it is only 
in these two stories that Herodotus uses the word ἄνομος,
449
 suggesting an extreme breach of 
the rules.
450
 The theme of tisis, the requirement to make someone pay for wrongdoing, is a 
common one in Herodotus, whether by individuals or by countries.
 451
 For example, Croesus 
wants to make Cyrus pay (τείσασθαι θέλων, 1.73.1) for the death of Astyages and the 
Scythians want to punish Darius (μεμονέναι μιν τείσασθαι, 6.84.2) for invading their lands. 
However, this is the only occasion when Herodotus uses this particular formulation for a 
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woman planning revenge (ἐν νόῳ ἔχουσα τείσασθαι, 1.10.2). Candaules’ wife has her mind 
directed towards vengeance whereas Harpagus acts out of passion, a challenge to a gender 
stereotype which sees women as emotional and uncontrolled, and men as rational.
452
 Flory’s 
designation of her ‘private lust for revenge’ is misplaced.
453
 She is, rather, disconcertingly 
rational in planning her revenge and in control of her emotions throughout. It is Gyges who 
cries out (μέγα ἀμβώσας, 1.8.3) when Candaules proposes that he should view his wife naked. 
Moreover, Candaules’ wife’s ultimatum, that death must be the price to redeem honour, is a 
measure of the respect due to her both as wife and queen, within the oikos, and is not a 
measure of barbarian ‘otherness’.
454
 In fact, it reflects a similarity between Lydian and Greek 
customs that Herodotus himself observes (Λυδοὶ δὲ νόμοισι μὲν παραπλησίοισι χρέωνται καὶ 
Ἕλληνες, 1.94.1). 
 
It is argued that Candaules’ wife has a normative function
455
 illustrating the consequence of 
male transgression or is ‘an innocent and unwitting cause of a catastrophic break of social 
continuity’.
456
 However, an analysis of speech in this story shows this woman’s agency as 
judge, who gives an order backed up by a threat, enforcing the rule of law in its coercive 
sense as master. Dewald rightly observes that she exploits both Candaules and Gyges’ 
assumptions about her and her conventional role.
457
 Moreover, through her own breach of 
nomos, in using Gyges to commit regicide, she triggers political consequences after five 
generations, for Croesus (1.91.1).  
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To conclude, Candaules violates the boundary between women and unrelated men, and his 
story shows the consequences for those who assume that they are above nomos and gender-
appropriate responsibilities do not apply to them.
458
 However, Candaules’ peculiar state of 
mind, the oikos setting, with no external references, and the queen’s considered and calculated 
act of revenge are aspects of this story which distinguish it from other scenes and character 
types in the Histories. It is notable that this woman is exceptional. Whilst she resembles other 
women in the Histories, in that she maintains control of both speech and action, 
understanding and interpreting the situation accurately, she is very different in assuming a 
quasi-judicial authority, whereby she exercises the power of life and death.  
 
This story, therefore emphasises the coercive aspect of nomos but in the following stories 
from the Spartan logos we meet characters who meet legal challenges strategically. 
 
2. Playing with the rules: Spartan family nomoi 
Herodotus recognised the Spartans’ attachment to their religious rules:  
For the Spartans give precedence to the divine over the human  




In this section I will consider Spartan religiosity and interrogate Parker’s assertion that ‘the 
Spartans heeded divine signs and obeyed the rules’.
460
 Of Parker’s examples, I will consider 
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the stories of Anaxandridas, Argeia, and Ariston, Cleomenes and Demaratus, and argue that 
these characters take, in fact, a rather flexible approach to some rules, whilst exploiting to the 
full the coercive aspect of oaths and, in one instance going so far as to bribe the Pythia. Her 
involvement in the Argeia story not only provides an aetiology for the dual kingship, but also 
shows the interaction of divine and mortal agency. In the story of Demaratus and his paternity 
however, the Pythia is manipulated to support one side of the dispute. The focus in all these 
stories is the negotiation between kingship and the constitution introduced by Lycurgus. In 
my analysis of the paternity dispute regarding Demaratus, I argue that it is anachronistic to 
read this as a formal court case. Whilst Herodotus uses quasi-legal language to identify the 
nature of the dispute, the involvement of Demaratus’ mother is not ‘giving the case for the 
defence’ in any formal sense, but inviting his audience to consider issues of credibility and to 
show that, ultimately, the issue of paternity is unknowable except to the woman involved.
461
 
In all three stories, gender relations are central to the legal issues at stake: in what 
circumstances is bigamy allowable, can the rules of succession be altered, and how is a 




The creative approach to marriage nomoi, and willingness to compromise, shown by Spartan 
royals, contrasts with the Spartans’ military nomos which is inflexible and coercive. I argue, 
therefore, that a polarity approach, which emphasises the ‘otherness’ of Sparta, does not 
adequately account for Herodotus’ portrayal of the Spartan royals, male and female, as 
negotiators, for whom nomos is not a coercive order in all circumstances. With regard to the 
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institution of the dual kingship, Millender takes the polarity model as the key organisational 
principle of Herodotus, which leads him to construct a polarity between democratic Athens 
and autocratic Sparta. Millender, therefore reads the dual kingship in terms of tyrannical 
hubris, based on a model of absolute rule, which is constrained to a degree by what she 
describes as ‘the high court’ of the ephors and gerousia.
463
 She argues that the Spartan 
hereditary kingship conforms to the model of the barbarian autocrat in the Histories, and so, 
on matters of gender, she draws parallels between the erōs of Ariston and that of Candaules 
and Xerxes, which is also reflected in the passion for tyranny attributed to Deioces (1.96) and 
Pausanias (5.32).
464
 She also identifies a link between ‘undisciplined, dominating women and 
despotism’ in the stories of powerful Spartan and barbarian women, so Argeia, for example, is 
like Atossa (7.3.4) in seeking to influence the dynastic succession, and the paternity dispute in 
respect of Demaratus which involves his mother as well as Cleomenes and Leotychides 
reflects the folklore elements of the stories of Cyrus as a child (1.110-122) and Cypselus 
(5.92).
465
 Hansen also argues that Herodotus’ viewpoint on Sparta is Athenocentric and he 
stresses the unusual nature of Spartan kingship, but he distinguishes between the performance 





Hodkinson, however, argues that, though the ‘aggressively polarising ideology of Athens’ 
imperialist democracy creates the Spartan ‘other’’, and this is reflected to a degree in 
Herodotus’ portrayal of Spartan nomoi (6.51-60), Herodotus also shows the limitations of the 
king’s jurisdiction in Sparta to unmarried heiresses not already betrothed (6.57.4) making it 
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less restrictive than Athens or Gortyn.
467
 This makes the situation more complex than 
Millender’s portrayal of Sparta as a ‘society organised on despotic principles’. It is one in 
which rules, as in other Greek poleis, have to be negotiated, and the performance of those 




I will argue that the Herodotean stories on Spartans ‘living with the rules’ and engaging with 
nomos and gender support Hodkinson’s argument that Spartan nomos is more complex than 
the despotēs nomos of the Spartan military male. The institutional aspect is less important 
than the interaction of human and divine authority, expressed through oaths, the Pythia and 
supplication, which is used by Herodotus to show the importance which the Spartans, he 
believed, attached to the divine, but to show also that they did not regard nomos as coercive, 
an order backed by threats, in all circumstances. Furthermore, I will argue that we should read 
in particular the story of Demaratus and his disputed parentage as based on the theme of 
family conflict, which is expressed in quasi-legal language, rather than as an example of 
despotic kingship. 
 
I now consider how Anaxandridas negotiates marriage with the ephors, both parties ‘playing 
with the rules’, in Sibley and Ewick’s terminology, though the ephors introduce an element of 
coercion. Spartan Kings and queens engage with nomos, they change it to suit their own ends 
and do not regard family nomoi as inviolable. 
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The story of Anaxandridas of Sparta illustrates a negotiated change of nomos. He has married 
his niece but they remain childless. The ephors declare the rule that a marriage must produce 
an heir: ‘we cannot allow Eurysthenes’ line to die out’ (ἡμῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ οὐ περιοπτέον, γένος 
τὸ Εὐρυσθένεος γενέσθαι ἐξίτηλον, 5.39.2).
469
 Anaxandridas, however, refuses to divorce his 
wife and remarry, as advised by the ephors; he is pleased with his wife (ἐούσης ταύτης οἱ 
καταθυμίης, 5.39.1) and she is blameless (ἀναμάρτητος, 5.39.2). However, matters are not 
allowed to escalate. The ephors, joined now by the elders, debate and put forward proposals 
(βουλευσάμενοι προσέφερον Ἀναξανδρίδῃ τάδε, 5.40.1) which include an element of 
coercion: ‘Don’t refuse, otherwise the Spartiates might come to an unpleasant decision in 
your case’ (μὴ ἀντίβαινε τούτοισι, ἵνα μή τι ἀλλοῖον περὶ σεῦ Σπαρτιῆται βουλεύσωνται, 
5.40.1).
470
 Their proposal is that Anaxandridas is allowed to have two wives and two 
households, though this is not accepted Spartan practice (γυναῖκας ἔχων δύο διξὰς ἱστίας 
οἴκεε, ποιέων οὐδαμῶς Σπαρτιητικά, 5.40.2), and the king accepts (συνεχώρησε, 5.40.2). The 
parties reach a negotiated settlement, because both sides are prepared to compromise. 
Millender argues that Anaxandridas is ‘forced to violate Spartan custom’ and is motivated by 
an ‘excessive attachment’ but I do not think the text justifies this reading.
471
 It is because he is 
not driven by erōs that he can reach an accommodation with the ephors, who are prepared, for 
their part, to take a flexible approach to Spartan nomos, to solve the potential problem of the 
empty oikos. Anaxandridas’ marriage offers a model of compatibility, like that of Masistes, 
who tells Xerxes that ‘[my wife] suits me perfectly well’ (αὐτή τέ μοι κατὰ νόον τυγχάνει 
κάρτα ἐοῦσα, 9.111.3) which contrasts with those relationships based on transgressive erōs. 
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This story, I argue, shows both the king and the ephors and gerousia adopting a pragmatic 
approach to nomos, which is negotiable and changeable. This is presented by Herodotus not 
as a constitutional check on monarchy but as a debate between the king and the ephors, which 
results in an agreed compromise, a model of law which does not fit the adversarial one of 
competing narratives, where one party succeeds in defeating the claim of the other. However, 
there is a coercive element to the negotiations. The ephors can threaten consequences if 
Anaxandridas does not cooperate, making it different from the despotic model of tyranny, and 
showing that the Spartan kingship is subject to a degree of restraint. 
 
2.2 Argeia and the twins 
In this story, the change of nomos is not negotiated but arises because of the mother’s actions. 
The Spartans plan to make the older of the twin sons of Argeia and Aristodemus king 
according to the rules (κατὰ νόμον βασιλέα τῶν παίδων τὸν πρεσβύτερον ποιήσασθαι, 
6.52.3). Their mother, however, attempts to manipulate circumstances to achieve an end 
which is not κατὰ νόμον. In Herodotus’ account, she ‘claims not to know which son was born 
first though in truth she does, because she wants both to become king’ (τὴν δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὴν 
φάναι διαγινώσκειν: εἰδυῖαν μὲν καὶ τὸ κάρτα λέγειν ταῦτα, βουλομένην δὲ κως ἀμφότεροι 
γενοίατο βασιλέες, 6.52.4). Herodotus thus emphasises the woman’s calculated planning and 
the Spartans’ helplessness (ἀπορέειν, ἀπορέοντας ... ἀπορέουσι, 6.52.4-6) in the face of her 
deception. They consult the oracle at Delphi who says they should make both boys king but 
give greater honour to the elder (ἀμφότερα τὰ παιδία ἡγήσασθαι βασιλέας, τιμᾶν δὲ μᾶλλον 
τὸν γεραίτερον, 6.52.5). We see here the interaction, therefore, of divine authority and human 
agency, because the oracle needs interpretation. The Spartans have to work out which is the 
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elder child by watching the mother to see which of the twins she feeds and washes first 
(τιμῶσαν τὸν πρότερον καὶ σίτοισι καὶ λουτροῖσι, 6.52.7). The irony, therefore, is that Argeia 
achieves her aim but at a cost. Though she refuses to identify the older twin, she nevertheless 
reveals his identity to the Spartans. As a result, he was brought up by the state (τρέφειν ἐν τῷ 
δημοσίῳ, 6.52.7), not at home.
472
 This caused a family feud which persisted until Herodotus’ 
day (6.52.8) and explains the dispute between the twins’ descendants Cleomenes and 
Demaratus, which is the backdrop to a paternity dispute. 
 
The Argeia story differs from that of Anaxandridas in that it involves the Pythia and Argeia is 
not in a position to negotiate on behalf of her sons. She has knowledge, however, which she is 
not prepared to share, requiring the Spartans to devise a means of interpreting her actions to 
remedy her calculated silence. In these circumstances, silence, not speech, gives a woman 
power to influence the succession. This, I suggest, is very different from Atossa, who is able 
to achieve the kingship for Xerxes because of her powerful position in relation to Darius: 
I think Xerxes would have been made king even without [Demaratus’ advice] advice, 
for Atossa was all powerful  
δοκέειν δέ μοι, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθήκης βασιλεῦσαι ἂν Ξέρξης: ἡ γὰρ Ἄτοσσα 
εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος (7.3.4) 
 
2.3 Who is the father? Demaratus and a paternity dispute 
Ariston is aggravated by erōs (ἔκνιζε ἄρα τῆς γυναικὸς ταύτης ὁ ἔρως, 6.62.1), which I have 
already identified as a transgressive passion. He also acquires his wife through an exchange of 
oaths with her existing husband Agetus (ἐπὶ τούτοισι δὲ ὅρκους ἐπήλασαν, 6.62.1) promising 
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to give each other whatever each requests. Agetus is forced by his oath and Ariston’s deceitful 
trick to hand over his wife (ἀναγκαζόμενος μέντοι τῷ τε ὅρκῳ καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης τῇ παραγωγῇ 
ἀπιεῖ ἀπάγεσθαι, 6.62.2). Ariston then swears on oath (ἀπομόσας, 6.63.2) that the child born 
seven months later is not his. Herodotus, therefore, signals that erōs and oaths are significant 
aspects of this story in contrast with the previous two stories. 
 
Cleomenes, who had his own desire for revenge (ὁρμηθεὶς ὦν ἀποτίνυσθαι, 6.65.1) persuades 
Leotychides to swear an oath (κατόμνυται, 6.65.3) that Demaratus was not entitled to be king 
as he was not the son of Ariston (οὐκ ἱκνεομένως βασιλεύειν Σπαρτιητέων, οὐκ ἐόντα παῖδα 
Ἀρίστωνος, 6.65.3). He based his claim (ἐπιβατεύων, 6.65.4) on Ariston’s denial of paternity 
after Demaratus’ birth, producing as witnesses the ephors who heard Ariston’s original denial 
(6.65.4). Was this a formal prosecution? This is certainly how it is presented by Waterfield in 
his translation.
473
 Leotychidas ‘swore a complaint’ (κατόμνυται, 6.65.3) against Demaratus 
and ‘followed up this affidavit by prosecuting Demaratus in court’ (μετὰ δὲ τὴν κατωμοσίην 
ἐδίωκε, 6.65.3). After ‘the legal battle raged back and forth’ (ἐόντων περὶ αὐτῶν νεικέων, 
6.66.1), the case is referred to the Pythia. However, as Hornblower and Pelling say, ‘ἐδίωκε 
may suggest a formal legal prosecution but could be used metaphorically to mean 




My interpretation is that, whilst Herodotus may intend to give a ‘legal flavour’
475
 to these 
proceedings we cannot read it as a formal trial, because of the way Herodotus structures this 
paternity dispute. When Herodotus relates that the Spartans referred the matter to the Pythia, 
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in what sense is this a ‘legal battle’? To use legalistic terminology, we only get ‘the case for 
the defence’ later in the story when Demaratus interrogates his mother to find out her account 
of his parentage, a meeting which of course does not take place in court, but involves an act of 
supplication, more oaths, and a hero figure, all of which gives the story a religious rather than 
a legalistic flavour. I read this passage, therefore, as one in which any institutional 
involvement is much less significant than the use of oaths, the referral to a Pythia, who on this 
occasion is corrupt, and an act of supplication, all of which signal both the Spartans’ 
religiosity and the contradictions inherent in that, when some royals, both male and female, 
exploit the power of these engagements with the gods.   
 
This passage illustrates both the coercive power of oaths, and the way they can be used as a 
tool to achieve a particular outcome. Agetus commits to a blind oath, which, as Braund notes, 
is risky because he is then forced (ἀναγκαζόμενος) to hand over his wife, but Ariston exploits 
the oath to get what he wants.
 476
 When the case was referred to the Delphic Oracle because 
the protagonists kept quarrelling (ἐόντων περὶ αὐτῶν νεικέων, 6.66.1) Herodotus makes it 
clear that the Pythia was being manipulated for political purposes; she was bribed to give the 
answer Cleomenes wanted (τὰ ἐβούλετο λέγεσθαι λέγειν, 6.66.2), namely that Demaratus was 
not Ariston’s son. When found out, she lost her office (ἐπαύσθη τῆς τιμῆς, 6.66.3) but that did 
not stop Demaratus being deposed as king, which was Cleomenes’ aim. 
 
The scene between Demaratus and his mother starts with an act of supplication: having 
offered an ox to Zeus ‘he placed some of the entrails in her hands and supplicated her’(ἐσθεὶς 
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ἐς τὰς χεῖράς οἱ τῶν σπλάγχνων κατικέτευε, 6.68.1).
477
 Herodotus then emphasises the act 
with a statement in direct speech by Demaratus to his mother: ‘I supplicate you, appealing to 
all the gods, and especially Zeus of the household’ (θεῶν σε τῶν τε ἄλλων καταπτόμενος 
ἱκετεύω καὶ τοῦ ἑρκείου Διὸς τοῦδε, 6.68.1). Naiden defines supplication as ‘a quasilegal 
practice consisting of four steps – an approach made by the suppliant, his use of a gesture or 
word, his presentation of a request, and a response by the party entertaining the request, the 
supplicandus’.
478
 I think therefore that Herodotus intends this scene to have a religious as well 
as a legal flavour. It also functions as a response to the allegation of Leotychides, that his 
father was either his mother’s former husband (κυέουσάν σε ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου ἀνδρὸς) or, 
more insultingly (τὸν ματαιότερον λόγον), one of the household’s donkey-keepers (τῶν 
οἰκετέων τὸν ὀνοφορβόν, 6.68.2).  
 
Demaratus claims to want the truth (τὴν ἀληθείην, 6.68.1) and a straight answer to his 
question: who really is my father? (τίς μευ ἐστὶ πατὴρ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ, 6.68.1). His mother relates 
her visitation by a phantom (φάσμα, 6.69.1) who put garlands round her neck, and her 
subsequent conversation with Ariston, when she swore (ἐγὼ δὲ κατωμνύμην, 6.69.2) that he 
had given her the garlands. This oath persuaded him that there was divine intervention (ὁρέων 
δέ με κατομνυμένην ὁ Ἀρίστων ἔμαθε ὡς θεῖον εἴη τὸ πρῆγμα, 6.69.2-3).  
 
His mother promises to tell Demaratus the whole truth (πᾶν ἐς σὲ κατειρήσεται τὠληθές, 
6.69.1) and assures him at the end of her speech that this is what he has been told (τὰ γὰρ 
ἀληθέστατα πάντα ἀκήκοας, 6.69.5). Her explanation is that either Demaratus was born 
premature, at seven months, and Ariston had spoken out of ignorance (ἀνοίῃ, 6.69.5) when he 
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said he could not be the father, or he was the child of a phantom who looked just like Ariston 
but turned out to be Astrobacus, a hero from Spartan myth. Hornblower and Pelling, I think 
rightly, wonder ‘whether this three-times repeated promise to be telling the truth might be 
overdoing it’.
479
 There is a suggestion that the mother protests too much, in defence of her 
own status and reputation, but in the context of the oikos, not a court case. This story explores 
issues of credibility and shows that some questions are unanswerable. Though Herodotus 
stages for us the dispute between the parties, the issue of paternity is not resolved. These three 
Spartan stories all show characters, male and female, who regard nomos as flexible, and 
changeable, rather than being the despotēs nomos which Demaratus explains to Xerxes.  
 
Does this also apply to the nomos of tyranny? I now consider stories from the Persian logos 
where living with the rules means living with a tyrant. To what extent is he bound by 
reciprocal obligations? What rules bind kings as well as subjects? What happens when tyrants 
act without constraint, as Cambyses does when he assaults his wife/sister? To what extent are 
gender relations a sounding board for thinking about power, excess and arbitrary power? 
 
3. The Persian oikos  
In the Histories, the word oikos is used in three ways: firstly, as the king’s household, the 
place where he exercises power, as well as establishes his dynasty; secondly, as a building or 
property, for example, when Darius gives Metiochus a house, property and a Persian wife 
(6.41.4), and Democedes is said to own a very fine property (3.132.1); thirdly, as a household, 
including family members. For example, Nitocris is the only member of Amasis’ oikos left 
(3.1.3), the thief from Rhampsinitus returns with his brother’s head to his mother in the oikos 
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As the king’s household, the oikos clearly has significance both politically and rhetorically. It 
is the place where most influential interviews would take place, and where people, male and 
female, would have to negotiate their relationship with the king, but also exercise some 
agency as advisors. I have already shown that the danger of the empty oikos is a persistent 
motif in the Histories, imposing an obligation on everyone to preserve, not destroy the oikos. 
Conversely, there is a strong message in the Histories that kinship and family bring good 
fortune; Tellus the Athenian is the example given by Solon of a fortunate man, in part because 
he had good and noble sons who themselves all had children who survived (Τέλλῳ τοῦτο μὲν 
τῆς πόλιος εὖ ἡκούσης παῖδες ἦσαν καλοί τε κἀγαθοί, καί σφι εἶδε ἅπασι τέκνα ἐκγενόμενα 




The preservation of the royal oikos is of great significance therefore, since it is not only a 
dynastic base but also a centre of power. Darius promises a reward to Coës of Mytilene, for 
his advice to keep the pontoon bridge over the Hellespont in place ‘when I get home safe and 
sound’(σωθέντος ἐμεῦ ὀπίσω ἐς οἶκον τὸν ἐμὸν, 4.97.6) and Xerxes orders Artabanus to 
return to Susa to protect his household and kingdom (σῶζε οἶκόν τε τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ τυραννίδα 
τὴν ἐμήν, 7.52.2). Consequently, the security of the king’s house is used as a persuasive 
strategy by characters in the Histories, to warn of the risks some men are taking. 
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It is also a way to signal loyalty to the king; for example, when Croesus addresses Cyrus 
before his battle with the Massagetae, he seeks his goodwill through identifying threats to his 
oikos: 
‘O King, I told you before, when Zeus gave me to you, that I would do all I could to 
avert any catastrophe I saw threatening your house.’  
‘ὦ βασιλεῦ, εἶπον μὲν καὶ πρότερόν τοι ὅτι ἐπεί με Ζεὺς ἔδωκέ τοι, τὸ ἂν ὁρῶ σφάλμα 
ἐὸν οἴκῳ τῷ σῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἀποτρέψειν’ (1.207) 
 
When Artemisia speaks to Xerxes, after the defeat at Salamis, urging him to return to Persia, 
she points out that, even if things go wrong for his general Mardonius ‘it will be no disaster as 
regards your survival and the prosperity of your house’(οὐδεμία συμφορὴ μεγάλη ἔσται σέο 
τε περιεόντος καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν πρηγμάτων περὶ οἶκον τὸν σόν, 8.102.2). Meanwhile Masistes 
condemns Artayntes for Persian defeat, saying no punishment was too severe for the harm he 
had done the king’s house (καὶ ἄξιον εἶναι παντὸς κακοῦ τὸν βασιλέος οἶκον κακώσαντα, 
9.107.1).  
 
In this way, Herodotus signals through speech both the importance of preserving the oikos 
and the risks to its security that both Cyrus and Xerxes pose. There is an ironic import to these 
speeches in that Croesus’ advice to Cyrus leads to the king’s destruction at the hands of 
Tomyris, and both Artemisia and Masistes both speak on behalf of a king who will go on to 
destroy his own extended family. This is because, I argue, men sometimes fail to recognise 
that women speak with authority on matters pertaining to the oikos, they have a stake in it, 
they have legitimate expectations within it and they observe the dangers of the empty oikos 




3.1. Cambyses and his sister/wife 
The following story shows that a tyrant who does what he wants without heeding nomos puts 
his own oikos at risk. Cambyses is accused by his sister/wife of ‘stripping the house of Cyrus 
as bare as a lettuce’(ταύτην μέντοι κοτὲ σὺ τὴν θρίδακα ἐμιμήσαο τὸν Κύρου οἶκον 
ἀποψιλώσας, 3.32.4) and his subsequent attack on her completes the act, because he kills not 
only her but also her unborn child.  
 
Like Candaules and Ariston, Cambyses’ feelings were transgressive. In his case, he was in 
love with his sister and wanted to marry her, which Persian rules did not allow (ἠράσθη μιῆς 
τῶν ἀδελφεῶν Καμβύσης, καὶ ἔπειτα βουλόμενος αὐτὴν γῆμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐωθότα ἐπενόεε 
ποιήσειν, 3.31.2). The form of endogamy whereby brothers marry sisters is, according to 
Brosius, likely to be a function of Cambyses’ madness and failure to respect custom and 
moral boundaries.
482
  Unlike Candaules, however, he takes legal advice but what follows is a 
travesty of legal process. He consults the royal judges whose job is to adjudicate lawsuits for 
the Persians and interpret ancestral laws and customs:
483
  
They found a rule that the king could do whatever he wanted. Thus, they did not break 
the rule, though they were afraid of Cambyses, and, so that they would not be killed 
for maintaining the rule, they found another rule assisting someone who wanted to 
marry sisters.  
ἐξευρηκέναι νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσέων ἐξεῖναι ποιέειν τὸ ἂν βούληται. οὕτω 
οὔτε τὸν νόμον ἔλυσαν δείσαντες Καμβύσεα, ἵνα τε μὴ αὐτοὶ ἀπόλωνται τὸν νόμον 
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περιστέλλοντες, παρεξεῦρον ἄλλον νόμον σύμμαχον τῷ θέλοντι γαμέειν ἀδελφεάς. 
(3.31.4-5).  
 
Asheri reads this story as resembling a Greek sophistic argument of the sort found in the 
Dissoi Logoi to illustrate the relativism of human customs.
484
 However, I think it functions as 
a description of a tyrant, someone for whom nomos means unbridled licence. A king who can 
do whatever he likes has unfettered power, he is not constrained by any rules. The institution 
of the royal judges is demonstrated to be no kind of check on this king. It is part of a 
characterisation of Cambyses as violent and insane, leading him to kill his brother Smerdis 
and later his wife/sister, whose killing follows on from the careful and prudent adjudication 
by the Persian judges which legitimises the king’s wishes and emphasises the dangers of 
speaking out against the king. However, it also presents us with an alternative unwritten 
nomos, as voiced by the sister/wife, who sees it as part of the king’s role to preserve, rather 
than destroy the royal oikos. Her words also carry a degree of dramatic irony in that 
Cambyses’ actions kill his only potential heir, thus ‘stripping’ his oikos completely.  
 
In juxtaposing the manipulation of nomos by the Persian judges with the spoken protest of the 
sister/wife, Herodotus gives emphasis to his own judgment on Cambyses; ‘It is, in every way, 
clear to me that Cambyses was completely mad; otherwise he would not have kept on 
laughing at religion and rules’ (πανταχῇ ὦν μοι δῆλα ἐστὶ ὅτι ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης: οὐ 
γὰρ ἂν ἱροῖσί τε καὶ νομαίοισι ἐπεχείρησε καταγελᾶν, 3.38.1). Otanes in the Constitutional 
Debate, arguing against tyranny, puts in general terms what Cambyses has already done; 
changed ancestral rules, used force on women and killed men without trial (νόμαιά τε κινέει 
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πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους, 3.80.5). West comments on his ‘terrifying 
combination of malice, paranoid policies and a sadistic sense of humour’ and his lack of 
regard for either Persian or Egyptian nomoi.
485
 Thus, Cambyses is shown to disregard the rule 
of law, and the role of his sister/wife, therefore, is to act as a foil, reminding him of his duty to 
preserve, not destroy the oikos. Cambyses, by contrast, destroys his own oikos through his 
assault on her. The story does not emphasise her power; rather the reverse, it indicates female 
vulnerability in a dangerous oikos. This is also the case in my next case study, though in this 
story the vulnerability is to female cruelty and violence. 
 
3.2 Xerxes and his oikos  
The next story I analyse concerns the intersection of power and gender transgressions at 
Xerxes’ court. Boedeker reads this story as a family drama, an extreme example of troubled 
Persian gender relationships, whereas Sancisi-Weerdenburg argues that it has a political 
import, in that Artaynte’s request for the king’s robe is a bid for the kingship itself on behalf 
of her maternal family, making Amestris’ revenge on her mother a form of punishment for 
rebellion.
486
 Brosius shows how this story in particular can be used to fit an ideology in which 
royal Persian women are portrayed as cruel, violent, vengeful and exercising power over the 
king, to draw a contrast with Athenian women who are excluded from both military and 
juridical policy.
487
 I will argue that in this story, as in others I consider in this chapter, there is 
a breach of nomos by Xerxes, Artaynte and Amestris which relates to marital and family 
nomoi, but that Herodotus problematises a reading which fits the ideological construct of the 
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‘barbarian royal’ by showing other characters in these stories who model appropriate 
reciprocity and due respect for the rule of law. 
 
There are unquestionably some parallels between the story of Candaules, and the final story in 
the Histories, of Amestris’ revenge for her husband Xerxes’ adultery (9.108-113). In this 
story as well there is a specific authorial interjection warning us of the outcome for Artaynte 
and her family (τῇ δὲ κακῶς γὰρ ἔδεε πανοικίῃ γενέσθαι, 9.109.2); both she and Candaules 
display what is not theirs to show off. Artaynte not only wears the cloak made for Xerxes by 
his wife, she flaunts it (ἐφόρεέ τε καὶ ἀγάλλετο, 9.109.3).
488
 The description of her feelings 
(περιχαρὴς ἐοῦσα τῷ δώρῶ, 9.109.3) is also an indication, as in other stories, of joy that is 
excessive and that will be followed by disaster.
489
 Both Candaules and Xerxes are motivated 
by erōs, which, as noted above, is a rare emotion in Herodotus, associated with transgression.  
 
However, the word has a different connotation in the two stories. Candaules is obsessed with 
his wife’s appearance, Xerxes desires sexually (ἤρα, 9.108.1; 9.108.2) first his brother’s wife, 
then his niece. The text emphasises that erōs in this context is associated with rape. All that 
protects Masistes’ wife from being forced to have sex with Xerxes (βίην προσέφερε ... βίης οὐ 
τευξομένη, 9.108.1) is his respect (προμηθεόμενος, 9.108.1) for his brother. Even the king’s 
written attempt to persuade her has a connotation of force (προσπέμποντι οὐκ ἐδύνατο 
κατεργασθῆναι, 9.108.1). In the Constitutional Debate, Otanes lists rape (βιᾶται γυναῖκας, 
3.80.5) as one of the three things wrong with monarchy; Masistes’ wife is only safe from 
sexual assault because of her status as Xerxes’ sister-in-law.  
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Another characteristic of monarchy which Otanes identifies in the Constitutional Debate is the 
subversion of rules (νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια, 3.80.5). We see this in this story in that all three 
characters, Artaynte, Amestris and Xerxes attempt to manipulate nomos for their own 
purposes. Xerxes at first exploits the ‘usual rites of marriage’ (τὰ νομιζόμενα, 9.108.2) to 
arrange a marriage between Artaynte and his son Darius, which will give him greater access 
to his brother’s wife.
490
 He is, however, forced by the custom of the royal feast (ὑπὸ τοῦ 
νόμου ἐξεργόμενος, 9.111.1) to accede to Artaynte’s request for the cloak made for him by 
Amestris, and to his wife’s request for Masistes’ wife. In this story there is also the paradox 
that, whilst Xerxes has the nominal power of the tyrant, he is subject to the actual power of 
women. We see Xerxes at court, unable to compel Masistes’ wife, unable to persuade 
Artyante not to demand the cloak (οὐ γὰρ ἔπειθε, διδοῖ τὸ φᾶρος, 9.109.3) and at his most 
impotent when he accedes to Amestris’ request, though he nods consent (κατανεύει, 9.111.1) 
like a god.
491
   
 
In both stories, another man acts as a foil to the king. Gyges is characterised as special to 
Candaules, but fails to argue against the king’s order, and is then astonished when the queen 
gives a command of her own (τέως μὲν ἀπεθώμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, 1.11.3). Masistes too has 
proved himself loyal to his brother the king in castigating the Persian commander Artayntes 
for the defeat at Mycale (ἄξιον εἶναι παντὸς κακοῦ τὸν βασιλέος οἶκον κακώσαντα, 9.107.1) 
but is himself shocked at the king’s order to divorce his wife (ἀποθωμάσας τὰ λεγόμενα, 
9.111.3), horrified at her mutilation and ultimately attempts a coup in Bactria (ἀποστήσων 
νομὸν τὸν Βάκτριον καὶ ποιήσων τὰ μέγιστα κακῶν βασιλέα, 9.113.1), an ironic outcome in 
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the light of his previous loyalty.
492
 Blok notes that Masistes, unlike Xerxes, is faithful to his 
wife, is a good father, and is a successful soldier and leader whom the Bactrians and Sacians 





When we consider the parallels between the two stories from the perspective of the women 
involved, however, the differences stand out. Larson suggests that Herodotus suppresses the 
names of both Candaules’ and Masistes’ wives out of ‘concern for personal reputation that 
both blameless wives exhibit’.
494
 I do not accept that Candaules’ wife is ‘blameless’. Rather, 
she upholds a notion of honour that is based on retribution (tisis). We now consider the lex 
talionis to be a primitive form of justice but it is based on a notion of fairness as long as the 
right person is punished. She blames both Candaules and Gyges for dishonouring her and so 
one of them must die. By contrast, Masistes’ wife is the victim of an erroneous assumption by 
Amestris that she is to blame for her daughter’s possession of the cloak (ἐλπίζουσα τὴν 
μητέρα αὐτῆς εἶναι αἰτίην, 9.110.1).
495
 Masistes’ wife is innocent, but tortured nevertheless. 
As Gray says ‘Amestris’ mutilation of a woman who had protected her own marriage bed in 
the interests of Amestris’ marriage bed is a grim irony’.
496
 It also fits with a concept of 
barbarian ‘otherness’ in being cruel and arbitrary. The third problem with monarchy 
according to Otanes is killing men without trial (κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους, 3.80.5). Xerxes’ 
whipping of the Hellespont, his injunction to his men (λέγειν βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, 
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7.35.2) and his beheading of the bridge supervisors (ἀποταμεῖν τὰς κεφαλάς, 7.35.3) echo the 
arbitrary nature of Amestris’ revenge.  
 
There is also a parallel between Xerxes and Amestris in that, whilst he is motivated by erōs, 
she devises a sexual aspect to the mutilation of Masistes’ wife, cutting off her breasts, lips and 
tongue as well as her ears and nose. The use of the present tense in this passage 
(διαλυμαίνεται ... ἀποπέμπει, 9.112) gives the narrative an immediacy which adds to the 
horror. Xerxes also knows his wife well enough (φοβεόμενος δὲ Ἄμηστριν, 9.109.3) to fear 
the consequences of giving Artaynte the cloak and understands why Amestris asks for 
Masistes’ wife as a gift (συνῆκε γὰρ τοῦ εἵνεκεν ἐδέετο, 9.110.3). Her mutilation of this 
woman comes as no surprise. Amestris fits Flory’s definition of the barbarian queen.
497
 She is 
clever, in exploiting the nomos of the royal feast which requires the king to accede to all 
requests, she has a personal and family motive, she plans carefully and the nature of her 
revenge is horrible and bloody. However, men are also capable of mutilation and bloody 
revenge, as the story of Astyages and Harpagus shows, and as Xerxes himself displays in 
relation to Pythius (7.38-9).  
 
Amestris represents barbarian ‘otherness’ in a household where abuse of power is associated 
with the manipulation of nomos, and where relationships, both between women and between 
women and men, are transgressive save for the marriage between Masistes and his wife, 
where the narrative emphasises compatibility (αὐτή τέ μοι κατὰ νόον τυγχάνει κάρτα ἐοῦσα, 
9.111.3) and mutual loyalty. This relationship based on reciprocity serves to highlight the 
abnormality of one based on abuse of power and authority or erōs. I conclude that the 
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characterisation of both Xerxes and Amestris in this story is one of barbarian excess, cruelty 
and arbitrariness, which creates a sense of unfairness that both king and queen ‘get away with 
it’, whilst the oikos of Masistes is destroyed. Xerxes, Amestris and Artaynte all seek to 
manipulate various types of nomoi, show a lack of constraint, and act beyond the boundaries 
of nomos as a force which regulates behaviour. These motifs are also present in the following 
story about another tyrant who, like Cambyses, destroys his own oikos. 
3.3 Cyrus, Astyages and Cyno 
Scholars have identified the mythic and dramatic elements in this story, both in technique and 
in subject matter, in contrast with the story of Deioces and the establishment of the Median 
tyranny.
498
 Pelling notes the dramatic use of speech, and the theme of the divided oikos, with 
Harpagus being presented as a blood-relative to the royal house (1.108.3, 109.3); 
consequently, Harpagus’ part in the planned murder of the infant Cyrus and Astyages’ murder 
of Harpagus’ son both appear as internal familial crimes.
499
 The murder of kin, familial 
violence, the echoes in Astyages’ banquet, when he serves up Harpagus’ son’s dismembered 
body to his father (1.119), of the myth of Atreus and Thyestes, and the exposure and survival 
of a king-child, certainly have a mythic quality. Moreover, the epic and tragic resonances are 
appropriate for Herodotus’ theme of familial conflict and the creation of a divided oikos. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Herodotus explores Astyages’ breach of nomos in his lack of 
respect for family and kin through stories which recall mythical exempla for his audience. As 
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Gray argues, existing stories, part of an oral tradition, were developed to reflect contemporary 




For Van de Veen, however, Herodotus emphasises the contrast between those, like Cyno, who 
show a commitment to nomos and the continuation of the oikos, and those characters like 
Astyages, Harpagus and Mitradates who are all motivated by safety and prepared to kill a 
child to achieve this. He points out the significance of grandchildren in the Histories, making 
Astyages’ conduct abnormal, whereas the motivation of both Cyno and Mitradates is care for 
family and concern for each other. Astyages, by contrast, humiliates his daughter, tries to kills 
her child and is not even concerned for a proper burial. Harpagus is only concerned that he is 
not blamed and violates family loyalty too, and when he is made to eat his own son, his 
revenge is to get the grandson to take power from his grandfather. In this way the story is told 
in terms of dysfunctional family relationships.
501
 Blok and Fisher also read this story in terms 
of Cyno defending normality (as moral and tradition) against irresponsible transgression by 
Astyages, who goes against values of family feeling and succession.
502
 My reading of this 
story is similar, though I put more emphasis on the rules which function within families either 
to protect or violate the rule of law.  
 
For Dewald, the whole account is structured to emphasise the improper devolution of 
authority, making Cyno the only actor who is prepared to voice her judgment on the situation 
and take responsibility for acting.
503
 Munson observes the human agents of compulsion 
(anankē) in both Median stories: Deioces compels the Medes, Harpagus compels Mitradates 
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and Astyages then compels Mitradates to tell the truth. She argues that the ways in which 
kings go about honouring nomos, or the special nomoi of kings (including monarchy itself as 
a nomos) have special, negative, status in Herodotus and they often come into conflict with 
the normal way of things and with a people’s traditional nomoi. Herodotus’ narrative 
‘delineates an opposition between the constraint of law, custom or moral obligation on the 





I argue that this opposition is not as much of a polarity as Munson suggests, that Herodotus 
shows the limits of despotic compulsion, in that some of his characters, male and female, 
adopt a strategic rather than a passive approach to the tyrant, and others evade or subvert his 
power. Moreover, tyrants themselves vary in the extent to which they accept the nomoi of 
family and the oikos. I have shown that Deioces creates a form of rule of law, in that he 
successfully tackles lawlessness for the Medians, and I will argue in this chapter that Darius 
brings his own preconceptions of the appropriate unwritten laws of family to his dealings with 
Intaphrenes’ wife. Astyages, however, like Cambyses, destroys his own oikos, thereby 
violating the rule of law.  
 
Firstly, he ignores the expectations of him as father and grandfather; the threatening aspect of 
kin is emphasised right from the start of the narrative.
505
 Mandale is seen by her father as a 
threat following his dream of her flooding Asia with urine (1.107), which is interpreted by the 
Magi in a way that terrifies him (ἐφοβήθη, 1.107.1). However, he then unwittingly causes the 
event he fears by marrying her to her social inferior, the Persian Cambyses, and then plotting 
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to kill her son when Mandale becomes pregnant and he learns that her offspring will rule 
instead of him (ἀντὶ ἐκείνου, 1.108.2).
506
 He thereby acts against the rule that the objective of 
marriage is to transmit social identity and status, to maintain social and kinship networks and 
to provide heirs, as his own marriage to Aryenis was itself aligned to a peace treaty between 
the Lydians and the Medes (1.74).
507
 Even though his daughter fulfils her female role and 
produces a male heir, her son is at risk because of dynastic considerations and the creation of 
a divided oikos by Astyages himself who marries her to a foreigner out of fear, not as a 
calculated marriage alliance.
508
 As with Xerxes and his marriage of Artaynte to his son 
Darius, the motivation is significant because it signals transgression, violating the rules. 
 
Astyages’ command to Harpagus to kill Mandale’s baby (1.108.4) and Harpagus’ command 
to Mitradates (1.109.3) to carry out the order illustrates one of the legacies of Deioces’ rule, 
namely the habit of using intermediaries to carry out orders in a hierarchy of command.
509
 
There is no attempt to persuade; Astyages gives orders, backed up by threats, unspecified in 
the case of Harpagus, who is told not to bring about [his] own downfall ( ἐξ ὑστέρης σοὶ αὐτῷ 
περιπέσῃς, 1.108.4) and all too specific in the case of Mitradates, who is threatened with 
torture if he disobeys orders. In this scene, Astyages personifies law as despot, in its most 
coercive sense. 
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However, in the dialogue between Harpagus and his wife, it is noticable that he adopts a 
strategic response to the king’s demands in that he does not conform to the king’s 
expectations. He intends to disobey Astyages by not killing the baby himself, partly because 
the baby is kin, partly because he fears reprisals from Mandale. He calculates that, if she 
becomes tyrant and he has killed her son, he will be in danger (ἄλλο τι ἢ λείπεται τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν 
ἐμοὶ κινδύνων ὁ μέγιστος, 1.109.4). He lies to Astyages; we learn his true motivation in this 
dialogue with his wife: 
The child was then given to him, consigned to its death, and he went to his house 
weeping. When he came in, he told his wife the entire speech uttered by Astyages. 
‘Now, then,’ she said to him, ‘what do you propose to do?’ ‘Not to obey Astyages’ 
instructions,’ he answered, ‘not even if he should lose his mind and be more crazy 
than he is now: I will not lend myself to his plan or be an accessory to such a murder. 
There are many reasons why I will not kill him: because the child is related to me, 
and because Astyages is old and has no male children. Now if the sovereignty passes 
to this daughter of his after his death, whose son he is now killing by means of me, 
what is left for me but the gravest of all dangers? For the sake of my safety this child 
has to die; but one of Astyages’ own people has to be the murderer and not one of 
mine.’ 
ὁ Ἅρπαγος, ὥς οἱ παρεδόθη τὸ παιδίον κεκοσμημένον τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἤιε κλαίων ἐς 
τὰ οἰκία: παρελθὼν δὲ ἔφραζε τῇ ἑωυτοῦ γυναικὶ τὸν πάντα Ἀστυάγεος ῥηθέντα 
λόγον. ἣ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγει ‘νῦν ὦν τί σοὶ ἐν νόῳ ἐστὶ ποιέειν;’ ὁ δὲ ἀμείβεται ‘οὐ 
τῇ ἐνετέλλετο Ἀστυάγης, οὐδ᾽ εἰ παραφρονήσει τε καὶ μανέεται κάκιον ἢ νῦν 
μαίνεται, οὔ οἱ ἔγωγε προσθήσομαι τῇ γνώμῃ οὐδὲ ἐς φόνον τοιοῦτον ὑπηρετήσω. 
πολλῶν δὲ εἵνεκα οὐ φονεύσω μιν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῷ μοι συγγενής ἐστὶ ὁ παῖς, καὶ ὅτι 
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Ἀστυάγης μὲν ἐστὶ γέρων καὶ ἅπαις ἔρσενος γόνου: εἰ δ᾽ ἐθελήσει τούτου 
τελευτήσαντος ἐς τὴν θυγατέρα ταύτην ἀναβῆναι ἡ τυραννίς, τῆς νῦν τὸν υἱὸν 
κτείνει δι᾽ ἐμεῦ, ἄλλο τι ἢ λείπεται τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν ἐμοὶ κινδύνων ὁ μέγιστος; ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
μὲν ἀσφαλέος εἵνεκα ἐμοὶ δεῖ τοῦτον τελευτᾶν τὸν παῖδα, δεῖ μέντοι τῶν τινα 
Ἀστυάγεος αὐτοῦ φονέα.’ (1.109.1-4)  
 
Harpagus calculates that Astyages’ lack of a male heir is a weakness, together with his age, 
and so, for him, safety lies in thinking about Mandale’s likely reaction. He, therefore, finds a 
way to evade Astyages’ coercive order, by passing on responsibility for the killing to a slave. 
Harpagus now uses coercive language to a social inferior, warning him that he will be tortured 
if he disobeys: ‘you will be put to death in the most excruciating manner’ (ὀλέθρῳ τῷ 
κακίστῳ σε διαχρήσεσθαι, 1.110). In this way, Harpagus is shown to think strategically and to 
contest the king’s authority, whilst also exercising his own power over a slave. 
 
His wife, however, has no agency, in that when Harpagus tells his wife of his conversation 
with Astyages, she asks ‘What do you intend to do now?’ (Νῦν ὦν τί σοι ἐν νόῳ ἐστὶ ποιέειν, 
1.109.2). She also expresses no feelings at the order to kill the child. She is the mere recipient 
of information, a cipher, as she will be when her husband tells her that their son has been 
invited to meet the young Cyrus (1.119.2).
510
 We hear nothing of her reaction to his murder. 
This relationship, therefore, models one type of gender norm: the active, calculating male, the 
passive female.  
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This contrasts with Mitradates and Cyno, as revealed by the dialogue between them when 
Mitradates relates what he had found at court. To that extent, he functions like a messenger in 
a play. Herodotus shows his aporia in telling the story of how he came to bring the baby 
home from the Median court.
511
 He is amazed (ἐκπλαγεὶς, 1.111.2) at the distress he finds in 
Harpagus’ household, he wrongly assumes that the mother of the baby is a household slave 
(δοκέων τῶν τινος οἰκετέων εῖναι, 1.111.4), he is astonished (ἐθάμβεον, 1.111.4) at the gold 
and luxurious clothes, and only finds out (πυνθάνομαι, 1.111.5) the truth when told by his 
escort. The characterisation is that of a slave, subject to orders, kept in ignorance, reliant on 
others for information and accepting his powerlessness in the face of intimidation and threats, 
as shown by his response to his wife’s plea not to expose the baby; ‘but he said he could not 
do otherwise’ (ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔφη οἷός τε εἶναι ἄλλως αὐτὰ ποιέειν, 1.112.1). 
 
Cyno, however, reacts differently from Harpagus’ wife. She notices the baby’s size and 
handsome appearance (τὸ παιδίον μέγα τε καὶ εὐειδὲς ἐόν, 1.112.1), not his apparel, and 
makes an effort to dissuade her husband from exposing him, in contrast to Harpagus’ wife. In 
her emotional response and act of supplication (δακρύσασα καὶ λαβομένη τῶν γουνάτων τοῦ 
ἀνδρὸς, 1.112.1) at the prospect of the killing of a baby she reflects a commitment to family 
and children that contrasts with the priorities of Astyages and Harpagus. Even when she fails 
to persuade her husband not to expose the baby (οὐ δύναμαί σε πείθειν μὴ ἐκθεῖναι, 1.112.2) 
she has a plan which, she convinces Mitradates, will avoid detection by Harpagus’ men. It 
will enable their still-born child to be buried and will enable her to rear a child; ‘you won’t be 
caught doing wrong to our masters, and we will have made a plan that’s not at all bad’ (οὔτε 
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σὺ ἁλώσεαι ἀδικέων τοὺς δεσπότας οὔτε ἡμῖν κακῶς βεβουλευμένα ἔσται, 1.112.3). She sets 
the agenda, and shows a decisiveness and independence of action that her husband lacks.
512
 
Moreover, her rational plan contrasts with Astyages’ ‘irrational non-reflective approach to 
reality’.
513
 Her plan, moreover, is an example of nomos in its practical sense of an action that 




Cyno, who saves Cyrus as a baby from exposure and looks after him as a young boy, is 
‘other’ in a number of respects, as slave (συνδούλη, 1.110.1), barbarian (a point emphasised 
by Herodotus in giving both the Greek and the Median version of her name, Κυνὼ and 
Σπακώ, 1.110.1) and female.
515
 However, in contrast with her husband, she exploits her 
invisibility and acts to evade and subvert the coercive orders of Astyages and Harpagus.
516
 
For Gray, the key ‘otherness’ is the status of slave which she shares with her husband 
Mitradates: ‘they are there to produce a dialectic on the nature of royal barbaric power 
through their difference’.
517
 This, she argues, is emphasised by the contrast between the wild 
mountainous region in which they live (ὄρεα θηριωδέστατα, 1.110.1) and the flatlands where 
most Medes live (ἡ δὲ ἄλλη Μηδικὴ χώρη ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἄπεδος, 1.110.2), her desire to nurture 
rather than kill the baby Cyrus, and her barrenness which contrasts with Mandane’s fecundity.  
 
I argue, however, that the significance of location lies as much in its cultural difference as its 
geographical distance from the royal centre of power, Ecbatana. In the figure of Cyno we see 
an individual who has not assimilated the nomos of tyranny completely, who has retained a 
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degree of independence which she, but not Mitradates, displays through speech as well as 
action. Herodotus draws a clear distinction between her and her husband whilst 
acknowledging that their relationship is based on mutual concern (ἦσαν δὲ ἐν φροντίδι 
ἀμφότεροι ἀλλήλων πέρι, 1.111.1). This reciprocity is not mirrored by any of the other 
relationships in this story; as with Masistes and his wife, Cyno and Mitradates model a marital 
norm which exposes the abnormality of other relationships in this story. 
 
Van de Veen cites this story in support of his hypothesis that during the course of Herodotus’ 
Histories ‘settlements which used to be great have lost their significance, those which are 
great used to be small’ (τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε,τὰ δὲ 
ἐπ’ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά, 1.5.4) showing that human prosperity never stays in 
the same place.
518
 Cyno saves Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire, though she has no 
social or political status and Astyages is ultimately defeated by the man he tries to have killed, 
despite his network of servants and informers. This type of dialectic, however, as with Gray’s 
analysis, fails to give due attention to the ambiguities in each individual’s speech, actions and 
emotions as portrayed by Herodotus. This is evident when we consider the ways in which 
Cyno and Mitradates differ from, as well as complement, each other. Cyno becomes a 
significant actor in the story because, unlike her husband, she transcends her powerlessness as 
a slave. However, she is less successful as a speaker. Her prediction that Mitradates will not 
be found out is wrong and her confidence in her plan is misplaced. When summoned to court 
as a child, for assaulting the child of an important Mede, as part of a game of kingship, Cyrus 
shows the deference of a subject or slave, in addressing the king as master (ὦ δέσποτα, ἐγὼ 
ταῦτα τοῦτον ἐποίησα σὺν δίκῃ, 1.115.2) which is appropriate for someone in his vulnerable 
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 However, his actions (violent, dictatorial 1.114-115), his resemblance to the king 
(ὅ τε χαρακτὴρ τοῦ προσώπου προσφέρεσθαι ἐδόκεε ἐς ἑωυτὸν, 1.116.1), and his speech, ‘he 
spoke like a free man’ (ἡ ὑπόκρισις ἐλευθεριωτέρη, 1.116.1) prevail over his upbringing as 




Does phusis therefore, his innate kingship, take precedence over nomos, his upbringing in a 
slave family? The portrayal of Cyrus is ambivalent.
521
 Though he ‘plays the game of being 
king’
522
 as a boy, he is, of course, the product of a mixed marriage (ἐκ γὰρ δυῶν οὐκ 
ὁμοεθνέων ἐγεγόνεε, 1.91.5) and so his social position is insecure. He is both inside the 
existing power structure with a Median mother but outside it with a Persian father and a slave 
carer. Moreover his ‘free speech’ could be a tribute to Cyno, and his open response to 
Astyages’ questions marks his distance, not his closeness, to the nomos of tyranny. There is 
also a significant difference between Cyrus and his biological parents. He does not disown 
Cyno but continues to praise her (τραφῆναι δὲ ἔλεγε ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ βουκόλου γυναικός, ἤιέ τε 
ταύτην αἰνέων διὰ παντός, 1.122.3) as the person who brought him up. As Chiasson says, it is 
fundamental to the narrative that Cyrus is human and accepts his humanity; this will change, 
in his encounter with Tomyris.
523
    
 
In terms of character, therefore, Herodotus draws a contrast between Cyrus and Astyages, 
thus challenging the concept of the ‘barbarian royal’ and introducing some nuance to 
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Herodotus’ portrayal of tyranny.
524
 As a young man, Cyrus is described as the most manly 
and popular of his contemporaries (ἀνδρηιοτάτος καὶ προσφιλεστάτος, 1.123.1), whereas 
Astyages is responsible for losing his empire through his harsh, cruel behaviour (διὰ τὴν 
τούτου πικρότητα, 1.130.1) both towards Harpagus, who has a personal motive for taking 
revenge, and towards the Median people (ἐόντος τοῦ Ἀστυάγεος πικροῦ ἐς τοὺς Μήδους, 
1.123.2).
525
 He is described by Herodotus as ‘sent mad by the gods (θεοβλαβὴς, 1.127.2) and 
therefore liable to make irrational decisions; he makes Harpagus his commander in the 
campaign against the Persians, forgetting his likely desire for revenge.
526
 Thomas notes the 
interest for Greeks in using the Medes and Persians to think about the connection between a 
king and divine order and justice.
527
 If the king is sent mad by the gods, that connection is 
broken. This contrasts with the story of Deioces, in which there is no divine element, but 
order is maintained and rules established, albeit at the price of submitting to a tyrant. 
 
It is also significant that, despite Astyages’ omnipotence, ultimately he is not in control.
528
 
His orders are disobeyed, his advisors give the wrong advice (to return Cyrus to his parents, 
for example) and within his family his actions earn him the resentment of his daughter 
(θυγατρὶ τῇ ἐμῇ διαβεβλημένος, 1.118.2) and the desire for revenge from Harpagus. It is 
ironic that, although both Astyages and Harpagus are motivated by power and safety, the 
outcome of their actions is that Astyages becomes subject to Cyrus’ power, and Harpagus 
loses his son through seeking to avoid the accusation of being Cyrus’ murderer.
529
 Apart from 
Cyno, the two women in the story, Mandale and Harpagus’ wife, do and say very little, but 
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the outcome of their passivity is very different. When Mandale’s son is returned to her and her 
husband, we note their joy at his unexpected arrival (μεγάλως ἀσπάζοντο, 1.122.1) and reflect 
on their happiness at a re-united oikos. Harpagus and his wife, however, are both the victims 
of his failure to act, when their only child is murdered by Astyages.  
 
Dewald makes a general observation that women in Herodotus have a more creative response 
to circumstances than men.
530
 This is certainly true of Cyno compared with Mitradates. In the 
case of Mandale and Harpagus’ wife, however, they are passive in responding to 
circumstances that men create but with very different outcomes. In the case of Cyno, her 
actions contributed to the defeat of the Medes and the beginning of the Persian empire; ‘the 
Persians, who were the slaves, are now the masters of the Medes’ (Πέρσας δὲ δούλους ἐόντας 
τὸ πρὶν Μήδων νῦν γεγονέναι δεσπότας, 1.129.4). She achieves not only significant change 
for herself but also for the wider historical narrative. 
 
I have analysed the story of Cyrus’ early life as a case study in life under a tyrant who does 
not follow the rules of the oikos. The story reveals various reactions to an order backed up by 
threats, including resistance from Harpagus, passivity from his wife, fear from the slave 
Mitradates and a creative and unexpected response from his wife. Cyrus himself shows that he 
can perform appropriately as a king even as a child, which contrasts with his later life, when 
he fails to do so in his encounter with Tomyris. These reactions are signalled through speech; 
the dialogue between Harpagus and his wife reveals his calculated refusal to obey Astyages’ 
order, and her response (what are you going to do about it?) her lack of agency, which she 
shares with Mandale. Meanwhile the dialogues between Astyages and Harpagus, and 
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Harpagus and Mitradates both expose the coercive threats of the tyrant, whereas Cyno’s 
response to her husband shows her to be a persuasive speaker as well as someone who is a 
significant actor. Sometimes the rule of law is recognisable by its absence. In this story, we 
see Astyages characterised by lack of restraint, who issues arbitrary punishments and fails to 
recognise his obligation to protect, not destroy his oikos. This quality of excess and 
arbitrariness is not, however, found in Darius, another Persian king who passes judgment and 
exercises the power of life and death, as I examine in my next case study. 
 
3.4 Darius and Intaphrenes’ wife: the intersection of motherhood and tyranny  
I now consider this story in which a Persian king voices the priorities he would expect of a 
wife and mother, and which, therefore, are part of the ideological construct of marriage and 
motherhood, the unwritten nomoi which dictate the social and cultural expectations of these 
roles, and which become contested once Intaphrenes’ wife has to choose between the 
competing claims of husband, sons and brother. I analyse how this contested familial role 
intersects with her change in status, following the adoption of the political nomos of tyranny 
in Persia, and Darius’ accession to the kingship. Like her husband, she is now subject to 
Darius’ authority, but unlike him she manages, through her performance in lament and in 
speech, to negotiate and survive the transition to the position of subject, and to preserve her 
role as mother and sister. She does this by taking a strategic approach to her dealings with 
Darius, rather than seeking, like Intaphrenes, to evade or appropriate law’s power, now in the 
hands of the king. I compare her story with that of Sophocles’ Antigone, arguing that there is 
a fundamental difference between the two stories, based on the different approaches of the 
protagonists. Intaphrenes’ wife enters into dialogue with Darius, who adopts an inquisitorial 
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role. Antigone and Creon, by contrast, are adversaries, whose exchanges are characterised by 
antagonism, conflict and opposition.  
 
As with the story of Asyages, Cyrus and Cyno, this story is likely to be Herodotus’ reworking 
of an existing oral tradition.
531
 Herodotus’ audience, therefore, would probably be familiar 
with the general outlines of the story and would be interested in how he reworks his material 
and in what context. By framing this story with the death of Intaphrenes, Herodotus alerts his 
external audience to one outcome. However, he introduces an element of surprise in the story 
of Intaphrenes’ wife, using the unusual or remarkable to provoke inquiry and debate, both 
internally, between Darius and Intaphrenes’ wife, and externally amongst Herodotus’ readers. 
The story of Intaphrenes’ wife poses the question: what sort of mother chooses to save a 
brother rather than a husband or son?  
 
Contextually, the story is told in the Histories at a liminal moment when Darius is 
consolidating his power, following the revolt of the conspirators, including Darius and 
Intaphrenes, against the Magi, and the Constitutional Debate between the seven conspirators, 
which led to Darius’ accession to the kingship and ‘everything was filled with his power’ 
(δυνάμιός τε πάντα οἱ ἐπιμπλέατο, 3.88.3), testing the relationship between the seven in a new 
hierarchy. Intaphrenes is shown to breach the new rules by mutilating two of the king’s 
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guards, cutting off their noses and ears, following a dispute over access to the king and is 
arrested, with all other male members of his family, following an action which Darius 
construes as treachery. 
 
Firstly, I consider the nomos which is engaged in Darius’ dealings with Intaphrenes: 
And indeed the rule stated that the conspirators could come in to see the king 
unannounced, unless he happened to be having sex with a woman 
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω εἶχε, τοῖσι ἐπαναστᾶσι τῷ Μάγῳ ἔσοδον εἶναι παρὰ 
βασιλέα ἄνευ ἀγγέλου, ἢν μὴ γυναικὶ τυγχάνῃ μισγόμενος βασιλεύς (3.118.1) 
 
This nomos applies to the six rebels against the Magi who had agreed to Darius becoming 
king, and there appears, therefore, to be both a duty-imposing and a power-conferring 
element. Darius’ fellow conspirators can enter unannounced as long as he is not having sex 
with a woman. This is an interesting example of a political nomos in transition. Darius has 
only just become king and is in the process of consolidating his authority. Intaphrenes 
‘thought it his right not to be announced’ (οὔκων δὴ Ἰνταφρένης ἐδικαίου οὐδένα οἱ 
ἐσαγγεῖλαι, 3.118.2) but this clashes with the duty imposed on those charged with preventing 
access when the king was having sex. In the event, Intaphrenes takes the law into his own 
hands and thereby breaches his new obligation to the king by assaulting the two men. His 
mode of punishment, mutilation, moreover, recalls the customary penalty for rebels. 
Intaphrenes arrogates to himself a power which now belongs to the king.
532
 The king asserts 
his authority by having Intaphrenes and his male family members arrested. He interrogates all 
six of the co-conspirators (ἀπεπειρᾶτο γνώμης, 3.119.1) and then imprisons Intaphrenes and 
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his family to await death. In assuming the power of life and death, he shows the coercive 
power of the tyrant. The story shows that Intaphrenes has not negotiated successfully the 
transition from being a co-conspirator with Darius to being the king’s subject; he acts as 
though the Constitutional Debate has not concluded and his status has not changed. 
 
For a Greek audience, much about this story conforms to Persian ‘otherness’; a polygamous 
king who exercises sole power of life and death, an autocrat who equates his will or fancy 
with the law.
533
 I argue, however, that Herodotus uses this story to show how the political 
nomos of tyranny develops and to distinguish Darius from other Persian kings. Firstly, in 
allowing conditional access to the six co-conspirators, Darius is more open than his 
predecessors and successors, and indeed than he will be with Intaphrenes’ wife. Secondly, he 
does conduct a form of trial, in that he questions each of the six co-conspirators individually 
(ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀπεπειρᾶτο γνώμης, 3.119.1) and only makes a judgment once he is satisfied 
that five of the six are not sympathetic to Intaphrenes. To that extent, his judgment is 
authoritarian but not arbitrary. Intaphrenes, however, acts like a barbarian, in using the 
Persian sword, the akinakes, and mutilation as his means of assault, and his thought processes 
are shown to be faulty: he ignores the conditional nature of his rights of access to the king and 
he wrongly accuses the guards of lying to him. This section of the story, therefore, shows that 
enforcement powers now lie with the king, the rules have changed, and through his dealings 
with Intaphrenes he consolidates his power. Intaphrenes, however, has not adjusted to the new 
reality of living with the rules of tyranny.  
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In the exchange between Darius and Intaphrenes’ wife, however, Darius encounters a 
different approach to nomos. Unlike Intaphrenes, who failed to recognise the coercive nature 
of the new law and whose resistance was futile, his wife approaches the law strategically, and 
that is the reason, I argue, for his death and her survival. She acts both as a participant 




Intaphrenes’ wife took to coming to the doors of the palace weeping and wailing. 
This behaviour of hers eventually moved Darius to pity, and he sent a messenger out 
to her. ‘Woman’, he said, ‘King Darius permits you to choose one member of your 
imprisoned family to save’. 
ἡ δὲ γυνὴ τοῦ Ἰνταφρένεος φοιτῶσα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας τοῦ βασιλέος κλαίεσκε ἂν καὶ 
ὀδυρέσκετο: ποιεῦσα δὲ αἰεὶ τὠυτὸ τοῦτο τὸν Δαρεῖον ἔπεισε οἰκτεῖραί μιν. πέμψας 
δὲ ἄγγελον ἔλεγε τάδε: ‘ὦ γύναι, βασιλεύς τοι Δαρεῖος διδοῖ ἕνα τῶν δεδεμένων 
οἰκηίων ῥύσασθαι τὸν βούλεαι ἐκ πάντων.’ (3.119.3-4) 
Are we to read this as a performance of her grief and distress? It could reflect, for a Greek 
audience, her ‘otherness’ as a Persian, reflecting a display of emotion which characterised the 
Persians, both male and female, in Aeschylus’ Persians.
535
 However, as Golden points out, 
‘grief should not be confused with ritual mourning’.
536
 The motif of weeping and wailing at 
the threat of death is also found in the story of Cyrus’ early life, when Astyages orders his 
servant Harpagus, to kill Cyrus as a baby. The whole of Astyages’ household laments (οἶκος 
μὲν πᾶς Ἁρπάγου κλαυθμῷ κατείχετο, 1.111.2) and Harpagus carries the baby home weeping 
(ἤιε κλαίων ἐς τὰ οἰκία, 1.109.1) after Astyages has ordered him to kill the child. As I have 
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shown, however, he is motivated by self-interest rather than concern for the child. I suggest, 
therefore, that it is not possible to know what Intaphrenes’ wife felt for her husband or her 
children, from her laments.
537
 It is the king’s emotions and perceptions which are focalised, 
not hers. He fears (ἀρρωδήσας, 3.119.1) treachery, the very persistence of her actions 
persuade him to pity her (ποιεῦσα δὲ αἰεὶ τὠυτὸ τοῦτο ... ἔπεισε οἰκτῖραί μιν, 3.119.3), her 
speech amazes him (θωμάσας τὸν λόγον, 3.119.5), he is pleased with her (ἡσθεὶς αὐτῇ, 
3.119.7) and approves her words (εὖ τε δὴ ἔδοξε ... εἰπεῖν ἡ γυνὴ, 3.119.7). 
 
However, we can analyse her performance of lament in terms of effect and outcome. Her 
initial performance is successful; it leads Darius to pity her and offer her the option to save 
one family member. Like her husband, she has to adjust to a new relationship with a man who 
now has greater authority over her and who has the power as tyrant to give orders backed up 
by threats. However, she uses a form of persuasion, the lament, which is appropriate both for 
a woman and for someone who is now a suppliant before the law.
538
 Her position outside the 





She is also cleverer than other characters in the Histories who seek to evoke the king’s pity.
540
 
Oeobazus, for example, asks to leave one of his three sons behind when the Persians were 
about to invade Scythia. Darius appeared to be friendly (ὡς φίλῳ ἐόντι, 4.84.1) offering to 
leave all three behind. However, the focalisation of Oeobazus’ feelings and expectations, 
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overjoyed that his sons, he supposed, would be released from military service (περιχαρὴς ἦν, 
ἐλπίζων τοὺς υἱέας στρατηίης ἀπολελύσθαι, 4.84.2) foreshadow disaster; all three are left 
behind, but dead.
541
 Pythius makes a similar request to Xerxes, hoping he will take pity on an 
old man (ἐμὲ ἐς τόδε ἡλικίης ἥκοντα οἰκτίρας, 7.38.3) but the king responds by saying his 
eldest son, the one he wants to save, will pay with his life (τῇ ψυχῇ ζημιώσεαι, 7.39.2). He is 
cut in half and displayed for the whole army to see. Both Oeobazus and Pythius thought their 
personal relationship with the king meant he would relax the reciprocity which imposed 
obligations on Pythius and Oeobazus to make sons available to the king and were proved 
wrong.
542
 Intaphrenes’ wife is outside these male ties of reciprocity, between subject and 
king, but successfully negotiates the family ties of reciprocity, which Darius’ offer of a life 
forces her to do. She uses the gender-appropriate lament both to signal to the king that she 
recognises his authority, and to gain a concession from him. 
She thought about the king’s offer and replied, ‘If, thanks to the king, I have to 
choose the life of one person, out of them all I choose my brother.’ 
ἣ δὲ βουλευσαμένη ὑπεκρίνετο τάδε: ‘εἰ μὲν δή μοι διδοῖ βασιλεὺς ἑνὸς τὴν ψυχήν, 
αἱρέομαι ἐκ πάντων τὸν ἀδελφεόν.’ (3.119.4) 
 
Her speech act is more surprising than her performance as a mourner; she chooses to save a 
brother, after deliberating with herself (βουλευσαμένη, 3.119.4). This is the only clue in the 
story as to her thought processes and it is crucial. She thinks before she speaks, she has a 
strategy, and is driven by reason rather than emotion. In this way she distinguishes herself 
from her husband, who acts impetuously, is suspected of plotting (ἐπιβουλεύειν, 3.119.2), and 
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suffers the consequences. The gender stereotype of the rational male and the emotional female 
is thereby subtly undermined, in Herodotus’ telling of this story. 
 
Darius is amazed by Intaphrenes’ wife’s speech, in that she does not prioritise husband or 
children. His reaction is a significant indication that he judges her speech unusual, and is a 
cue for Herodotus’ audience that her speech requires interpretation.
543
  
‘Woman, the king would like to know what your reason is for abandoning your 
husband and children and deciding to save your brother’s life, when he is not as close 
to you as your children, or as attached to you as your husband’. 
‘ὦ γύναι, εἰρωτᾷ σε βασιλεύς, τίνα ἔχουσα γνώμην, τὸν ἄνδρα τε καὶ τὰ τέκνα 
ἐγκαταλιποῦσα, τὸν ἀδελφεὸν εἵλευ περιεῖναί τοι, ὃς καὶ ἀλλοτριώτερός τοι τῶν 
παίδων καὶ ἧσσον κεχαρισμένος τοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι.’ (3.119.5) 
His use of words reveals that he is assessing her performance of her obligations to her 
husband and children. She is abandoning them (ἐγκαταλιποῦσα, 3.119.5), a word used by 
Phaedrus in Plato’s Symposium to express how unthinkable it would be to leave a lover on the 
battlefield,
544
 and which therefore has a pejorative meaning in that text and, I argue, reflects 
Darius’ judgment in this text.  
 
Some translations of this passage suggest that Darius is criticising her for how she feels about 
her husband and children.
545
 However, I suggest that, in saying that her brother should be 
ἧσσον κεχαρισμένος than her husband, Darius is highlighting the notion of reciprocity in 
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relations between husband and wife.
546
 Finglass notes that ‘χάρις is a key word in the 
vocabulary of reciprocity’,
547
 and forms of χαρίζομαι are used frequently by Herodotus to 
denote reciprocal obligation, the granting of favours in return for deeds done.
548
 Intaphrenes’ 
wife, therefore, is bound by ties of reciprocity to her husband and the question is how she is to 
negotiate these ties, in the circumstances of Intaphrenes’ arrest.  
 
As for her children, Darius voices the expectation that she should prioritise her relationship to 
them, over her brother. Darius is asking Intaphrenes’ wife, therefore, to answer his 
expectations of her, as wife and mother. It is the king, not Intaphrenes’ wife, who is voicing a 
normative construction of motherhood, a family nomos with which a Greek audience would 
be entirely comfortable, a nomos based on a construction of oikos by which a wife transfers 
her primary allegiance from her natal oikos to her husband’s oikos and fulfils her obligation to 
the oikos by providing a son. 
 
 She responds as follows:  
‘My lord’, she replied, ‘God willing, I may get another husband and more children, if 
I lose the ones I have at the moment. But my parents are dead, so there’s no way I 
can get another brother. That was why I said what I said’. 
ἣ δ᾽ ἀμείβετο τοῖσιδε. ‘ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἀνὴρ μέν μοι ἂν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, 
καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀποβάλοιμι: πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκέτι μευ ζωόντων 
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ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ἄλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ γένοιτο. ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ χρεωμένη ἔλεξα ταῦτα 
(3.119.6) 
 
This passage has been the subject of much scholarly debate, in part because it is likely that 
Sophocles borrowed this argument in Antigone.
549
 However I argue that the differences both 
in the circumstances of the two women, and the way they communicate with the men who 
have power over them outweigh the significance of the verbal echoes between the two 
passages, though there is one respect in which both women act in accordance with religious 
nomos. Whilst the significance of this is much greater in the Antigone story, Intaphrenes’ wife 
forestalls any accusation of impiety, and is thereby shown to speak appropriately, by 
acknowledging the role of the god (εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι). Through her speech act, she 
successfully preserves the lives of two family members: 
The woman seemed to Darius to speak well and, being pleased with her, he released 
not only her brother, as she had requested, but also her oldest son. However he had 
all the others executed. 
εὖ τε δὴ ἔδοξε τῷ Δαρείῳ εἰπεῖν ἡ γυνή, καί οἱ ἀπῆκε τοῦτόν τε τὸν παραιτέετο καὶ 
τῶν παίδων τὸν πρεσβύτατον, ἡσθεὶς αὐτῇ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπέκτεινε πάντας 
(3.119.7) 
 
Darius, therefore, judges her speech act; he thought she spoke well. The outcome of this story 
is that Intaphrenes’ wife emerges with her oikos diminished but intact, preserving both natal 
and marital ties. In this she is more successful than other supplicants before a king. 
 
                                                          
549
 Griffith 1999: 277. 
222 
 
Why does she not choose her husband? She knows that would be folly, since, as Dewald and 
Kitzinger observe, she is ‘no Antigone but rather a survivor, in her political astuteness’.
550
 
Dewald cites this story as an exception to the general rule in Herodotus, that wives are loyal 
to their husbands. In the case of Intaphrenes’ wife her husband ‘will not or cannot behave like 
a husband’.
551
 He has broken the ties of reciprocity and can no longer perform the roles of 
husband and father. His wife, therefore, is no longer bound by them either, and remarriage 
appears a good strategic choice in her circumstances. Dewald and Kitzinger term the story a 
metanarrative ‘a logos about the power of logos, reflecting on some of the complexities of 
speech as an act of communication’. The point of the story is ‘Darius’ recognition of the 
woman’s cleverness in expressing her tacit loyalty, by choosing to save a member of her natal 
family rather than her politically compromised husband’.
552
 Her power, they argue, lies in her 
ability to manipulate logos to persuade, but it wins her an ambiguous victory and, as with 
other courtiers, it corrupts the ability of the king to govern effectively.
553
 I agree with this 
reading insofar as it recognises Intaphrenes’ wife’s cleverness in not choosing her husband. 
However, the relationship between her as mother and the king is more complex than one of 
effective governance, which, I argue, the king has already proved, in relation to Intaphrenes. I 
consider now the maternal role that Darius assumes should take priority and the question as to 
why she does not choose a son.  
 
This story is a notable exception to the motif in Herodotus of mothers, both Greek and non-
Greek, who keep sons alive against the odds, in the stories of Cyno, and Labda (5.92), for 
example, so tests Boedeker’s conclusion that the relationship between Persian mothers and 
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sons is always supportive.
554
 The reason for her not choosing to save a son is much more 
complex than the reasons she does not choose to save her husband, and is one Herodotus does 
not answer. Perhaps she thinks that choosing a son might link her to the conspiracy, indicating 
that she sees him taking over from his father in due course.
555
 That is a possibility which I 
explore later on in this chapter. At this stage, I merely note that Intaphrenes’ wife has decided 
not to choose a son; it is part of her calculations. 
 
Some scholars have focussed on this response because of its syntactical and lexical echoes 
with the passage in Sophocles’ Antigone in which the protagonist voices the nomos which 
compels her to bury her brother Polyneices.
556
 Murnaghan, whose focus is on the Antigone 
story, suggests the argument better reflects the circumstances of Intaphrenes’ wife than those 
of Antigone, pointing to the way in which marriage, unlike ties of kinship, is not created 
irrevocably by nature but instituted by society. Antigone stresses the institutional aspect of 
marriage which she devalues in relation to her blood ties to a brother, who is now 
irreplaceable, and the supernatural laws of the gods.
557
 This, Murnaghan argues, is consistent 
with the conflict between the interests of men and women in the classical polis. She links this 
to Intaphrenes’ wife’s greater allegiance to the family into which she was born and to which 
she is tied by blood kinship than to the family into which she married and which, by marrying 
into, she helped to create.
558
 However, by suggesting a parallel with Greek women, she 
ignores firstly the Persian element of this story, with its polygamous king and distinctively 
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Persian aspect to Intaphrenes’ assault,
559
 and, more importantly, she fails to acknowledge that 
Intaphrenes’ wife, in contrast to Antigone, has now forged blood ties with sons.  
 
Hardy’s focus is on Intaphrenes’ wife, rather than Antigone, and she concentrates on the 
function rather than the origin of story. She reads the dilemma of Intaphrenes’ wife as part of 
her husband’s story, analysing it in terms of boundary-crossing, a violation of the nomos of 
separate spheres, the public and the private. Intaphrenes crosses a boundary when he tries to 
enter the king’s private space, his wife conversely enters a public space when she fails to 
‘make her decision based on criteria that are both private (pertaining to the household) and 
personal (pertaining to the emotions)’.
560
 She sees not a man she has lived with nor children 
she has borne and raised but rather the ‘offices’ of husband and children, which admit of 
being filled by other individuals’.
561
 Her choice to save her brother certainly has the logic of 
irreplaceability but we are not told that it is based on any filial affection or, as Zellner argues, 
the wish for companionship.
562
 I have already suggested that Herodotus does not explore 
Intaphrenes’ wife’s emotions and that, in any event, Darius questions her priorities, not her 
feelings. The public/private dichotomy also appears rather schematic for a story which is 
unquestionably about family priorities. There is a political dimension to this story, with 
respect to Intaphrenes, but his wife makes her decision on matters which pertain to the 
household, so acts appropriately in accordance with gender norms. 
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Honig presents the exchange between Intaphrenes’ wife and Darius as an agōn, rather than a 
negotiation.
563
 For this scholar, the story is ‘about a woman who laments too much and the 
sovereign’s determination to put an end to it’.
564
 In this reading, her resort to logos is an act of 
surrender; she loses the incalculable power of lamentation when she is forced, by Darius’ 
cross-examination, to reason her choice. This argument, however, does not reflect the role of 
lamentation in the Histories. It is not shown by Herodotus to be a particularly powerful 
weapon. The laments in Harpagus’ household do not cause Astyages to pity his daughter and 
repeal the death sentence on the child Cyrus, and the Persians, male and female, begging for 
water only achieve their end with a substantial financial inducement (3.117.5). In the case of 
Intaphrenes’ wife, it makes Darius pity her but this is the start not the end of the negotiation. 
Honig’s model of an agōn, moreover, with its implication of a contest with winners and 
losers, is less appropriate for the Herodotean story than it is for Antigone. To apply a legal 
analogy, Darius’ role is more inquisitorial than adversarial and Intaphrenes’ wife responds 
accordingly; she answers questions rather than engage in argument. Christ notes that Darius is 
a curious king, whose sense of wonder leads to enquiry; he subjects Intaphrenes’ wife to a 
trial of loyalty.
565
 It is, however, not an adversarial trial; this is a key difference between her 
and Antigone, and between Darius and Creon, as I will now illustrate. 
 
3.5 Comparison with Antigone  
The exchanges between Creon and Antigone in Sophocles’ play, by contrast, are adversarial. 
They do not agree on what constitutes nomos. For Creon, his edict forbidding the burial of 
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Polyneices is a nomos which must be obeyed. Antigone, however does not recognise his edict 
as a nomos; she calls upon the unwritten laws of the gods.  
Creon 
And still you had the gall to break this law? 
καὶ δῆτ᾽ ἐτόλμας τούσδ᾽ ὑπερβαίνειν νόμους;  
Antigone 
Of course I did. It wasn’t Zeus, not in the least, 
who made this proclamation - not to me. 
Nor did that Justice, dwelling with the gods,  
beneath the earth, ordain such laws for men. 
Nor did I think your edict had such force 
that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods,  
the great unwritten, unshakeable traditions.
566
 
οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε,  
οὐδ᾽ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη  
τοιούσδ᾽ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὥρισεν νόμους   
οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσοῦτον ᾠόμην τὰ σὰ  
κηρύγμαθ᾽, ὥστ᾽ ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν  
νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητὸν ὄνθ᾽ ὑπερδραμεῖν (449-457) 
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Moreover, Creon frames this dispute in gender terms. This is one of many polarities which 
characterise the antagonistic relationship between Creon and Antigone.
567
 
I am not the man, not now: she is the man 
if this victory goes to her and she goes free 
ἦ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀνήρ, αὕτη δ᾽ ἀνήρ,  
εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀνατὶ τῇδε κείσεται κράτη (484-5) 
 
Harris argues that any written law must respect the underlying principles of legitimacy 
contained in the unwritten laws. Creon’s order not to bury Polyneices, therefore, violates the 
laws of the gods regarding burial, that are recognised and enforced by the polis.
568
 Antigone, 
therefore, he argues, has the stronger legal arguments in that she appeals to laws, whether 
human or divine, that have universal application.
569
 This argument, therefore, complements 
my argument in this thesis that there are rules which apply to everyone and are of universal 
application. 
 
However, the second law she invokes, in the passage which has echoes of the Herodotean 
story, does not have this universal applicability. The nomos invoked by Antigone at 908 and 
914 concerns family obligations and competing roles within the family. In her agōn with 
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Creon, once she has been sentenced to be buried alive, she frames her reply within the context 
of a rhetorical question to her brother, on the subject of nomos.
570
  
Never, I tell you, 
if I had been the mother of children 
or if my husband died, exposed and rotting - 
I’d never have taken this ordeal upon myself, 
never defied our people’s will. What law, 
you ask, do I satisfy with what I say? 
A husband dead, there might have been another. 
A child by another, too, if I had lost the first. 
But mother and father both lost in the halls of Death, 
no brother could ever spring to light again. 
For this law alone I held you first in honor. 
For this, Creon the king judges me a criminal 
guilty of dreadful outrage, my dear brother. 
οὐ γάρ ποτ᾽οὔτ᾽ἄν, εἰ τέκνων μήτηρ ἔφυν,  
οὔτ᾽εἰ πόσις μοι κατθανὼν ἐτήκετο,  
βίᾳ πολιτῶν τόνδ᾽ἂν ᾐρόμην πόνον.  
τίνος νόμου δὴ ταῦτα πρὸς χάριν λέγω;  
πόσις μὲν ἄν μοι κατθανόντος ἄλλος ἦν,  
καὶ παῖς ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ᾽ ἤμπλακον,  
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μητρὸς δ᾽ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς κεκευθότοιν  
οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.   
τοιῷδε μέντοι σ᾽ ἐκπροτιμήσασ᾽ ἐγὼ  
νόμῳ Κρέοντι ταῦτ᾽ ἔδοξ᾽ ἁμαρτάνειν  
καὶ δεινὰ τολμᾶν, ὦ κασίγνητον κάρα. (905-15) 
 
Antigone treats this as a duty-imposing law, an obligation, which applies because her brother 
is irreplaceable. However, it differs significantly from the law she previously invoked, in that 
it is very specific and relates to the particular circumstances of her case. Harris’ model of 
nomos does not reflect the diversity and specificity of some nomoi, as with this example, 
which he does not analyse as a nomos, and as with many in the Histories. As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, the definition of nomos needs to recognise the force of rules which 
includes those relating to gender performance, and which may be culturally specific and 
subject to change. 
 
Antigone specifically rejects motherhood as a basis for disobeying Creon’s edict. However, 
this, for her, is a hypothetical situation; she is not yet a wife or mother. Her natal oikos has 
been destroyed, with Creon now in the role of kurios, but has not been replaced with a marital 
oikos. In terms of her status as a woman, she is in limbo. In this, her circumstances are 
significantly different from Intaphrenes’ wife. More significantly, however, the antagonism 
between her and Creon is absolute. They are at opposite poles in their verbal exchanges. 
Creon is characterised as a man who fails to deliberate or take advice before he speaks, unlike 
Intaphrenes’ wife. Antigone performs an absolute allegiance to her brother and to the 
unwritten laws which can find no accommodation with an inflexible king. Whilst Harris is 
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right to highlight Sophocles’ use of dramatic ambiguity, in the meaning of nomos, for Creon 
and Antigone their concept of nomos is inviolable, it admits of no nuance or ambiguity, 
debate or dissent, certainly for as long as Antigone is alive. This contrasts with the 
Herodotean story, in which lament makes a king pity the woman and offer a concession, and 
in which remarkable speech acts as a spur to enquiry and prompts a further gift. Both Darius 
and Intaphrenes’ wife show a flexibility which eludes Creon and Antigone.  
 
In giving her a son as well as a brother, Darius, Honig argues, is expressing what would be his 
choice, namely a son and heir. He is also indicating that ‘this is the relative she should have 
chosen, the one she should have valued the most’.
571
 In making this unasked-for gift, Darius 
‘presses Intaphrenes’ wife into futurity by maternalising her against her expressed wishes’.
572
 
Sancisi-Weerdenburg also sees the king’s actions as confirming her duty to ‘take motherly 
care of her children’ and to ‘guarantee the future of the husband’s family’.
 573
 Murnaghan 
notes the gift of a son is a corrective as well as a reward.
574
 These scholars, therefore, 
recognise that Darius is enforcing a norm, a social expectation, of motherhood, which he 
considers Intaphrenes’ wife has challenged, through choosing her brother.  
 
However, this surely begs the question why this king would do this; the elimination of 
Intaphrenes’ son is surely a safer option for a king who is consolidating his power. Honig 
recognises that this complicates the gift ‘with its promise of vengeance and joy’, but does not 
develop this argument, as her focus is on Antigone.
575
 West is the only scholar to highlight 
this aspect of the story; ‘It is hard to imagine a more powerful motive for regicide than the 
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desire for vengeance ... Darius’ decision to spare Intaphrenes’ eldest son does more credit to 
his heart than to his head’.
576
 This indeed is a paradox; a Persian king who is more emotional 
than a female subject. The sophistic nature of Intaphrenes’ wife’s cleverness may have been 
part of the appeal of this story, for Herodotus’ audience.
577
 Intaphrenes’ wife is unusual in 
comparison with other Persian women. She is a paradox, a puzzle, meant to stimulate debate. 
However, this story also shows Darius as a king who enforces, not violates nomos. He does 
this partly to consolidate his power, following the coup against the Magi. Nevertheless, his 
enforcement of a family nomos which has the potential to threaten his kingship shows just 
how strong this unwritten law is. Enforcement of the nomos which Intaphrenes breached 
makes Darius stronger; enforcement of a maternal nomos has the potential to weaken him. 
 
To conclude, Darius conducts the debate with Intaphrenes’ wife in an inquisitorial rather than 
an adversarial manner. She meanwhile manages the negotiation skilfully, waiting for her 
laments to have their effect on the king rather than risking a spoken request which might be 
rejected. She then thinks through her options before she speaks, and pleases the king with her 
paradoxical request. Thus, she succeeds in preserving the life of a son as well as a brother. 
Reading this story as a dialogue rather than an agōn reveals that both perform their roles 
appropriately. Darius is shown to uphold nomoi, both political and familial. Intaphrenes’ wife 
fulfils her obligation, to preserve the essential elements of her oikos. This is a story which 
uses a Persian king to voice a nomos which asks questions about maternalism and 
motherhood, and the gap between the priorities mothers should have and those they do have. 
It is also about a woman whose performance both as lamenter and speaker seeks to persuade 
and does so successfully, unlike Antigone, and who takes a rational rather than an emotional 
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approach to what is a question of life and death. It is also a story which suggests that the 
polarity model in gender relations does not always reflect the negotiations and strategies 
adopted by Herodotus’ characters, both those in power and those subject to their power. 
Finally, it leads us to question any essentialist view of what a mother is or ought to be, and 
shows that characters like Darius may indeed be surprised when those views are confounded.        
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used the Candaules’ story to argue that there are limits on the exercise 
of power by a tyrant who violates the rules of the oikos and ignores the legitimate 
expectations of his wife. She, however, is unique in the Histories in assuming a quasi-judicial 
function as a woman, punishing the breach of nomos by exercising the power of life and 
death, like male royals, thereby showing nomos in its coercive aspect. By contrast, I have 
analysed the Spartan stories as a strategic engagement with nomos, showing the flexible 
approach to family nomoi shown by Spartan kings and queens, but still based on a 
commitment to preserving the oikos and promoting the interests of the various factions with 
the Spartan royal family. 
 
The Persian stories, I argue, show different aspects of ‘living with the rules’ of tyranny, from 
a gender perspective. The royal oikos is a dangerous place for women who speak out, but 
Herodotus also shows that Cambyses destroys his own oikos and dynasty because he kills the 
woman who warns him of the risks he is taking with its security. Cyno, by contrast, is able to 
speak freely and act because of her distance from the royal oikos. The story of Intaphrenes’ 
wife gives us a different model of tyranny in which it is possible to modify though not change 
the king’s mind, whereas the story of Xerxes shows us a dysfunctional oikos, in which 
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Amestris in particular is portrayed as cruel, vindictive and vengeful, in contrast with Masistes’ 
wife, who is shown in a gender-appropriate relationship with her husband. There is also a 
disjuncture between the rhetoric of preserving the royal oikos, and events in the wider 
narrative, where kings end up destroying it. Darius, I suggest, is an exception to this rule in 
that he preserves his oikos and the key components of that of Intaphrenes’ wife. In all these 
stories, therefore, Herodotus gives us a nuanced view of what it is to live with the rules of 
tyranny. Not all tyrants oppress women in the same way and some women are shown to 
exercise agency in oppressive circumstances. Moreover, Herodotus shows that the rule of law 
applies to the oikos, imposing an obligation on everyone, including kings, to safeguard the 
oikos rather than put it at risk.  
 
In my next chapter, I examine the coercive military Spartan nomos of ‘win or die’ in the 
context of constructions of masculinity, both within the Histories, and more widely in texts 
which interrogate the gender nomos of andreia. I then apply this to the stories of three 
powerful women, Tomyris, Pheretime and Artemisia, who adopt a masculine role, which 











In my last chapter, my focus was on women in the oikos, and the different ways they 
conformed to, enforced, and, at times, resisted female gender rules and tyranny. I also showed 
women as well as men in the Spartan oikos taking a flexible approach to nomos. In this 
chapter, my focus is on performances of masculinity, in particular, the coercive Spartan 
nomos of ‘win or die’, the ideology of female inferiority which underpins it, and its practical 
application. 
 
I then consider in detail the relationship between power, nomos and gender, in particular, the 
extent to which the constraints of nomos and of gender apply to women who perform a 
masculine role in exercising military and political power. I will argue that Herodotus uses the 
character of Artemisia to highlight the contested aspect of andreia, both in speech and action, 
and that both she and Themistocles are shown to be characters of mētis, able to manipulate 
rules and relationships to succeed. I will show that powerful men sometimes underestimate 
female capacity, and do not live up to gender expectations themselves; conversely women 
sometimes defy those expectations. However, the downfall for Cyrus, Pheretime and Xerxes 
is ultimately because, in seeking to go beyond boundaries that separate humans from gods, 
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I have argued that femininity is a performance, regulated and evaluated by others, to whom 
one is accountable. The same is true of performances of masculinity. Atys anticipates censure 
from the community and from his wife if Croesus prevents him performing a masculine role 
in the hunt (1.35.1), showing women as well as men policing male performances of gender. 
This challenge to ‘prove oneself to be a man’ is seen elsewhere as a motivating factor, for 
example, when Oroetes ‘conceives a desire to commit an act which lacked mortal and divine 
authority’ (ἐπεθύμησε πρήγματος οὐκ ὁσίου, 3.120.1), his motivation, whichever of the two 
accounts given by Herodotus is preferred, is based on a personal insult.
579
 One of these insults 
is to suggest that his failure to capture Samos calls his manliness into question; Mitrobates 
taunts him with this rhetorical question: Call yourself a man? (σὺ γὰρ ἐν ἀνδρῶν λόγῳ; 
3.120.3). Similarly, Atossa’ appeal to Darius to pursue the Persian nomos of expansionism 
includes an injunction for him to prove his manly qualities: 
The right thing for a man who is both young and the master of great wealth is to be 
seen to accomplish something big, so that the Persians know too that they are ruled by 
a real man. On two counts it is in your interest to do this, both so that the Persians 
know that their leader is a man, and so that they be occupied by war and not have time 
to plot against you.  
οἰκὸς δὲ ἐστὶ ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων δεσπότην φαίνεσθαί τι 
ἀποδεικνύμενον, ἵνα καὶ Πέρσαι ἐκμάθωσι ὅτι ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἄρχονται. ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα δέ 
τοι συμφέρει ταῦτα ποιέειν, καὶ ἵνα σφέων Πέρσαι ἐπίστωνται ἄνδρα εἶναι τὸν 
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προεστεῶτα, καὶ ἵνα τρίβωνται πολέμῳ μηδὲ σχολὴν ἄγοντες ἐπιβουλεύωσί τοι, 
3.134.2 
This gender ideology, therefore, is used as a motivating factor in war, by women as well as 
men, and is based on the binary opposition of male and female; andreia is a quality which 
excludes women.
580
 The performance of andreia, likewise, means not only acting in a manly 
way but also being judged by others to do so. 
 
It is reinforced by the ideology of female inferiority, based on the binary opposition of male 
and female, as articulated by both Persians and Athenians. Artemisia, on the eve of the battle 
of Salamis, advises Xerxes, king of the Persians: ‘Do not commit the fleet to a battle, because 
at sea your men will be as far inferior to the Greeks as women are to men’ (φείδεο τῶν νεῶν 
μηδὲ ναυμαχίην ποιέο. οἱ γὰρ ἄνδρες τῶν σῶν ἀνδρῶν κρέσσονες τοσοῦτο εἰσὶ κατὰ 
θάλασσαν ὅσον ἄνδρες γυναικῶν, 8.68). Xerxes echoes her words in the aftermath of his 
defeat, when he explains it as an inversion of gender roles: ‘my men have become women, my 
women men’ (οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες, 8.88). The same 
binary opposition is rehearsed before the battle of Plataea the following year, when the 
Persian horsemen taunt the Greeks by calling them women (προσβάλλοντες δὲ κακὰ μεγάλα 
ἐργάζοντο καὶ γυναῖκας σφέας ἀπεκάλεον, 9.20), the harshest of insults for Persian men 
(παρὰ δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι γυναικὸς κακίω ἀκοῦσαι δέννος μέγιστος ἐστι, 9.107), to encourage 
their own men to fight bravely.   
 
In this chapter, I will analyse the performance aspect of gender, in particular of masculinity in 
the context of war, and I will consider relationships between men and the creation of 
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hierarchies, not only in the Persian court but also in the Greek alliance. I will show that 
normative conceptions of appropriate masculine attitudes and activities are variable and can 
change with time.
581
 Again, this links to one of Hart’s secondary rules, the rule of change, 
which provides necessary flexibility in any legal system. I will argue, therefore, that 
Herodotus shows andreia (manliness) to be a social construct rather than an innate 
characteristic of men by making the performance of gender regulated by changeable nomoi, at 
times deceptive, and dependent on the judgment of others, both Herodotus himself and 
characters in his text.  
 
1. What are the rules of masculinity? 
a) Spartans 
They are free, yet not completely free: the rule is their master, which they fear much 
more than your men fear you. Each man does what the rule commands, and its 
command never changes, which is that they should not flee from battle, no matter 
how many men are ranged against them, but stay in line and either win or die. 
ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἰσί: ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν 
ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγῃ: 
ἀνώγει δὲ τὠυτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ 
μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι. (7.104-5) 
 
b) Persians 
After bravery in battle, manliness is proved above all by producing plenty of sons  
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ἀνδραγαθίη δὲ αὕτη ἀποδέδεκται, μετὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃς ἂν πολλοὺς 
ἀποδέξῃ παῖδας (1.136) 
 
To what extent do these military nomoi reflect contemporary thinking on andreia? In 
Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes, the seven possess ‘iron-hearted spirit, blazing with 
courage’ (σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμὸς ἀνδρείᾳ φλέγων, A. Th. 52) and in Euripides’ Andromache 
it is also a virtue associated with performance on the battlefield: ‘ignorant of weapons and 
battle, they went on to learn military valour’ (ὅπλων γὰρ ὄντες καὶ μάχης ἀίστορες, ἔβησαν 
εἰς τἀνδρεῖον, E.Andr. 682-3). However, in Euripides’ The Suppliants, the Theban herald 
argues that ‘foresight, too, is a kind of andreia’ (καὶ τοῦτ’ἐμοὶ τ’ἀνδρεῖον, ἡ προμηθία, 
E.Supp. 510) and, in the circumstances of the revolution in Corcyra, Thucydides notes that 
words were changing their meaning: 
To fit in with the change of events, words, too had to change their meanings. What 
used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the 
courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait 
was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was 
just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a question 
from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. Fanatical enthusiasm 




καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα 
μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία 
εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν 
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ἀργόν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ 
ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος (Th.3.82.4) 
Moderation is equated with lack of manliness (τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα) which 
is now associated with a thoughtless act of aggression (τόλμα ... ἀλόγιστος). Andreia, in other 
words, now has a negative not a positive connotation, as a feature of stasis.
583
 In 
Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, the word is used as parody, when a woman ‘plays’ at being a man; 
the chorus greet Lysistrata as ‘most manly of all women’ (χαῖρ᾽ ὦ πασῶν ἀνδρειοτάτη, Ar. 
Lys. 1108).
584
 When Plato comes to consider the question ‘What is andreia?’ in his dialogue 
Laches, between Socrates, Laches, and Nicias, there is no clear-cut answer: 
Socrates 
Try to answer my question: what is courage? 
Laches 
... that’s not difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, 
and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous 
Socrates 
ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία. 
Laches 
... οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν: εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους 
καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη. (Pl. Laches. 190e) 
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Socrates, predictably, challenges Laches’ simple definition, suggesting andreia could be 
defined as ‘foolish daring’ (ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα, Pl.La. 193d), echoing Thucydides’ negative 
connotation, and concludes by saying ‘We have failed to discover what courage really is (οὐκ 
ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν ... ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν, Pl.La. 199). Andreia has become a contested virtue, to 
be examined and debated by historians and philosophers, and made into comedy by the 
playwright.
585
 To what extent, therefore, does Herodotus’ narrative reflect or foreshadow this 
debate? 
 
2. Andreia in the Histories 
Herodotus reflects the contested nature of andreia in his portrayal of Artemisia. I will show 
that, in her, it is a quality not associated with heroic deeds but with forthright speech and 
freedom of action. Her story is not the only one to problematise andreia. Telines of Sicily, 
who held the priesthood of the chthonian goddesses, was described by his contemporaries as a 
rather womanly and soft man (θηλυδρίης τε καὶ μαλακώτερος ἀνήρ, 7.153.4) but nevertheless 
achieved a form of dispute resolution, the restoration of Geloan exiles, using sacred rites, 
rather than a force of men (ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν ἀλλὰ ἱρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν, 
7.153.3).
586
 Herodotus finds this remarkable: 
Now it is a wonder to me that Telines should have achieved such a feat, for I have 
always supposed that such deeds can only be performed by such a man as has a 
courageous heart and manly strength. 
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θῶμά μοι ὦν καὶ τοῦτο γέγονε πρὸς τὰ πυνθάνομαι, κατεργάσασθαι Τηλίνην ἔργον 
τοσοῦτον: τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα οὐ πρὸς τοῦ ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς νενόμικα γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ 
πρὸς ψυχῆς τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ ῥώμης ἀνδρηίης. (7.153.4) 
 
Herodotus thereby shows that male as well as female appearances can be deceptive; Telines’ 
looks belie his achievements. The following examples also illustrate the provisional nature of 
andreia which can be lost as well as won. Cyrus is described as the most manly and well-
liked of his contemporaries (τῶν ἡλίκων ἀνδρηιοτάτος καὶ προσφιλεστάτος, 1.123.1) as a 
young man, but is shown to lose his andreia, in his encounter with Tomyris, when she 
performs the masculine role of valour in battle, not him, as I will show in my case study. 
When the Lydians are facing a battle with Cyrus ‘there was no braver or more warlike race in 
Asia’ (ἦν ... ἔθνος οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ οὔτε ἀνδρηιότερον οὔτε ἀλκιμώτερον τοῦ Λυδίου, 
1.79.3), but their continuing rebellion against Cyrus leads Croesus to make proposals to the 
king, as an alternative to slavery, which are intended to feminise the Lydians, to change 
external markers of gender, from male to female, to make them perform female rather than 
male activities, and to train their boys to be retailers rather than warriors: 
Send and forbid them to possess weapons of war, and order them to wear tunics 
under their cloaks and knee-boots on their feet, and to teach their sons lyre-playing 
and song and dance and shop-keeping. And quickly, O king, you shall see them 
become women instead of men, so that you do not have to fear that they might revolt.  
ἄπειπε μέν σφι πέμψας ὅπλα ἀρήια μὴ ἐκτῆσθαι, κέλευε δὲ σφέας κιθῶνάς τε 
ὑποδύνειν τοῖσι εἵμασι καὶ κοθόρνους ὑποδέεσθαι, πρόειπε δ᾽ αὐτοῖσι κιθαρίζειν τε 
καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τοὺς παῖδας. καὶ ταχέως σφέας ὦ βασιλεῦ 
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γυναῖκας ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ 
ἀποστέωσι. (1.155.4) 
 
Croesus’ advice to Cyrus, however, needs further consideration; does becoming a shopkeeper 
(καπηλεύειν, 1.155.4) feminise you? Ruffing uses this passage to argue that ‘for Herodotus, 
selling by retail is a form of emasculation’, making Darius a ‘huckster’
587
 (κάπηλος, 3.89.3) 
who lacks warrior virtues.
588
 This is in the context of Ruffing’s overall argument that 
Herodotus intends to draw a parallel between the Persian defeat by the Greeks and Athens’ 
defeat by Sparta, whereby Darius’ imposition of tribute foreshadows Athens’ imperial 
ambitions and need for money from subject poleis, and signposts a move away from the 
poverty which makes bravery possible. 
 
My first point is that the two passages to which Ruffing refers are not comments by 
Herodotus as narrator; the first is in direct speech given to Croesus, the second records the 
Persians’ own view of their own rulers: 
The Persians say that Darius is a retailer, because he put a price on everything, 
Cambyses is a despot, because he was cruel and restrictive and Cyrus, a father who 
was kind and set up everything for their own good  
λέγουσι Πέρσαι ὡς Δαρεῖος μὲν ἦν κάπηλος, Καμβύσης δὲ δεσπότης, Κῦρος δὲ 
πατήρ, ὃ μὲν ὅτι ἐκαπήλευε πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ὁ δὲ ὅτι χαλεπός τε ἦν καὶ 
ὀλίγωρος, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἤπιός τε καὶ ἀγαθά σφι πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο (3.89.3)  
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Herodotus is showing the Persians’ own judgment on their rulers, not his own, and they are 
differentiating between their kings not on the basis of military prowess, but their wider 
actions as Persian kings. 
 
As for the passage in direct speech by the character Croesus to Cyrus (1.155.4) this has to be 
contextualised as a piece of rhetoric intended to persuade. As Herodotus does say as narrator, 
Croesus has three reasons for making this proposal: being feminised is a better option than 
being enslaved (ἀνδραποδισθέντας), he had to make a persuasive proposal (ἀξιόχρεον 
πρόφασιν) to make Cyrus change his mind, and any future revolt by the Lydians against the 
Persians would lead to their compete destruction (ἀποστάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Περσέων ἀπόλωνται, 
1.156.1). The proposal he makes is persuasive because this king is influenced by the gender 
ideology which makes women inferior to men, as he will be before he takes on the 
Massagetae, mistakenly as Herodotus shows. Being called a woman may be the worst insult 
for a Persian but enslavement is a worse fate than having to give up one’s fighting ability, 
highlighting a gap between ideology and practice. 
 
I question, therefore, Ruffing’s conclusion that Darius lacks warrior virtues, because these are 
not shown to be innate qualities in the Histories, but performed in battle, and proved through 
victory. The Getae are described as very brave and just (ἀνδρηιότατοι καὶ δικαιότατοι, 4.93) 
and are the only Thracians to resist the Persians, but their reward is to be enslaved by Darius. 
Leonidas, by contrast, becomes the best of men (ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄριστος, 7.224.1) when he 
dies at Thermopylae, and with him the other Spartans whose names Herodotus learnt as 
worthy to be called men (τῶν ἐγὼ ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων γενομένων ἐπυθόμην τὰ οὐνόματα, 
244 
 
7.224.1). They have proved themselves to be men through their performance in battle.
589
 As 
with all Persian kings in the Histories, Darius is shown in differing guises, both as something 
of a trickster and authoritarian, when he takes power, to being a successful administrator of 
his expanding empire and ‘not without humanity and paternalistic wisdom’ as I showed in the 
story of Intaphrenes’ wife.
590
 In gender terms, he is unlike other Persian kings in not being 
persuaded by an ideology of female inferiority or performances of female beauty; that is the 
mistake the Paeonian brothers make when they parade their sister before him, thinking her 
beauty will persuade. In fact, as I showed in chapter 3, Darius seeks to possess female hard 
work, not beauty. 
 
Herodotus himself discriminates between men, for example, in the story of Helen. Hector is 
not only older than Alexander but more of a man (καὶ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ἀνὴρ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον 
ἐὼν, 2.120.4) and ‘it would not have been appropriate for him to allow his brother to act 
unjustly’ (τὸν οὐ προσῆκε ἀδικέοντι τῷ ἀδελφεῷ ἐπιτρέπειν, 2.120.4). However, in this story, 
performances of gender are of less significance, in Herodotus’ opinion, than the message of 
Trojan annihilation that ‘divine retribution is as great as the wrongdoing it punishes’ (ὡς τῶν 
μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῇ ἐμοὶ 
δοκέει εἴρηται, 2.120.5.)
591
 There are some circumstances where it does not matter how well 
you perform as a man. The normative male, therefore, is shown to be an unstable construct, 
subject to continuing judgment and scrutiny, and liable to change. I will now consider to what 
extent this applies in a military context. 
 
                                                          
589
 Other examples, given by Chiasson 2005: 55 of those who become men in battle: 7.181.1; 7.226.1; 
8.123.2; 9.71.2. 
590
 Asheri 2007: 478 (quotation); Waterfield 1998: 638. 
591
 Flower and Marincola 2002: 193-4 on the motif of the best/bravest at war in the Histories. 
245 
 
3. The Spartan nomos of win or die 
The military nomos of win or die is a coercive force which dictates male conduct in battle, no 
matter what the circumstances, and is reinforced, as I have shown, by an ideology of female 
inferiority which is articulated by both Persians and Athenians, with characters, male and 
female, contrasting the inferior female ‘other’ with the superior normative male. However, it 
is also enforced through social pressure, the shaming of those who are perceived to perform 
gender roles inappropriately. As the story of Candaules’ wife illustrates, it is shaming for a 
woman to be exposed to the gaze of an unrelated male, whereas, for men, cowardice, failing 
to live up to the Spartans’ nomos of win or die, is shameful. Orthryades commits suicide 
because he was too ashamed (αἰσχυνόμενον, 1.82.8) to return to Sparta after the Battle of the 
Champions. The man who fails to live up to the expectations of him as a warrior is a coward, 
just like a woman, and the ideology is reinforced by social control, as illustrated by the case of 
Aristodemus, who did not fight at Thermopylae: 
When Aristodemus returned to Sparta, he was disgraced and without honour. He was 
deprived of his honour in this way: no Spartan would give him fire or speak with 
him, and they taunted him by calling him Aristodemus the Trembler. In the battle at 
Plataea, however, he made up for all the blame brought against him.  
ἀπονοστήσας δὲ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ὁ Ἀριστόδημος εἶχε ὄνειδός τε καὶ ἀτιμίην: πάσχων 
δὲ τοιάδε ἠτίμωτο: οὔτε οἱ πῦρ οὐδεὶς ἔναυε Σπαρτιητέων οὔτε διελέγετο. ὄνειδος δὲ 
εἶχε ὁ τρέσας Ἀριστόδημος καλεόμενος. ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἐν Πλαταιῇσι μάχῃ 
ἀνέλαβε πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπενειχθεῖσαν αἰτίην (7.231) 
 
He is excluded from civil society, shunned, shamed, the object of contempt and only redeems 





 The rules are enforced at home, by women as well as men; Aristodemus is 
punished through social exclusion. Though Hodkinson writes that cowardice in battle was ‘a 
public affair subject to official investigation and adjudication’, juridical and political penalties 
are not mentioned by Herodotus. In his narrative, the penalty is informal, not imposed through 




To what extent, though, were these rules practised? Ducat finds that offences linked to the 
crime of cowardice were not strictly defined or codified, but part of Sparta’s official ideology, 
‘the image Sparta presented to the outside world’ and ‘the trembler’ was an ideal construct to 
mask divergence from Demaratus’ code.
594
 Evidence for this divergence can be found in the 
Histories in that military strategy at Plataea has to take account of the practical effects of war. 
When the Persian cavalry block the army’s water supply (9.49.2), Pausanias and the other 
Greek commanders make a decision that a strategic retreat is preferable to an immediate 
engagement; ‘the narrative makes sense both in its own terms and as an explanation of how 
people actually act in times of stress: after a long day of continual harassment without food 
and water, the flight of the centre, albeit irresponsible and cowardly, is not at all surprising or 
unnatural’.
595
 Amompharetus, however, takes the Spartan despotic nomos literally, so retreat 
becomes an act of cowardice; he is not willing to bring shame on Sparta by retreating from the 
‘strangers’ (οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς ξείνους φεύξεσθαι οὐδὲ ἑκὼν εἶναι αἰσχυνέειν τὴν Σπάρτην, 
9.53.2). He has to be persuaded that such literal adherence to the nomos is unnecessary in the 
circumstances (ἐπειρῶντο πείθοντές μιν ὡς οὐ χρεὸν εἴη ταῦτα ποιέειν, (9.53.4).  
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Blösel calls his rebellion ‘totally inappropriate in a battlefield situation’ but this is to ignore 
the Spartan nomos which requires men to ‘win or die’, and not to submit obediently to the 
orders of a tyrant.
596
 Flower and Marincola’s reading is more sympathetic of Amompharetus, 
seeing him motivated by Homeric qualities of heroism, whereas I read it more as a portrayal 
of an individual who has successfully internalised the Spartan nomos.
597
 Blösel’s wider 
argument is that Sparta, as much as Athens, often failed to live up to its own ideals, and that 
the central characteristic of the Spartans was ‘hesitation, fear and vacillation’ not adherence to 
the Spartan nomos of ‘win or die’.
598
 However, the situation before and during the battle of 
Plataea is surely more complex than he allows, and requires different qualities in leaders. It is 
true that Herodotus attributes fear of the Persians to Pausanias (9.46.1) and he is taunted by 
Mardonius for diverging from Demaratus’ code: 
Men of Lacedaemon, you are said by the people of these parts to be very brave men. 
It is their boast of you that you neither flee from the field nor leave your post, but 
remain there and either slay your enemies or are yourselves killed. It would seem, 
however, that there is no truth in all this 
‘ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὑμεῖς δὴ λέγεσθε εἶναι ἄνδρες ἄριστοι ὑπὸ τῶν τῇδε ἀνθρώπων, 
ἐκπαγλεομένων ὡς οὔτε φεύγετε ἐκ πολέμου οὔτε τάξιν ἐκλείπετε, μένοντές τε ἢ 
ἀπόλλυτε τοὺς ἐναντίους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀπόλλυσθε. τῶν δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀληθές (9.48.1-2) 
 
However, is this not the rhetoric of war that we would expect from a military opponent, just 
as the Persian cavalry insult the Greeks as ‘women’ when they inflict severe losses in a 
cavalry charge? Actual military outcomes tell a different story, however; at the battle of 
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Plataea, the Greeks defeat the Persians and Pausanias’ tactics prove correct. His responsibility 
and the power he is given in the Spartan hierarchy of command is to use tactics and strategy 
to achieve a successful outcome, not necessarily to conform to despotēs nomos, but to use it 
as a tool, at the appropriate time. Herodotus’ own judgment is that ‘the most glorious of 
victories of all which we know was won by Pausanias’ (νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἁπασέων 
τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Παυσανίης, 9.64.1). 
 
Herodotus, therefore, shows that this nomos can be a tool as well as a master and that we need 
to distinguish between Spartans. Pausanias with the high status of commander has to ‘live 
with’ this rule by making strategic decisions in the light of circumstances, whereas 
Aristodemus in the end ‘wins and dies’ at Plataea by accepting the rule as a coercive order.  
 
4. Gender fluidity: the case of Artemisia 
When introducing Artemisia as a character in his history, Herodotus makes three key 
observations about her. Firstly, ‘it is a great wonder to me that Artemisia, a woman, went to 
war against Greece’ (Ἀρτεμισίης δὲ τῆς μάλιστα θῶμα ποιεῦμαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα 
στρατευσαμένης γυναικός, 7.99.1). Secondly, ‘she was accustomed to wage war with a manly 
spirit and purpose, and under no compulsion’ (ὑπὸ λήματός τε καὶ ἀνδρηίης ἐστρατεύετο, 
οὐδεμιῆς οἱ ἐούσης ἀναγκαίης, 7.99.1) and, thirdly, she gave Xerxes the best advice of all his 
allies (πάντων τε τῶν συμμάχων γνώμας ἀρίστας βασιλέι ἀπεδέξατο, 7.99.3). The first of 
these observations recalls the historian’s programmatic statement at the start of the Histories 
when he announces his intention to ensure that great and remarkable deeds do not become 
uncelebrated (μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά ... ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, Proem). In finding 
Artemisia remarkable, Herodotus acknowledges that is it unusual for a woman to fight, but he 
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also recognises that her military achievements are worth preserving. Herodotus also found 
Telines of Sicily (θῶμά μοι ὦν, 7.153.4) remarkable. In both cases, the thōma is behaviour 
that is unusual in a woman or in a man who looks like a woman. 
 
Artemisia is the only women in the Histories to whom Herodotus attributes andreia, though 
she is not the only one to fight, suggesting a quality beyond military prowess. Her manly 
spirit and purpose is linked to her political autonomy. She takes power on her husband’s 
death, when her son is not old enough to rule (αὐτή τε ἔχουσα τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ παιδὸς 
ὑπάρχοντος νεηνίεω, 7.99.1) and chooses to fight on the side of the Persians, rather than being 
compelled to do so, unlike most of Persia’s allies and indeed most of those fighting for the 
Greek alliance.
599
 Herodotus as narrator does not judge such behaviour inappropriate, whereas 
he notes the Athenians’ indignation at her attack on Athens (δεινὸν γάρ τι ἐποιεῦντο γυναῖκα 
ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας στρατεύεσθαι, 8.93.2), their hostility to what, in Athenian terms, is a breach 
of a gender nomos, a woman who fights. Sophocles dramatises this issue in Electra when he 
portrays a protagonist who imagines winning honour, jointly with her sister, for manliness 
(τιμᾱν ἅπαντας οὕνεκ’ ἀνδρείας χρεών, S. El. 983), by killing Clytemnestra and Aegisthus; as 
Goldhill writes, ‘the image of the armed woman is not a comfortable one for the Athenian 
imagination, nor is the female political revolutionary’.
600
 Chysothemis voices the prevailing 
Athenian ideology when she reminds her sister that ‘you are by nature a woman not a man’ 
(γυνὴ μὲν οὐδ’ ἀνὴρ ἔφυς, S. El. 997).   
 
As well as waging war, Artemisia is naval commander (ἡγεμόνευε, 7.99.2) with capacity to 
supply five ships (παρείχετο, 7.99.3) to the Persian fleet and ruler of her country. Herodotus’ 
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use of the imperfect in these verbs suggests that waging war, commanding the fleet and 
providing ships are part of her role as ruler, not specific actions taken in response to a 
particular situation, and this role involves giving advice to the king on matters of strategy as 
well as fighting on his behalf. Thus, Artemisia performs her role in accordance with the 
Halicarnassian nomos of tyranny which allows for a female ruler. Tomyris also exercises 
power in accordance with Massagetan nomos but she only engages in battle with Cyrus 
(συνέβαλε Κύρῳ, 1.214.1) where the aorist is used to signify a single action taken by the 
queen, when negotiations had failed, and where, as I will show, she wants to avoid war. 
Artemisia, by contrast, performs the role as commander-in-chief of her country’s military 
forces as part of her function as ruler; she practises what, in ideological terms, is the role of 
the normative male ruler. The third attribute Herodotus gives to Artemisia is advisor; she 
gives the king the best advice and is the only one of the king’s allies who is not constrained 
by fear, and speaks freely. In summary, then, we have, in 7.99, a mini-proem introducing 
Herodotus’ account of Artemisia, and highlighting the significant themes that he will explore 
and test; her status as a remarkable or unusual woman, as someone who possesses andreia, 
and as an excellent advisor. 
 
Munson’s article published in 1988 remains the fullest, most sophisticated analysis of the 
Artemisia story.
601
 She starts her analysis of this story in terms of a Greek-barbarian antithesis 
reflected in the Greek mind by the contrast between male and female; by proving inadequate 
in the masculine task of war, the Persians are characterised as female, that is, soft, devious, 
ferocious, and liable to excess, and the predominance of female influence on Persian kings is 
dangerous. Gender, therefore is a signifier of Persian ‘otherness’ and Artemisia, as a powerful 
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woman, allied to the Persians, both embodies and expresses the metaphor of ‘women 
becoming men and men, women’.
602
 However, Munson’s main argument is that in many ways 
Artemisia, ‘representative of a straight male world, like a cultured Athena’
603
 eventually 
becomes identified with a topsy-turvy world, threatening to Hellas, which resembles Athens 
more than it does Persia.
604
 She thereby deconstructs the Greek-barbarian antithesis, 
anticipating more recent scholarship which puts greater emphasis on cultural borrowing and 




In her article, she draws parallels between the character of Artemisia, and that of 
Themistocles, in that both practise isēgoriē, giving opinions that are contrary to the majority 
view, and both are capable of deception and trickery (mētis) for the sake of self-
preservation.
606
 She also suggests that Artemisia and the Athenians are similar in playing a 
significant role in naval battles, in being free agents, and smart tacticians, and in acting 
ultimately out of self-interest. The Athenians, she argues, are shown during the course of the 
Histories to move from Athenian Panhellenism, and idealism (8.143 and 8.144.1-2) to a more 
pragmatic and self-serving approach with an introduction of the antithesis between the useful 
and the just: 
607
 
We know that it is more to our advantage to make terms with the Persians than to 
wage war with him, yet we will not make terms with him of our own free will.  
ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερον ἐστὶ ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἤ περ 
πολεμέειν: οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσομεν ἑκόντες εἶναι. (9.7.2)  
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This, of course, is part of a wider debate about the extent to which Herodotus’ Histories 
anticipate events beyond his text, both Athenian imperial ambitions and actions, and Spartan 
foreign policy, for an audience who knew, for example, about the downfall of Xerxes and 
Pausanias.
608
 Harrell argues that it is Artemisia’s ethnic ambiguity which accounts for her 
ability to embody andreia; both Greek and non-Greek, she reflects the hybrid nature of 
Halicarnassus and would be a marginal figure for Greeks.
609
 Bassi gives more weight to the 
gender ambiguity in Artemisia, reflecting the increasingly contested meaning of the word 
andreia, whereby, in her case, it signifies ethical and political expedience and the absence of 
heroic valour.
610
 My analysis will focus more on the gender aspect of the story and I will 
consider the final part of the story, Artemisia’s role with Xerxes’ children, unlike most 
commentators, because I argue that the importance of this is to signpost the complexity of 
gender identities for which a non-binary approach is appropriate.  
 
Sebillote Cuchet rejects the view that gender polarity is a structural feature of the Histories 
arguing that Herodotus mentions Artemisia’s gender to stress the unusual nature of an 
expeditionary force led by a woman and to explain the Athenians’ hostility towards her, but 
he does not, in her view, view her gender as having any impact on either her tactical 
intelligence or her conduct in battle; ‘les régimes de genre son variés, semble dire Hérodote, 
l’un ne valant pas plus ni moins qu’un autre’.
611
 Sebillote Cuchet, therefore, emphasises the 
contrast between Athenian gender ideology and the relativist view she attributes to Herodotus. 
However, this ignores the rhetorical use of the inferiority of women, which is significant, as I 
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have already argued. It also overstates the opposite view, that gender has no impact. In fact, 
gender, both male and female, is extremely significant in this story requiring us to deconstruct 
manliness as an attribute, if it can be given to a woman. 
 
4.1 Artemisia as orator: first speech 
Her first speech follows a summons by Xerxes to his advisors seeking their views (πυθέσθαι 
τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων τὰς γνώμας, 8.67.1) but also testing them (ἀποπειρώμενος ἑκάστου, 8.67.2) 
on the wisdom of engaging the Greeks in a sea battle at Salamis. The story highlights the 
reality of living with the rules of tyranny in that this sense of being ‘put on trial’ illustrates 
that this is a test of loyalty, not a request for advice; negotiating such occasions is a delicate 
matter for advisors on the Persian side.
612
 Performances at court therefore require not only 
oratorical skill, but also managing the protocols of hierarchy, which may be more significant 
in practice than appearing manly. Robert Hariman has shown that, in a court setting, the 
king’s power depends not only on using force and controlling the administrative apparatus 
effectively (the coercive nomos of tyranny) but also on a successful performance of kingship, 
within a ‘structure of relationships constituted by symbolic acts’.
613
 Both king and subject 
must play their part; there is a reciprocal process of display and response, with courtiers 
fighting to be heard and be seen. This is shown very clearly in the setting for Xerxes’ debate: 
They sat according to the honour which the king had granted each of them, first the 
king of Sidon, then the king of Tyre, then the rest. 
ἵζοντο ὥς σφι βασιλεὺς ἑκάστῳ τιμὴν ἐδεδώκεε, πρῶτος μὲν ὁ Σιδώνιος βασιλεύς, 
μετὰ δὲ ὁ Τύριος, ἐπὶ δὲ ὧλλοι. (8.67.2) 
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A court identity, therefore, as much as a gender identity, depends on performance. Success as 
a courtier depends on performing one’s role appropriately, being distinctive, placing oneself 
within the hierarchy as a way to establish authority, and manipulating tropes of (self) 
promotion, rivalry and self-preservation through interpreting information and motives, all 




She is the only one of Xerxes’ advisors to warn of defeat on land as well as sea if Xerxes runs 
the risk of a sea battle (ναυμαχίῃσι ἀνακινδυνεύειν, 8.68α2). In constructing a speech for her, 
Herodotus dramatises her attempt at persuasion.
615
 The ability to speak well and to establish 
oratorical superiority over others, as well as physical dominance, had been a mark of the 
normative male from Homeric epic onwards, so it is no surprise that speech is an aspect of 
Artemisia’s andreia.
616
 Herodotus, therefore, gives Artemisia a speech which is full of 
persuasive rhetorical tropes.
617
 She starts her speech with self-praise, a captatio benevolentiae 
intended to impress Xerxes with her qualifications: ‘I did not play a negligible or cowardly 
role in the sea battles off Euboea’ (οὔτε κακίστη γενομένη ἐν τῇσι ναυμαχίῃσι τῇσι πρὸς 
Εὐβοίῃ οὔτε ἐλάχιστα ἀποδεξαμένη, 8.68α1). She also signals her respect for his authority 
addressing him as master (δέσποτα). She then gives direct advice: 
Spare your ships, and do not fight at sea. Their men are as much stronger than your 
men by sea as men are stronger than women 
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φείδεο τῶν νεῶν μηδὲ ναυμαχίην ποιέο. οἱ γὰρ ἄνδρες τῶν σῶν ἀνδρῶν κρέσσονες 
τοσοῦτο εἰσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ὅσον ἄνδρες γυναικῶν, 8.68α1  
 
She reminds Xerxes, with a rhetorical question, that he has already taken Athens, his 
ostensible goal, and the rest of Greece (οὐκ ἔχεις μὲν τὰς Ἀθήνας ... ἔχεις δὲ τὴν ἄλλην 
Ἑλλάδα; 8.68.α2) so does not need to take the risk of a naval battle, and points out that the 
Greeks lack the resources to hold out for long.  
 
The strategic part of her argument draws a contrast between what she predicts will happen if 
Xerxes avoids a sea battle and if he commits to one: 
I have learned that they have no food on this island, and it is not likely, if you lead 
your army against the Peloponnese, that those of them who have come from there will 
sit still, nor will they care to fight at sea for Athens ... If you engage in a sea battle 
straight away, I am afraid that the defeat of your fleet will also ruin your land army 
οὔτε γὰρ σῖτος πάρα σφι ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ταύτῃ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, οὔτε αὐτοὺς οἰκός, ἢν 
σὺ ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλαύνῃς τὸν πεζὸν στρατόν, ἀτρεμιεῖν τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῶν 
ἥκοντας, οὐδέ σφι μελήσει πρὸ τῶν Ἀθηνέων ναυμαχέειν ... ἢν δὲ αὐτίκα ἐπειχθῇς 
ναυμαχῆσαι, δειμαίνω μὴ ὁ ναυτικὸς στρατὸς κακωθεὶς τὸν πεζὸν προσδηλήσηται 
(8.68β2 ... γ1)  
 
She is arguing here from probability, signalling the need to exercise judgment, to choose 
between two options. Artemisia concludes, however, by reverting to an argument based on the 
rhetoric of praise and blame, reminding Xerxes of the baseness and cowardice of others, in an 
attempt to establish her own superiority:  
256 
 
Good people’s slaves tend to be bad, and the slaves of the bad tend to be good. You, 
who are best among men, have bad slaves 
τοῖσι μὲν χρηστοῖσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακοὶ δοῦλοι φιλέουσι γίνεσθαι, τοῖσι δὲ κακοῖσι 
χρηστοί. σοὶ δὲ ἐόντι ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρῶν πάντων κακοὶ δοῦλοι εἰσί.  
  
She emphasises the contrast between Xerxes, ἀρίστος ἀνδρῶν, and his enslaved allies, a 
contrast which also applies to her, since she fights freely, not under compulsion (οὐδεμιῆς οἱ 
ἐούσης ἀναγκαίης, 7.99.1). The antithesis is between free and slave as well as between men 
and women. Herodotus proves Artemisia’s oratorical andreia by showing her in a verbal 
combat, and constructing for her a speech characterised by the antithesis of praise and blame. 
This makes a form of ring composition; she starts her speech with self-praise, to make Xerxes 
favourably inclined towards her and concludes by reminding him of the shortcomings of 
others. By attributing baseness and cowardice to others, she establishes her own superiority. 
This speech, therefore, illustrates what Roisman calls the ‘rhetoric of agōn’ in which there 
have to be winners and losers, and which finds expression also in the manipulation of courage 
and shame by Athenian orators who elevate self and denigrate others.
618
 She speaks in terms 
of binary opposites, the adversarial creation of the ‘other’ in a successful rhetorical 
performance.  
 
However, her speech also includes strategic advice, which requires Xerxes to exercise 
judgment between two options. She also does the remarkable thing of performing isēgoriē at 
the Persian court, that is, speaking like a man in Athenian terms. Herodotus shows that such 
speech is risky; all Xerxes’ councillors, bar Artemisia, are coerced by the nomos of tyranny. 
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The response to Artemisia’s performance by the internal audience, both her friends (εὔνοοι, 
8.69.1) and her enemies, motivated by envy and resentment of her political influence 
(ἀγεόμενοί τε καὶ φθονέοντες, ἅτε ἐν πρώτοισι τετιμημένης διὰ πάντων τῶν συμμάχων, 
8.69.1), makes it clear that everyone on the Persian side thinks Xerxes is committed to a sea 
battle and anticipate, therefore, that he will punish Artemisia (κακόν τι πεισομένης πρὸς 
βασιλέος, 8.69.1) or kill her (ἀπολεομένης αὐτῆς, 8.69.2) for voicing a different opinion. 
Perhaps they recall his fury (θυμωθεὶς, 7.11.1) in an earlier debate, when the rest of the 
Persians had kept quiet, not daring to voice an opposite opinion (σιωπώντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων 
Περσέων καὶ οὐ τολμώντων γνώμην ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἀντίην τῇ προκειμένῃ, 7.10). Artabanus, 
however, urged caution before Xerxes launched his expedition against the Greeks and crossed 
the Hellespont. Xerxes was furious and said to him: ‘for your craven cowardice I will 
humiliate you by not taking you with me on this expedition to Greece; instead you will stay 
here with the women’ (καί τοι ταύτην τὴν ἀτιμίην προστίθημι ἐόντι κακῷ καὶ ἀθύμῳ, μήτε 
συστρατεύεσθαι ἔμοιγε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα αὐτοῦ τε μένειν ἅμα τῇσι γυναιξί, 7.11.1). As 
Boedeker notes, this rebuke makes the invasion of Greece a masculine pursuit; Artabanus is 
unmanned by being denied the opportunity to prove himself in battle.
619
 The response of the 
internal audience to Artemisia’s speech reveals that their primary concern is how Xerxes will 
react, not whether her strategic view is correct, and shows that Xerxes has canvassed their 
views as a test of loyalty, not in the spirit of joint decision-making.  
 
Xerxes’ response, however, is not anticipated; he is pleased with Artemisia’s advice (κάρτα τε 
ἥσθη τῇ γνώμῃ, 8.69.2). Exactly the same phrase is used to describe Darius’ reaction (4.97.6) 
to Coës’ advice, before the king invaded Scythia, not to dismantle the bridge over the Ister 
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river but to keep it guarded as an escape route. Darius, however, is not only pleased with this 
advice, but follows it. Xerxes, by contrast, does not act on Artemisia’s advice but gives orders 
that the advice of those in favour of a sea battle be followed (τοῖσι πλέοσι πείθεσθαι ἐκέλευε, 
8.69.2). This is because he likes the polarities in Artemisia’s speech (after all, he speaks them 
himself), and the way her speech is constructed in terms of opposites, but he does not heed the 
γνώμας ἀρίστας which is what Herodotus himself approves, nor does he come to a balanced 
judgment between two options.  
 
Both the contemporary and the modern audience can appreciate the dramatic irony in Xerxes’ 
failure to heed Artemisia’s warning. This, suggests Lang, is its function, to prefigure Xerxes’ 
defeat at Salamis.
620
 Xerxes’ response to the speech is part of Herodotus’ characterisation of 
his motivation, a firm belief that his men fought badly on purpose at Euboea because he was 
not there (τάδε καταδόξας, πρὸς μὲν Εὐβοίῃ σφέας ἐθελοκακέειν ὡς οὐ παρεόντος αὐτοῦ, 
8.69.2).
 
He listens, therefore, to Artemisia’s criticism of other allies, which, I have suggested, 
is a function of her agonistic andreia, but he ignores her accurate analysis of the Greek 
position and her subsequent advice, to avoid a sea battle and take advantage of Greek 
disunity. This is because he gives too much significance to his own contribution as king, 
thinking that his presence at Salamis will make them perform as men. His final action, before 
he gives the order to set sail, is to prepare himself to watch the battle (αὐτὸς παρεσκεύαστο 
θεήσασθαι ναυμαχέοντας, 8.69.2), a Persian defeat when many men die precisely because 
they want to be seen by him (8.86; 8.89.2). 
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Our response to Artemisia’s speech is conditioned by the additional information that 
Herodotus gives about her and Xerxes’ other allies. How do her claims for her own 
contribution and her criticism of others as expressed in her two proverbial statements and in 
particular the Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilicians and Pamphylians fit with Herodotus’ narrative? 
At the battle of Artemisium, off the coast of Euboea, Herodotus has nothing to say about her 
role, whereas he marks out the Egyptians for their outstanding bravery (ἠρίστευσαν, 8.17). 
More generally, he also mentions Syennesis of Cilicia and Gorgus and Timonax, both of 
Cyprus, as amongst the most notable (ὀνομαστότατοι, 7.98) of Xerxes’ naval commanders. 
Moreover, the joint contribution of the Egyptians, Cilicians, Cyprians and Pamphylians to the 
Persian fleet was 480 ships (7.89.2-7.91) as against Artemisia’s five, though these are 
described by Herodotus as most famous (νέας εὐδοξοτάτας, 7.99.2), after the squadron from 




Moreover, Herodotus does not attribute the losses off the coast of Euboea to Persian 
inferiority but to shipwreck, caused by a storm which happened by divine will (ἐποιέετο τε 
πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, 8.13) to reduce the disparity between the size of the Persian and the Greek 
navies. He thus creates a distance between his version of events and that he gives to 
Artemisia, on this occasion through being silent about Artemisia’s actions, giving us no 
evidence either way as to whether she showed andreia, but commending those men she 
condemned as cowards. This first speech, therefore, shows Artemisia as an accomplished 
orator, who manages to give sound strategic advice whilst also using the rhetoric of praise and 
blame, which is undercut by Herodotus’ narrative on the battles of both Euboea and Salamis. 
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Some bravery was involved in her making the speech but she is also shown as someone 
capable of misrepresenting the truth for rhetorical advantage. 
 
Xerxes, however, is coerced by nomos himself; he is obliged as king of Persia, to wage 
constant war. He makes this point explicit when he first declares his intention to attack Greece 
and achieve world domination: 
Men of Persia, I am introducing no new rule here; I am simply drawing on traditional 
Persian ways ... there has never been a time when we have not been at war, ever 
since Cyrus deposed Astyages and we took over from the Medes 
ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθείς, παραδεξάμενός 
τε αὐτῷ χρήσομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, οὐδαμά κω 
ἠτρεμίσαμεν, ἐπείτε παρελάβομεν τὴν ἡγεμονίην τήνδε παρὰ Μήδων, Κύρου 
κατελόντος Ἀστυάγεα (7.8α) 
 
I learn that this is the situation: no city of men or any human nation which is able to 
meet us in battle will be left, if those of whom I speak are taken out of our way. Thus 
the guilty and the innocent will alike bear the yoke of slavery. 
πυνθάνομαι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχειν, οὔτε τινὰ πόλιν ἀνδρῶν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε ἔθνος οὐδὲν 
ἀνθρώπων ὑπολείπεσθαι, τὸ ἡμῖν οἷόν τε ἔσται ἐλθεῖν ἐς μάχην, τούτων τῶν 





Xerxes is portrayed as a man who seeks to cross the boundary between Asia and Europe and 
then obliterate all boundaries by creating an world-wide empire, thus personifying hubris, by 
violating the boundary between men and gods.
622
 However, he is also subject to pressure to 




His response to Artemisia’s speech shows him to be a man who lacks judgment. He enjoys 
Artemisia’s display of her competitive andreia, and listens to her caustic criticism of his other 
allies but discounts her accurate analysis of the Greek position and ignores her advice, to 
avoid a sea battle and take advantage of Greek disunity. Xerxes, therefore, proves to be 
constrained by the nomos of Persian imperialism, which compels him to reject Artemisia’s 
advice.
624
 She, however, is the only one of the king’s allies who is not constrained by fear, 
and speaks freely, like the normative Athenian male. 
 
4.2 Second speech of Artemisia 
The second occasion when Artemisia gives advice to Xerxes is after the defeat at Salamis. On 
this occasion, he recognises that she had been the only person with a strategy (ἐφαίνετο μούνη 
νοέουσα τὰ ποιητέα ἦν, 8.101.1) and had given good advice (εὖ συνεβούλευσας, 8.101.4), 
and asks for her advice on her own, dismissing (μεταστησάμενος, 8.101.2) his councillors and 
guards. On this occasion, therefore, Xerxes is the sole internal audience and judge of her 
performance. He puts to her the two options proposed by Mardonius, that is either for him to 
launch an immediate attack on the Peloponnese (8.100.3) or to allow Mardonius to wage war 
on his behalf. 
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Artemisia says it is difficult to know what is best to say (χαλεπὸν μέν ἐστι συμβουλευομένῳ 
τυχεῖν τὰ ἄριστα εἴπασαν, 8.102.1), a form of self-deprecation which is itself a rhetorical 
strategy and is disingenuous.
625
 Her speech reveals that there is no real argument to be had. 
She devotes no time at all to Mardonius’ first proposal. She commends the second as being 
advantageous to Xerxes whether Mardonius succeeds or not. If Mardonius succeeds, the 
achievement will belong to Xerxes, because his slaves were victorious (σὸν τὸ ἔργον γίνεται; 
οἱ γὰρ σοὶ δοῦλοι κατεργάσαντο, 8.102.2); the repetition of σὸν ... σοὶ emphasises his 
ownership of the victory. If he fails, Xerxes and his family will still survive, and the Greeks 
will have to ‘run for their lives, over and over again’ (ἢν γὰρ σύ τε περιῇς καὶ οἶκος ὁ σός, 
πολλοὺς πολλάκις ἀγῶνας δραμέονται περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν οἱ Ἕλληνες, 8.102.3). This is clever 
oratory on Artemisia’s part; she gives Xerxes a way to save face. Though he is the one about 
to flee, she suggests it will be the Greeks who will be running away in the longer term. It is 
significant, I think, that Xerxes is the only addressee, since what she proposes does not fit 
Xerxes’ model of kingship which relies on his presence. Moreover, her arguments could not 
safely be put to a wider audience. 
 
This second speech, therefore, is constructed less as an attempt to persuade, and more as an 
accurate reading of Xerxes’ mind and intentions, which Herodotus makes explicit as narrator: 
‘I think he was so frightened that he would not have stayed even if every man and woman had 
told him to’ (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ πάντες καὶ πᾶσαι συνεβούλευον αὐτῷ μένειν, ἔμενε ἂν δοκέειν ἐμοί: 
οὕτω καταρρωδήκεε, 8.103). On this occasion, he presents Artemisia as voicing a pragmatic 
solution and acting as the ‘consummate courtier’ who protects herself, since it is safer to 
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advise retreat, than find herself in Mardonius’ position, if things go wrong for the Persians.
626
 
Artemisia succeeds as a courtier because she performs appropriately as a speaker, she 
establishes a distinctive position at court proving to be the only person with a strategy, she 
protects her authority within the court hierarchy, whilst acknowledging Xerxes’ power, and 





However, her speech also has a proleptic purpose, in making a significant prediction. Perhaps 
it was a ‘vast mistake’ to let the king escape.
 628
 Certainly the Athenians were incensed when 
they found out (μάλιστα ἐκπεφευγότων περιημέκτεον, 8.109.1) and it took a ‘disingenuous 
speech’ (ταῦτα λέγων διέβαλλε, 8.110.1) by Themistocles to convince them not to pursue the 
king.
629
 Baragwanath points out that διαβάλλειν means both ‘to deceive’ and ‘to hide one’s 
intentions’ but argues that the Athenians were ready to be persuaded (πάντως ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν 
λέγοντι πείθεσθαι, 8.110.1).
630
 This suggests a parallel with Artemisia and Xerxes. Her advice 
pleases the king because it confirmed his own intentions (λέγουσα γὰρ ἐπετύγχανε τά περ 
αὐτὸς ἐνόεε, 8.103). Moreover, just as I noted Artemisia being commended for her good 
advice by Xerxes, so Themistocles is judged by the Athenians to be both clever and a good 
advisor (σοφός τε καὶ εὔβουλος, 8.110.1). However, his true motivation in urging the Greeks 
to stay in Greece, according to Herodotus, was to gain favour (ἀποθήκην μέλλων ποιήσεσθαι, 
8.109.5) with Xerxes.
631
 Like Artemisia, he is skilled at strategy but capable of treachery and 
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betrayal. Baragwanath calls Themistocles a ‘man of mētis’
632
 for whom self-interest is 
paramount. The same could be said of Artemisia. Her speech, like her actions at Salamis, 
shows political and ethical expedience, not heroic valour, qualities which are part of the 




To summarise, Artemisia shows skill in ‘playing with the rules’. Even in defeat she can 
manage the relationship with Xerxes to her advantage. Herodotus shows this through making 
her a skilful speaker, who can ‘read’ Xerxes effectively, but whose excellent advice (γνώμας 
ἀρίστας, 7.99.3) is disregarded, making this a judgment by Herodotus on Xerxes, not on her. 
 
4.3 Themistocles’ first speech: a comparison 
In constructing Artemisia’s first speech, Herodotus shows her contending with the royal 
nomos of aggression, which compel Xerxes (7.8: 7.12-18) and his father before him (3.134) to 
extend the Persian Empire. It was always going to be difficult to persuade him to refrain from 
battle. However, she accurately diagnoses the Greeks’ problem: Greek disunity, fear of the 
invader and a desire to retreat in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the Persian 
forces.
634
 As the Persians progress through Greece, some states medise (7.132; 7.138), some 
do not (7.178.2) and Herodotus’ narrative gives a detailed account of the dilemmas and 
disagreements between Greek states, in the face of Xerxes’ invasion. The Greek league 
against the Persians sent delegations to Argos (7.148-52), Sicily (7.157-63) and Corcyra 
(7.168) to try to persuade them not to remain neutral or to become allies of Persia. 
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Herodotus also notes that fear is often the decisive factor in determining whether states fight 
or retreat. For example, when the Greek forces decide to retreat from Tempe in Thessaly, on 
the advice of Alexander of Macedon, he observes, as narrator, the persuasive effect of fear 
(δοκέειν δέ μοι, ἀρρωδίη ἦν τὸ πεῖθον, 7.173.4).
635
 However, whereas Artemisia flatters 
Xerxes, Themistocles makes his praise of Eurybiades conditional. It is within his power to 
save Greece (Ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἐστι σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, 8.60α) but only if he takes his advice to 
stay put and fight rather than withdraw to the Isthmus, as the other Greeks at Salamis had 
already decided to do.  
 
Both Themistocles and Artemisia, however, are speaking against the majority view. Artemisia 
skilfully avoids attributing any blame to Xerxes for past defeats. Themistocles, too, is aware 
of the danger of inflaming Greek disunity by repeating Mnesiphilus’ view (8.57) that the 
allies would disperse if they retreated from Salamis, and he omits it from his speech. He 
recognises that ‘it would not bring him any advantage to make accusations’ (οὐκ ἔφερέ οἱ 
κόσμον οὐδένα κατηγορέειν, 8.60); to adopt the legal parallel, he decides an adversarial 
approach is not appropriate. This focalisation reveals his awareness of the fragility of the 
Greek alliance but also his self-interest which mirrors Artemisia’s comments on the 
uselessness of the Persian allies. The external audience, however, will recall Mnesiphilus’ 
warning, which is predicted by Artemisia in her first speech. 
 
Both comment on the inferiority of their own side’s forces. Artemisia’s remarks about the 
Persian navy find an echo in Themistocles’ observation that the Greeks are at a clear 
disadvantage ([ἐς] τὸ ἥκιστα ἡμῖν συμφορόν ἐστι, 8.60α) in a sea battle in open water, 
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because their ships are heavier than the Persian ships and the Persians have a larger fleet. Both 
speeches are also characterised by pragmatism and evaluation of risk. Artemisia reminds 
Xerxes that he has already taken Athens, his ostensible goal, so why take the risk of a naval 
battle? Themistocles tells his audience that they run the risk of inviting the Persians into the 
Peloponnese and putting the whole of Greece in danger (σφέας αὐτὸς ἄξεις ἐπὶ τὴν 
Πελοπόννησον, κινδυνεύσεις τε ἁπάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, 8.60α) if they retreat to the Isthmus, and 
will lose Salamis, Megara and Aegina in any event (8.60α). In putting the case for the 
alternative option, he argues from probability that the Greeks, if they fight in the narrow 
straits, will prevail, if the battle goes as they might reasonably expect (ἢν τὰ οἰκότα ἐκ τοῦ 
πολέμου ἐκβαίνῃ, πολλὸν κρατήσομεν, 8.60β). Unlike Artemisia, however, he does not 
consider the possibility of defeat at Salamis but uses an emotional appeal to argue for its 
survival as the place where ‘we have placed our women and children’ (ἐς τὴν ἡμῖν ὑπέκκειται 
τέκνα τε καὶ γυναῖκες, 8.60β). This is a sleight of hand; he is speaking to the Greeks but it is 
the Athenians who have had to take refuge at Salamis. However, this makes it a persuasive 
argument for his Athenian audience.     
 
Artemisia uses a proverb that good men have bad slaves and vice versa. Themistocles 
concludes his speech contrasting those who make reasonable plans and those who do not 
(οἰκότα μέν νυν βουλευομένοισι … μὴ δὲ οἰκότα βουλευομένοισι, 8.60γ), echoing 
Mnesiphilus’ advice in which he emphasises the importance of debate (ἀβουλιῃσι ... τὰ 
βεβουλευμένα ... μεταβουλεύσασθαι, 8.57.2) and Artabanus’ similar words to Xerxes, that a 
well-laid plan brings the most advantage (τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι κέρδος μέγιστον εὑρίσκω 
ἐόν, 7.10δ2).
636
 However, Artabanus is characterised as a cautious person, a foil to Xerxes. 
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Themistocles, by contrast, is characterised as impatient, as the exchange with Adeimantus 
before his speech makes clear, when Themistocles does not wait for Eurybiades to arrive: ‘In 
the games, those who start before the signal is given, get flogged’ (ἐν τοῖσι ἀγῶσι οἱ 
προεξανιστάμενοι ῥαπίζονται, 8.59) says Adeimantus, to which Themistocles replies ‘Those 
who get left behind, win no prizes’ (Οἱ δέ γε ἐγκαταλειπόμενοι οὐ στεφανοῦνται, 8.59). There 
is irony in Themistocles advising counsel, just as there is in Artemisia following praise of her 
exploits with a generalisation about female inferiority, which suggests that both characters are 
skilled at making speeches that are appropriate for the situation.  
 
Both Artemisia’s and Themistocles’ first speeches, therefore, dramatise an attempt at arguing 
against the prevailing view. The reaction to those speeches, however, is very different. 
Whereas Xerxes is pleased with Artemisia’s speech but does not take her advice, 
Themistocles faces immediate opposition from Adeimantus, who questions his right to speak, 
as Athens has fallen to the Persians making Themistocles a ‘man without a city’ (ἀπόλι ἀνδρί, 
8.61.1). He responds by abusing both Adeimantus and the Corinthians generally (πολλά τε καὶ 
κακὰ ἔλεγε, 8.61.2) and speaking in a more forthright way to Eurybiades. He threatens to 
withdraw the Athenian troops if he does not stay to fight. His rhetoric hardens; he speaks 
more vehemently (μᾶλλον ἐπεστραμμένα, 8.62.1) and puts the alternatives in stark form; 
either Eurybiabes can be a brave man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, 8.62.1) or he can bring ruin to Greece. 
The debate is adversarial, described by Herodotus, using a military metaphor, as a verbal 
skirmish (ἔπεσι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, 8.64.1), echoing the verbal jostling between the Greek 
commanders at Salamis (ὠθισμὸς λόγων πολλός, 8.78). Herodotus, as narrator, expresses the 
viewpoint that fear was the motivating factor in Eurybiades’ decision to stay: 
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When Themistocles said this, Eurybiades changed his mind. I think he did so chiefly 
out of fear that the Athenians might desert them if they set sail for the Isthmus. 
ταῦτα δὲ Θεμιστοκλέος λέγοντος ἀνεδιδάσκετο Εὐρυβιάδης: δοκέειν δέ μοι, 
ἀρρωδήσας μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀνεδιδάσκετο, μή σφεας ἀπολίπωσι, ἢν πρὸς 
τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀγάγῃ τὰς νέας (8.63) 
 
This earlier speech also illustrates the power imbalance between Athens and Corinth. When 
Adeimantus threatens to withdraw his troops before the battle of Artemisium, a bribe from 
Themistocles is enough to persuade him not to do so (8.5.2), but withdrawal of the 200 
Athenian ships before Salamis would have left the rest of the Greeks no match (οὐκέτι 
ἐγίνοντο ἀξιόμαχοι οἱ λοιποί, 8.63) for the enemy. As Munson notes, Themistocles is 
‘executive rather than advisor’ whereas Artemisia is isolated and powerless.
637
 This use of 
threats foreshadows later use of force and compulsion by Themistocles, and his changing 




Bakker suggests that the two speeches of Themistocles, a ‘clever blend of strategic argument 
and a naked threat’, together keep the fleet at Salamis long enough to prevent the 
fragmentation he feared and Artemisia predicted.
 639
 They also illustrate both a contrast with 
the Persian court where Artemisia is the only person to practice isēgoriē, but also the reality 
that power rests with Athens, just as it does with Xerxes on the Persian side. Themistocles has 
to establish his authority in a male hierarchy, hostile to his opinion, and he wins in the end 
through a deceptive act.  
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5. Battle of Salamis: Artemisia in battle  
Artemisia’s motive of self-interest becomes apparent also in her actions in battle.
640
 During 
the battle of Salamis, Artemisia is being pursued by an Athenian ship, whose skipper has been 
offered a substantial reward for her capture, because of the Athenians’ anger at being attacked 
by her. The Athenians’ hostility to a woman attacking Athens has echoes of the Amazon 
myth; they are the only group, however, shown to foreground Artemisia’s gender. Her skill in 
battle consists of deceiving both Greeks and Persians, by sinking one of her own ships. The 
Athenian captain assumes that Artemisia’s ship was either Greek or was a defector from the 
Persians fighting on his side, so he changed course and turned to attack other ships (8.87). 
Xerxes’ men recognise her insignia and draw the king’s attention to her performance in the 
battle, which they interpret as her sinking an enemy ship (8.88). As none of the crew of the 
ship sunk by Artemisia survive, there is no-one to correct their assumption. The king’s 
explanation for the defeat at Salamis is ‘My men have turned into women and my women into 
men!’ (‘οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες’, 8.88). He attributes 
andreia to Artemisia for her actions in battle, as he contrasts her conduct with that of his men, 
whom he perceives as cowards. 
 
However, Herodotus’ narratorial judgment on Artemisia’s performance is less positive: 
‘although she did a bad deed, her actions made Xerxes particularly pleased with her’ (τοῦτο 
δὲ συνέβη ὥστε κακὸν ἐργασαμένην ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτὴν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμῆσαι παρὰ Ξέρξῃ, 
8.88.1). Herodotus attributes her success to her double good fortune (εὐτυχίῃ χρησαμένη 
διπλᾶ ἑωυτὴν ἀγαθὰ ἐργάσατο, 8.87.4) not to courage, and shows that he, unlike the Greeks 
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and the Persians, is not deceived by Artemisia. Moreover, Herodotus does not attribute defeat 
to cowardice on the part of the Persian force, as he declares:  
They displayed and acted with far more courage that day than they had off Euboea: 
every single one of them fought with determination, spurred on by his fear of Xerxes, 
and each of them imagined that the king’s eyes were on him 
καίτοι ἦσάν γε καὶ ἐγένοντο ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην μακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ 
πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ, πᾶς τις προθυμεόμενος καὶ δειμαίνων Ξέρξην, ἐδόκεέ τε ἕκαστος 
ἑωυτὸν θεήσασθαι βασιλέα. (8.86). 
 
Xerxes’ words to Demaratus, before the battle of Thermopylae, are proved to be true: his men 
do excel themselves through fear of their one leader (ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι κατὰ 
τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον γενοίατ᾽ ἄν, δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον, 7.103.4) but the larger Persian fleet is 
at a disadvantage in the narrow straits of Salamis and it was precisely because crews were 
trying to impress Xerxes with their bravery, ‘to show the king that they too could perform 
well’ (ὡς ἀποδεξόμενοί τι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔργον βασιλέι, 8.89.2) that many perished, because they 
fell into the path of retreating Persian ships. Herodotus thereby undercuts the stereotype of the 




Artemisia clearly shows tactical skill in deceiving both Greeks and Persians and avoiding 
capture but Herodotus shows that her claim to be superior to Xerxes’ other allies is not 
justified by her actions, if andreia is bravery in battle. This paradoxical situation makes us 
question the very meaning of andreia, if it can be displayed through ‘escape and survive’ 
rather than ‘win or die’, the Spartans’ all-powerful nomos (7.104). Thus, it is argued, 
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Herodotus links himself much more closely to contemporary sophistic debate in which the 
weaker becomes the stronger, than to Homeric or Spartan models of manly valour.
642
   
 
However, I do not think that Herodotus takes such a polarised position in portraying 
Artemisia in this way; rather, he highlights ambiguities in her character which could equally 
be found in a man. His own judgment of her performance is that he commends her for giving 
excellent advice, he condemns her for her self-serving actions during battle. Her 
characterisation, therefore, is complex and nuanced. Her capacity for deception, moreover, is 
not gender specific, in that she is similar to Themistocles in her ‘trickster’ side.
643
 In 
Themistocles’ case, this is before the battle. Once the Persians arrived at Salamis, fear once 
again took hold of some of the Greeks (ἀρρώδεον, 8.74.1) when they learned that the Greeks 
at the Isthmus were building a defensive wall, and they began to question Eurybiades’ 
judgment (θῶμα ποιεύμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην, 8.74.2). Realising that he was being 
defeated in the argument (ἑσσοῦτο τῇ γνώμῃ, 8.75.1) by the Peloponnesians, Themistocles 
arranged for his slave Sicinnus to take a message secretly to Xerxes saying that the Greeks 
were in a state of panic and planning to run away (δρησμὸν βουλεύονται καταρρωδηκότες, 
8.75.2). This tricks the Persians into making preparations for an immediate attack and forces 
the Greeks to stay put and fight, because they have been surrounded in the night by the 
Persian fleet. However, at the battle of Salamis, Herodotus notes that, though Themistocles 
advised the same group once again to fight badly, in practice few did (ἐθελοκάκεον μέντοι 
αὐτῶν κατὰ τὰς Θεμιστοκλέος ἐντολὰς ὀλίγοι, οἱ δὲ πλεῦνες οὔ, 8.85.1). 
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Most commentators leave the story of Artemisia after the battle of Salamis, and her second 
speech to Xerxes, or dismiss the concluding section with a dismissive aside. Romm for 
example, describes it as ‘the Amazon warrior returning from battle to become the royal 
nanny’.
644
 However, I think the conclusion to the story is very significant in that it signposts 
complex gender identities which test gender binaries: 
Having praised Artemisia, he sent her off to take the illegitimate children, who had 
come on the expedition with him, to Ephesus; he sent with her his most trusted 
eunuch, Hermotimus, to act as guardian ... who exacted the greatest retribution we 
know of, for a crime committed against him  
ἐπαινέσας δὲ τὴν Ἀρτεμισίην, ταύτην μὲν ἀποστέλλει ἄγουσαν αὐτοῦ παῖδας ἐς 
Ἔφεσον: νόθοι γὰρ τινὲς παῖδές οἱ συνέσποντο. συνέπεμπε δὲ τοῖσι παισὶ φύλακον 
Ἑρμότιμον, γένος μὲν ἐόντα Πηδασέα, φερόμενον δὲ οὐ τὰ δεύτερα τῶν εὐνούχων 
παρὰ βασιλέι ... τῷ μεγίστη τίσις ἤδη ἀδικηθέντι ἐγένετο πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν 
(8.103-5) 
 
This story has been analysed mostly for its link to the story of Hermotimus’ revenge on 
Panionius. Hermotimus, who achieved high status in Persia as a favoured eunuch destroys all 
the males in the Chian family of Panionius, illustrating the reciprocal process of vengeance, 
with which the Histories start, the theme of east-west and Greek-Persian reciprocal action 
responding to unjust acts.
645
 Hornblower reads the story as a ‘signifier’ for the Chian disaster 
of 494 BCE when, as a reprisal for the Ionian revolt, the Persians castrated the Chian boys and 
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deported the girls. Xerxes’ defeat is reciprocal justice for this atrocity.
646
 He highlights the 
liminal significance of place in the story, which happens on the borders on the eastern 
Aegean, where early Greek settlers, local non-Greeks, such as the Carians (whose female 
resistance I analysed in chapter 1), and the invading Persians ‘coexist uneasily’ and where 




I think Herodotus also intends to highlight the fluid nature of gender boundaries in this 
passage. Artemisia to this point has been shown as remarkable principally because she 
performs a masculine role in speech and actions. Here she reverts to a more normative role as 
a carer for royal children, who themselves have a liminal status as the children of pallakai, in 
the company of a man who is physically not a man, but who paradoxically achieves status as a 
non-man at the Persian court, enabling him to take his revenge on Panionius. Moreover he 
comes from Pedasa, the place where the priestess of Athena grew a long beard (ἡ ἱρείη τῆς 
Ἀθηναίης πώγωνα μέγαν ἴσχε, 1.175) when disaster threatened, a woman like Artemisia, 
therefore, who can move between genders.
648
 She can perform both a masculine and a 
feminine role, as can Hermotimus, someone capable of destroying a family but also of taking 
a protective role of the king’s children. This pendant, therefore, is a significant reminder that 
gender signifiers, as well as ethnic or cultural signifiers, are unstable and characters who are 
gender-fluid invite us to interrogate gender boundaries. In my next case study, gender roles 
are not so much fluid, as reversed, in that the woman performs as a normative male, the man 
is unable to do so. 
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Cyrus’ enthusiasm to engage in battle with the Massagetae (προθυμίην στρατεύσασθαι, 
1.204.1) was influenced by two main factors, according to Herodotus; his birth, which seemed 
more than mortal (ἡ γένεσις, τὸ δοκέειν πλέον τι εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, 1.204.2) and his good 
fortune in war (ἡ εὐτυχίη ἡ κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους γενομένη, 1.204.2) which made him 
invincible. Asheri suggests that Herodotus is signalling Cyrus’ hubris, born of 
overconfidence, and preparing the reader for the reversal of fortune.
649
 I will argue that whilst 
the opposition of mortal and immortal rather than male and female is certainly an important 
aspect of this story, there is also a strong gender element in that Cyrus is shown to have 
changed as a character, from being the most manly of his contemporaries as a young man, and 
someone who rejected stories of his divine birth, as I showed in chapter 4, to being a king 
who cannot perform a masculine role in war and is defeated because he ignores good advice, 
preferring to heed the ideology of female inferiority, and, as a consequence, underestimating 
female capacity in war. 
 
Cyrus initially tries to trick the queen with a marriage proposal, foregrounding her gender:  
However, Tomyris realized that it was not her he desired so much as the Massagetan 
kingdom, so she rejected his advances. Since Cyrus had got nowhere by trickery, he 
next marched to the Araxes and started to wage open war against the Massagetae.  
ἡ δὲ Τόμυρις συνιεῖσα οὐκ αὐτήν μιν μνώμενον ἀλλὰ τὴν Μασαγετέων βασιληίην, 
ἀπείπατο τὴν πρόσοδον. Κῦρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὥς οἱ δόλῳ οὐ προεχώρεε, ἐλάσας ἐπὶ 
τὸν Ἀράξεα ἐποιέετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανέος ἐπὶ τοὺς Μασσαγέτας στρατηίην. (1.205.1-2) 
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Like Artemisia, Tomyris shows an ability to ‘read’ a Persian king; she rejects Cyrus’ proposal 
of marriage because she knows he makes it to gain power for himself. By focalising this event 
from Tomyris’ perspective, Herodotus shows the queen’s discernment and foreshadows 
Cyrus’ later trickery. When she sees him prepare for war, she sends a message: 
King of the Medes, give up this hasty enterprise. You cannot know if in the end it 
will come out right for you. Stop and rule your own people, and put up with the sight 
of me ruling mine. But no: you are hardly going to take this advice, since peace is the 
last thing you desire 
ὦ βασιλεῦ Μήδων, παῦσαι σπεύδων τὰ σπεύδεις: οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης εἴ τοι ἐς καιρὸν 
ἔσται ταῦτα τελεόμενα: παυσάμενος δὲ βασίλευε τῶν σεωυτοῦ, καὶ ἡμέας ἀνέχευ 
ὁρέων ἄρχοντας τῶν περ ἄρχομεν. οὔκων ἐθελήσεις ὑποθήκῃσι τῇσιδε χρᾶσθαι, 
ἀλλὰ πάντως μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ ἡσυχίης εἶναι. (1.206.1-2)  
 
Her use of the imperative shows an assertive character who takes the initiative.
650
 Dickey 
reads Tomyris’ form of address, ὦ βασιλεῦ Μήδων, as indicating her hostility to Cyrus and 
comparing it with the two other occasions when this form of address is used, namely when the 
two Spartiates present themselves to Xerxes to pay the penalty for the death of Darius’ heralds 
at the hands of the Spartans (7.136.2) and the Spartan herald’s demand for compensation for 
the death of Leonidas (8.144.2), also addressed to Xerxes. She argues that, as a form of 
address it is ‘not entirely courteous ... and embedded in demands and threats’ whereas 
βασιλεῦ is used in contexts where respect is shown.
651
 Certainly this is suggested by the use 
of βασιλεῦ by Atossa (3.134.1) and Intaphrenes’ wife (3.119.5), both to Darius. However, 
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does Herodotus intend to convey hostile intent on the part of this speaker? The examples of 
Atossa and Intaphrenes’ wife show the individuals in a relationship, of wife and of suppliant 
respectively, where the form of address is calculated to persuade and influence. What is 
striking about the three instances of ὦ βασιλεῦ Μήδων is not necessarily hostile intent but 
certainly no intention to foster a relationship. That is how I read Tomyris’ address to Cyrus; 
she is courteous but direct in rejecting future engagements with him, and I think Herodotus 
shows through speech how her hostility to Cyrus increases, culminating in her extremely 
hostile address to his corpse at the end of the story.  
 
In advising Cyrus to avoid a battle with the Massagetae she mirrors Artemisia’s advice to 
Xerxes, to avoid fighting the Greeks at sea. Unlike Artemisia, however, she is not eager for 
war but seeks to maintain her territorial integrity. Her desire for peace echoes Croesus’ words 
to Cyrus, that ‘no-one is mad enough to prefer war to peace, for in peace men bury their 
fathers, in war fathers bury their sons’ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητος ἐστὶ ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ 
εἰρήνης αἱρέεται: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι, ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς 
παῖδας, 1.87.4) but she also speaks like Solon, who warns Croesus to look at outcomes and 
endings (1.32.9). 
 
Croesus is shown to have learnt this lesson from Solon and corrects Cyrus’ view that he will 
inevitably win, saying that the wheel of fortune ‘does not allow the same man to prosper for 
ever’ (οὐκ ἐᾷ αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐτυχέειν, 1.207.2). However, he is less reliable as a military 
strategist, advising Cyrus to cross into Massagetan territory, and telling the king ‘it would be 
intolerably shameful for Cyrus the son of Cambyses to withdraw and give ground to a 
woman’ (αἰσχρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχετὸν Κῦρόν γε τὸν Καμβύσεω γυναικὶ εἴξαντα ὑποχωρῆσαι 
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τῆς χώρης, 1.207.5), thus playing to Cyrus’ belief in female inferiority. However, victory over 
the Massagetae is not achieved through a great performance on the battle field but through 
deception, leading Tomyris to accuse Cyrus of overcoming her son through the trick of 
intoxication, rather than through strength in battle (τοιούτῳ φαρμάκῳ δολώσας ἐκράτησας 
παιδὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μάχῃ κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν, 1.212.2). By contrasting Cyrus’ trickery 
with masculine warrior courage, Tomyris condemns Cyrus’ performance not only as king and 
military leader, but also as a man. Her rhetoric has hardened; βασιλεῦ Μήδων has become 
‘bloodthirsty Cyrus’ (ἄπληστε αἵματος Κῦρε, 1.212.1) and this time there is a warning, 
emphasised with an oath, that she will sate even his thirst for blood (ἥλιον ἐπόμνυμί τοι τὸν 
Μασσαγετέων δεσπότην, ἦ μέν σε ἐγὼ καὶ ἄπληστον ἐόντα αἵματος κορέσω, 1.212.3), a 
threat she makes good after the battle. 
 
In this story, the threat to her son is given as the motivating factor for war, thus foregrounding 
Tomyris’ role as a mother, in contrast to Artemisia.
652
 Moreover, Herodotus does not show 
her glorying in victory. When the battle is over, and she pushes Cyrus’ severed head into a 
wineskin she addresses him: ‘although I have come through the battle alive and victorious, 
you have destroyed me by capturing my son with a trick’ (σὺ μὲν ἐμὲ ζῶσάν τε καὶ νικῶσάν 
σε μάχῃ ἀπώλεσας, παῖδα τὸν ἐμὸν ἑλὼν δόλῳ, 1.214.5); there is none of the rhetoric of self-
praise that I identified in Artemisia’s speech. To that extent, her conduct does not mirror that 
of a normative male, victorious in battle, though her military victory is itself a masculine feat. 
 
Thus, Herodotus shows her as a high-status woman exercising military power successfully 
and speaking honestly and openly. In this way, she acts more like the normative male than 
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Cyrus, who uses a trick, rather than military force, to oppose her. He is also shown to ignore 
the two Persian rules of showing bravery in battle and honesty (τὸ μάχεσθαι εἶναι ἀγαθόν ... 
ἀληθίζεσθαι, 1.136.1-2) thereby losing the andreia attributed to him as a young man (1.123). 
He makes a strategic mistake in listening to Croesus’ gender prejudices as well as ignoring 
Tomyris’ warnings, and he fails to live up to masculine norms that require victory in battle 
and straightforward speech. However, he also ignores Croesus’ reminder of human mortality 
and the mutable nature of good fortune, and so, like Xerxes, he is shown by Herodotus to 
ignore human limitations, the boundary between mortal and immortal, which is another 
significant polarity in this story as well as that between male and female.
653
 As I have already 
argued with respect to other characters, the rule of law includes divine rules which limit 
human ambition and punish those who invite the phthonos of the god. This is made very clear 
by Herodotus in the story of Pheretime, who goes too far in avenging her son’s death. 
 
7. Pheretime 
Pheretime is different from Artemisia and Tomyris in that she does not exercise military 
power as of right, indeed she is shown to resist the constitutional change brought about by the 
mediation of Demonax, which has introduced a new rule of law limiting the powers of 
kingship. She petitions Euelthon for an army: 
Pheretime came to him, asking him for an army to bring her and her son back to 
Cyrene; Euelthon was willing to give her everything else, only not an army, and when 
she accepted what he gave her, she said that it was fine, but it would be better to give 
her an army as she asked. This she said whatever the gift, until at last Euelthon sent 
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her a golden spindle and distaff, and wool, and when Pheretime uttered the same 
words as before, he answered that these, and not armies, were gifts for women.  
ἡ Φερετίμη ἐδέετο στρατιῆς ἣ κατάξει σφέας ἐς τὴν Κυρήνην. ὁ δὲ Εὐέλθων πᾶν 
μᾶλλον ἢ στρατιήν οἱ ἐδίδου: ἣ δὲ λαμβάνουσα τὸ διδόμενον καλὸν μὲν ἔφη καὶ τοῦτο 
εἶναι, κάλλιον δὲ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ δοῦναί οἱ δεομένῃ στρατιήν. τοῦτο ἐπὶ παντὶ γὰρ τῷ 
διδομένῳ ἔλεγε, τελευταῖόν οἱ ἐξέπεμψε δῶρον ὁ Εὐέλθων ἄτρακτον χρύσεον καὶ 
ἠλακάτην, προσῆν δε καὶ εἴριον. ἐπειπάσης δὲ αὖτις τῆς Φερετίμης τὠυτὸ ἔπος, ὁ 
Εὐέλθων ἔφη τοιούτοισι γυναῖκας δωρέεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ στρατιῇ (4.162.3-5) 
 
Euelthon expresses a gender norm: the spindle was the archetypal gift for a woman 
symbolising her role within the household.
654
 Mitchell notes the Homeric echo, when Hector 
tells Andromache to go to her loom and distaff, because war is men’s work (Hom. Il. 6.490-
3).
655
 Through her repeated refusal of these gifts and her request for an army, she is shown to 
reject the gender performance expected of her, though her high status as guest-friend is 
recognised by Euelthon. 
 
However, the political context for this request is significant. Arcesilaus and his mother 
Pheretime are shown to reject the settlement introduced by the external mediator, Demonax of 
Mantinea, which limited the power of the king, reserving certain religious functions to the 
king but placing all other rights and privileges with the Cyrenean people (τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ 
πρότερον εἶχον οἱ βασιλέες ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἔθηκε, 4.162.3).
656
 Both mother and son resist 
constitutional change, seeking to restore tyrannical nomos, and there is a parallel between this 
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and Pheretime’s rejection of the gender performance expected of her, I suggest, in that she is 
shown to disregard both gender and political nomoi. 
 
After her son’s death at the hands of men from Barca, Pheretime persuades the Persian 
governor of Egypt, Aryandes, to put an army at her disposal (4.167). These forces besiege 
Barca until the Barcaeans are tricked into letting the Persians enter the city and Pheretime 
takes revenge, using the characteristic punishment by mutilation of a tyrant, but also 
signalling gender reversal in that the men are penetrated, the women deprived of their 
maternal capacity, making this a ‘horrific tableau’ of sexualised barbarity.
657
  
The Barcaeans who had played the biggest part in her son’s death were handed over 
to Pheretime by the Persians, and she had them impaled at intervals all around the 
city walls. She also had their wives’ breasts cut off and displayed here and there on 
the city walls too  
τοὺς μέν νυν αἰτιωτάτους τῶν Βαρκαίων ἡ Φερετίμη, ἐπείτε οἱ ἐκ τῶν Περσέων 
παρεδόθησαν, ἀνεσκολόπισε κύκλῳ τοῦ τείχεος, τῶν δέ σφι γυναικῶν τοὺς μαζοὺς 
ἀποταμοῦσα περιέστιξε καὶ τούτοισι τὸ τεῖχος (4.202.1) 
 
Herodotus is clear as to the consequences of her overstepping boundaries: 
Pheretime came to a bad end as well ... she died a horrible death. She became 
infested with a mass of worms while still alive, as if to show people that excessive 
vengeance is looked on with jealousy by the gods 
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οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ἡ Φερετίμη εὖ τὴν ζόην κατέπλεξε ... ἀπέθανε κακῶς: ζῶσα γὰρ εὐλέων 
ἐξέζεσε, ὡς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιμωρίαι πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται 
(4.205) 
 
Pheretime asks for an army and rejects the spindle, showing a disregard for the constraints of 
nomos, and her gender transgression is a large part of her excess, as is her cruelty and barbaric 
practice, but Herodotus’ judgment on her death suggests that she is punished ultimately for 
overstepping the limits set by the gods on human vengeance rather than for her violation of 
gender norms.
658
 In this way, I think she is portrayed as more than a cruel and sadistic queen, 
she is marked by a number of excesses. The end of the story makes it clear that the issue is not 
just her gender but the same problem highlighted in other stories of male tyrants: power 
corrupts her, and she oversteps the limits of acceptable human behaviour. Like Cyrus and 
Xerxes, she is punished for violating the rule of law in its wider sense. 
 
Conclusion 
In the Athenian city-state, the binary opposition of genders is highlighted by an ideology of 
female inferiority that goes hand in hand with the exclusion of women from male, political 
power. However, the ideology still has a firm hold even when women do exercise power and 
leads some men to underestimate female capacity. Cyrus thinks Tomyris will be tricked into 
surrendering her power through a marriage alliance and does not take her advice or warnings 
seriously. In fact, it is Cyrus who fails to live up to the normative gender performance 
expected of a Persian man and king, seeking to defeat the Massagetae through a trick rather 
than through bravery in battle. The performance of andreia as warlike masculine valour is by 
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Tomyris, not by him. Xerxes and Artemisia both articulate the binary opposition of male and 
female. Xerxes, however, is shown to misread the actions both of his men and of Artemisia, 
casting them as cowards and the queen as brave. His defeat at Salamis, which makes him 
scared and forces him to retreat, fractures his omnipotence as Persian king. Meanwhile 
Artemisia, who survives as a free woman, both in speech and action, is very far from the 
ideological construct of the inferior woman yet her performance of andreia is not 
straightforward. Her ambiguous characterisation as brave in speech, the giver of good advice 
but also capable of treachery and deception is shown not to be a function of her gender, as 
these qualities, both positive and negative, are found equally in Themistocles. Herodotus also 
tells Pheretime’s story as a warning on the excesses of mortal power more than female power.  
 
He problematises the concept of andreia by showing, through the character of Artemisia, that 
it is not the straightforward virtue of military prowess and bravery, which necessarily 
excludes women. Both Artemisia and Themistocles are shown to be powerful people who can, 
to a degree, escape the constraints of nomos, managing relationships successfully, in the case 
of Artemisia, at Xerxes’ court, in the case of Themistocles, in the male hierarchy of the Greek 
commanders. 
 
To conclude, Herodotus destabilises the binary opposition of male and female by showing the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric of female inferiority and the agency and authority of women 
in his wider narrative. He characterises men and women in a nuanced and complex way, and 
undermines the stereotype of the powerful woman who, for example wields power through 
trickery, or whose public interventions lead to disaster for the wider community. He shows 
men who do not live up to gender expectations, as well as women who defy those 
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expectations. However, Cyrus, Xerxes and Pheretime all go beyond acceptable human 







CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
In my introduction, I argued that we should consider the rule of law to be a concept which has 
to be debated and which has a ‘thick’ and a ‘thin’ aspect. From a gender perspective, I do not 
think it is sustainable to import a ‘thick’ definition of the rule of law into Herodotus’ Histories 
because that definition relies on a commitment to universal human rights and to equality and 
non-discrimination which is both anachronistic and would be incomprehensible to Herodotus, 
let alone to his contemporary audience. However, I think it is possible to discern a ‘thick’ 
meaning of rule of law in the Histories if we consider the rule of law as a bulwark against 
those tyrannical regimes which flout the rule of law. The arbitrary use of power, and the lack 
of restraint on the exercise of that power, are hallmarks of most, but not all, tyrants in the 
Histories. Those who flout the rule of law do so by ignoring limits which are implicit in the 
unwritten laws of the gods and of communities, by exercising power in an arbitrary way, and 
by disregarding the rules which bind everyone. Gender transgression is a significant marker of 
this, so Cambyses, for example, not only laughs at religion and custom, and uses law to do 
what he wants, but also destroys his oikos through killing his wife/sister and unborn child. 
Does this mean, therefore, that the rule of law is incompatible with tyranny? Herodotus, I 
argue, gives us a more nuanced view in the character of Darius, whose dealings with 
Intaphrenes and his wife show both the coercive aspect of a tyrant who exercises the power of 
life and death, but also differing responses to the nomos of tyranny, from Intaphrenes and his 
wife, which lead to very different outcomes. 
 
In matters of punishment, there are also limits on human vengeance as shown clearly by the 
fate of Pheretime, whose gender transgressions are linked to her political misjudgement in 
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trying, with her son, to subvert the constitution introduced by Demonax. As regards ambition, 
Xerxes’ aim at conquering the entire world is part of a hubristic goal which ironically forces 
him to obey the Persian nomos of expansion, and which finds a parallel at the Persian court, 
when another type of nomos compels him, following his gender transgressions. Meanwhile 
Cyrus forgets the message of Solon, passed on to him by Croesus, to look to the end, but also 
underestimates the authority and power of Tomyris, who performs a more effective masculine 
role than he. 
 
In terms of Herodotus’ methodology, I have argued that he models for us a form of 
inquisitorial legal method which is not based on the adversarial model of the Athenian law 
courts and forensic oratory, but still requires legal skills of evidence-gathering, interpretation 
and judgment. I have applied this to the performance of gender by men as well as women and 
shown that Herodotus often shows appearance and speech to be deceptive, making it 
imperative to be able to interpret what one sees and hears, and to make a judgment on that. 
This is always in tension with the polarising model of ideology which, in gender terms, values 
the male over the female and creates a binary opposition of male and female. 
 
I have argued for a much wider definition of nomos than the model which is appropriate for 
Athenian law, where we can debate how the institutions intersected with the individuals who 
used them. In the Histories, the institutions are of less significance than the characters, male 
and female, who engage with law in its various manifestations; as despot, as social regulation, 
as divine sanction, but also as tool, as agent of social cohesion, and as part of identity, to 




I have used modern analogies in the light of Loraux’s plea for (controlled) anachronism; she 
asks the question ‘if we really have so little in common with the Greeks how can we 
understand them’?
659
 She acknowledges the dangers of asking questions the Greeks would not 
have asked and drawing conclusions which the texts themselves do not justify, but argues that 
we should make use of analogy as a means to understand and interpret these texts, paying 
attention to the language and motivation of the speaker. I apply this to Herodotus and agree 
that this is important for our reading of the Histories because Herodotus gives a subjective 
identity, the internal aspect of nomos, to some of his characters, and to groups of people, by 
attributing motivations, feelings and speech to them and requiring us to interpret his text.
 
Reflecting on our own world and the role of conflict and war within it, I identify certain 
contemporary themes which link us to the world of Herodotus, in particular, the abduction 
and rape of women, the displacement of communities and the mass migration of peoples, and 
the cultural negotiations and conflicts which then arise, as well as the threat to the rule of law. 
I read the story of the Carian women as a creative response, the making of a new nomos, to a 
situation in which these women and their daughters have no formal power. 
 
In the wider context, Herodotus juxtaposes stories of abducted mythical women used as 
justification for political alliances or acts of aggression, with stories of women as founders of 
cults and transmitters of social, religious and cultural values. In this way, the founders of the 
oracles at Dodona and Siwa and the priestesses who tell their story, acquire an identity, rather 
than being objects of exchange. However, in his wider narrative he also shows that the 
meeting of cultures may lead to antagonism and hostility rather than integration; in the story 
of the Aeginetans and the Athenians, female dress both symbolises the conflict between poleis 
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and emphasises the differences between them. Herodotus, however, shows another aspect of 
the rule of law through gender relations in communities; how these can be undermined in war, 
leading to, for example, the Athenian women’s actions in killing the survivor of the Aegina 
campaign, and in joining with men in killing Lycides and his oikos. He also shows that those 
who destroy their own oikos break a fundamental rule of law, that imposes an obligation to 
protect it, and avoid the empty oikos.   
 
He also shows that those with power can escape the constraints of nomos to a degree, by 
manipulating the rules to achieve a desired outcome. Anaxandridas and Argeia both regard 
nomos as something which can be changed through negotiation, rather than being the despot 
to which Demaratus introduces Xerxes. Artemisia manages to perform effectively as a free 
agent, despite the constraints of the Persian court, and negotiates both male and female roles 
successfully. However even those without power can have some agency, like Cyno under the 
oppressive regime of Astyages, when she asserts her commitment to the rule of law in a 
‘thick’ sense, protecting the oikos which Astyages seeks to destroy. The Carian women 
respond to their oppressive situation by creating nomos, asserting their authority to settle 
arrangements and discourse within the oikos, and using the coercive power of oaths to pass 
that nomos onto daughters. Candaules’ wife is unusual in being the judge in her own cause, 
and asserting the rule of law in her marital relations, yet most of her audience would recognise 
that Candaules had acted unlawfully.  
 
The rule of law in the Histories is a normative ideal. Herodotus shows how often it is broken, 
undermined, and distorted, usually by those who have the power to disregard the rules. 
However, he also shows the consequences for those who do so, and he thereby asserts the rule 
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of law over everyone. Though we cannot identify in Herodotus a concept of universal human 
rights, I think we can discern a belief in a concept of universal values, which acts as a check 
on the powerful as well as the rest of society. I am writing this conclusion at a time when, in 
the UK, the executive is exercising the royal prerogative, parliament is asserting its 
sovereignty, and the judiciary is being asked to adjudicate, making the rule of law a live issue 
which is being debated and contested in the context of Brexit. On 24th September 2019, the 
Supreme Court decided that the prime minister had acted unlawfully in advising the queen to 
prorogue parliament, referring to a 17th CE case (Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 7) 
which held that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows 
him”.
660
 The Supreme Court also reasserted the principle that ‘every prerogative power has its 
limits’ and that ministers are accountable to Parliament, to ensure due scrutiny and to protect 
citizens from ‘the arbitrary exercise of executive power’.
661
 The law lords thereby declared 
the rule of law. In Gina Miller’s words, ‘our laws are all that protect us from tyranny and 
before them we are all equal’.
662
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